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Abstract 
Technological capabilities are built to support different types of 
collaboration, and this gives the justification to widely observe, how 
activity environments are influenced by technology. Technology as an 
enabler can be addressed from different perspectives, other than merely 
technological. Dynamic, evolving environment is at the same time 
interesting but also challenging. As a multinational collaboration 
environment, the maritime surveillance is an good example of time 
critical and evolving environment, where technological solutions enable 
new ways of collaboration. Justification for the inspiration to use 
maritime environment as the baseline for understanding the challenges in 
creating and maintaining adequate level of situational awareness, derives 
from the complexity of the collaboration and information sharing 
environment elements, needed to be taken into account, when analyzing 
criticalities related to decision making.  
Situational awareness is an important element supporting decision 
making, and challenges related to it can also be observed in the maritime 
environment. This dissertation describes the structures and factors 
involved in this complex setting, found from the case studies that should 
be taken into account when trying to understand, how these elements 
affect the activities. This dissertation focuses on the gray area that is 
between a life threatening situation and normal everyday activities. From 
the multinational experimentation series case studies, MNE5 and MNE6  
it was possible to observe situations that were not life threatening for the 
participants themselves, but not also basic every day activities. These case 
studies provided a unique possibility to see situations, where gaining of 
situational awareness and decision making are challenged with time 
critical crisis situations. 
Unfortunately organizations do not normally take the benefit from the 
everyday work to prepare themselves for possible emerging crisis 
situations. This dissertation focuses on creating a conceptual model and a 
concept that supports organizations – also outside the maritime 
community – to improve their ability to support gaining of situational 
awareness from the individual training level, all the way to changes in 
organizational structures in aiming for better support for decision making 
from the individual level to the highest decision making level. Quick 
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changes and unpredictability are reality in organizations and 
organizations do not have the possibility to control all the factors that 
affect their functioning. Since we cannot be prepared for everything, and 
predict every crisis, individual activities inside teams and as a part of 
organizations, need to be supported with guidance, tools and training in 
order to support acting in challenging situations. In fact the ideology of 
the conceptual model created, lies especially in the aim of not controlling 
everything in beforehand, but supporting organizations with concrete 
procedures to help individuals to react in different, unpredictable 
situations, instead of focusing on traditional risk prevention and 
management.  
Technological capabilities are not automatically solutions for 
functional challenges; this is why it is justified to broaden the problem 
area observation from the technological perspective. This dissertation 
demonstrates that it is possible to support collaboration in a multinational 
environment with technological solutions, but it requires the recognition 
of technological limitations and accepting the possible restrictions related 
to technological innovations. Technology should not be considered value 
per se, the value of technology should be defined according to the support 
of activities, including strategic and operational environment evaluation, 
identification of organizational elements, and taking into account also the 
social factors and their challenges. Then we are one step closer to 
providing technological solutions that support the actual activities by 
taking into account the variables of the activity environment in question. 
 The multidisciplinary view to approach the information sharing and 
collaboration framework, is derived especially from the complexity of 
decision making and building of situational awareness, since they are not 
build or created in vacuity, but in the organizational framework by the 
people doing it with the technological capabilities, enabled by the 
organizational structures. Introduced case studies were related to maritime 
environment, but according to the research results, it is valid to argue, that 
based on the lessons learned it is possible to create and further develop 
conceptual model and to create a general concept to support a wider range 
of organizations in their attempt to gain better level of situational 
awareness (SA) and to support decision making. To proof the versatile 
usage of the developed concept, I have introduced the case study findings 
to the health care environment and reflected the identified elements from 
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the trauma center to the created concept.  
The main contribution to complete this adventure is the presented 
situational awareness concept created in the respect to NATO concept 
structure. This has been done to tackle the challenge of collaboration by 
focusing on situational awareness in the information sharing context by 
providing a theoretical ground and understanding, of how these issues 
should be approached, and how these elements can be generalized and 
used to support activities in other environments as well. This dissertation 
research has been a several year evolving process reflecting and affecting 
presented case studies and this learning experience from the case studies 
has also affected the goals and research questions of this dissertation.  
This venture has been written from a retro perspective according to 
ideology of process modeling and design rationale to present to the reader 
how this entire journey took place and what where the critical milestones 
that affected the end result, conceptual model.  
Support in a challenging information sharing framework can be 
provided with the right type of combination of tools, procedures and 
individual effort. This dissertation will provide insights to those with a 
new approach to war technology for the organizations to gain a better 
level of awareness and to improve the capabilities in decision making. 
This dissertation will present, from the war technology starting point, a 
new approach and possibility for the organizations to create a better level 
of awareness and support for decision making with the right combination 
of tools, procedures and individual effort. 
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Abstrakti 
Teknologisia suorituskykyjä rakennetaan tukemaan erilaisia 
yhteistyön muotoja ja tämä antaa perusteet laaja-alaiseen teknologian 
vaikutusten tarkasteluun. Teknologiaa toiminnan mahdollistajana on siis 
mahdollista tarkastella myös muista kuin teknologisista lähtökohdista. 
Dynaaminen, alati muuttuva ympäristö, on samaan aikaan 
mielenkiintoinen, mutta myös erittäin haasteellinen. Monikansallisena 
toimintaympäristönä meritilannevalvonta on hyvä esimerkki 
aikakriittisestä ja muuttuvasta ympäristöstä, jossa teknologiset ratkaisut 
mahdollistavat uusia yhteistyön muotoja. Inspiraatio merellisen 
ympäristön käyttämisestä tapaustutkimuksena tilannetietoisuuden ja 
päätöksenteon haasteiden ymmärtämiseen on perusteltua juuri merellisen 
yhteistyöympäristön haasteellisuuden ja siihen liittyvien päätöksentekoon 
vaikuttavien elementtien vuoksi. Tilannetietoisuus on merkittävässä 
roolissa päätöksenteon tukemisessa, ja haasteita, joita tähän yhdistelmään 
liittyy, voidaan löytää myös merellisen ympäristön tarkastelusta. Henkeä 
uhkaavien tilanteiden ja jokapäiväisen normaalin työskentelyn väliin 
jäävä ns. harmaa alue on tämän väitöskirjan keskipisteessä. 
Tapaustutkimukset monikansallisesta eksperimentaatio-sarjasta (MNE5 ja 
MNE6) mahdollistivat tilanteiden havainnoinnin, jotka eivät olleet 
toimijoiden omaa henkeä uhkaavia, mutta eivät myöskään jokapäiväisiä 
rutiineja. Nämä tapaustutkimukset mahdollistivat aikakriittisten 
kriisitilanteiden havainnoinnin, joissa tilannetietoisuuden ja 
päätöksenteon haasteita oli mahdollista tarkkailla. 
Valitettavan harvoin organisaatiot näkevät normaalissa työarjessa 
potentiaalia hyödynnettäväksi varautumiseen yllättäviin tilanteisiin ja 
kriiseihin. Väitöskirjani keskittyy organisaatioita tukevan konseptin 
luomiseen – myös merellisen toiminnan ulkopuolella – parantamaan 
kykyä tukea tilannetietoisuuden luomista yksilöiden kouluttamistasolta 
aina organisaatioiden rakenteiden muokkaamiseen päätöksenteon 
tukemiseksi. 
Väitöstyön työstäminen on ollut usean vuoden, jatkuvasti muuttuva 
prosessi, joka on vaikuttanut myös väitöskirjassa esitettävien 
tapaustutkimusten tutkimusasetelmiin ja toisaalta tapaustutkimukset ovat 
vaikuttaneet väitöstyön tavoitteiden ja tutkimuskysymysten 
muotoutumiseen. Olen dokumentoinut tämän mielenkiintoisen matkan 
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väitöskirjaksi prosessimallinnuksen ja design rationale -ajatusmallin 
mukaisesti mahdollistaakseni lukijalle käsityksen siitä, minkälaisesta 
tutkimusmatkasta olikaan kyse, ja minkälaisia kriittisiä 
päätöksentekopisteitä työn edistyessä esiintyi, jotka vaikuttivat 
väitöskirjani merkittävimmän kontribuution, tilannetietoisuuskonseptin 
luomiseen. 
Nopeat muutokset ja ennakoimattomuus ovat nyky-yhteiskunnassa 
realiteetteja, jolloin organisaatioilla ei ole valmiuksia kontrolloida kaikkia 
muuttujia, joilla saattaa olla vaikutuksia organisaation toimintaan. Koska 
emme kykene varautumaan kaikkeen ja ennakoimaan jokaista kriisiä tai 
muutosta, yksilöiden toiminta osana ryhmiä ja osana organisaatiota tulee 
olla tuettua ohjeistusten, työkalujen ja koulutuksen kautta. Itse asiassa 
konseptuaalisen mallin ideologia perustuu juuri tavoitteeseen, jossa 
organisaatioiden ja niihin kuuluvien yksilöiden reagointivarmuus 
perustuu toimintoihin, joilla tuetaan yksilöiden kykyä reagoida 
ennakoimattomiin tilanteisiin perinteisen riskien ennaltaehkäisyn ja 
hallinnan sijaan. 
Teknologiset suorituskyvyt eivät automaattisesti toimi ratkaisuina 
toiminnallisiin haasteisiin, siksi ongelmakentän tarkastelua on perusteltua 
laajentaa myös teknologian ulkopuolelle. Väitöskirja osoittaa, että 
teknologisilla ratkaisuilla on mahdollista tukea esimerkiksi 
kollaboraatiota monikansallisessa toimintaympäristössä, mutta se 
edellyttää teknologian reunaehtojen tunnistamista ja rajoitusten 
hyväksymistä. Teknologiaa ei tule käsitellä itseisarvona, vaan sen arvon 
tulisi määräytyä kokonaisuuden tukemisen kautta, johon kuuluvat niin 
strategisen ja operatiivisen ympäristön analysointi, organisatoristen 
elementtien tunnistaminen ja sosiaalisten tekijöiden asettamien haasteiden 
huomioonottaminen, jolloin ollaan askeleen lähempänä teknologisia 
ratkaisuja, jotka tukevat todellista toimintaa, toimintaympäristön 
variabiliteetit huomioonottaen. 
Väitöskirjani monitieteellisyys juontaa juurensa nimenomaisesti 
päätöksentekoprosessien ja tilannetiedostamisen muodostamiseen 
vaikuttavien tekijöiden monimuotoisuudesta, sillä tilannetietoisuus 
eivätkä päätökset synny tyhjiössä, vaan siinä organisatorisessa 
viitekehyksessä, niiden henkilöiden toteuttamana ja niiden teknologisten 
ratkaisujen mahdollistamana, joita organisaatiolla on käytössä. 
Väitöskirjassa hyödynnetyt tapaustutkimukset sijoittuvat merelliseen 
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yhteistyö-ympäristöön, mutta tapaustutkimuksista saatujen 
tutkimustulosten perusteella on validia ja argumentoitua jalostaa 
tilannetietoisuusmallin sekä luodun konseptin generoimista myös 
laajemmin erilaisten kriisiorganisaatioiden toiminnan tukemiseen. Tämän 
todistaakseni, olen esitellyt merellisen toimintaympäristön havainnot 
myös sairaalaympäristössä ja reflektoinut sairaalaympäristöstä 
tunnistettuja elementtejä luotuun konseptiin. 
Väitöstyöni keskeisin kontribuutio on tilannetietoisuuskonsepti, joka 
noudattaa NATOn konseptin rakennetta. Konseptissa keskitytään 
yhteistyön haasteisiin tiedonjakamisen kontekstissa, tarjoamalla ratkaisu 
siihen, miten tilannetietoisuuteen ja päätöksentekoon liittyvät haasteet ja 
mahdollisuudet voidaan hyödyntää erilaisissa organisaatioissa. Tämä 
väitöskirja esittelee sotatekniikan lähtökohdista uuden lähestymistavan ja 
mahdollisuuden organisaatioille parempaan tilannetietoisuuden luomiseen 
ja päätöksentekoon oikeanlaisilla työkalujen, toimintamallien sekä 
yksilöiden panostuksen yhdistelmällä. Tämä yhteensovitus kiteytyy 
väitöskirjan teoreettisena näkökulmana konseptuaalisessa mallissa sekä 
konkreettisella ohjeistuksella tilannetietoisuus-konseptissa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Justification and background of the study area  
When you think of the Baltic Sea, the first thing that comes to you 
mind might not be that despite its small size, Baltic Sea is the worlds most 
operated traffic area. For example in May 2011, 11 887 vessels arrived to 
Finnish ports (Liikennevirasto, 2011). At this very moment couple 
thousand vessels are sailing in our Baltic Sea area. Oil and chemical 
transportation and passenger traffic have been increasing and the amount 
of traffic has been estimated to grow up to 50 percent of the current level 
before 2030 (Ulkoasianministeriö, 2010).  
Actors in the maritime environment face a lot of challenges that are 
among others the intensity of traffic, weather conditions and geographical 
restrictions. With the respect to this, it is justified to say that the amount 
of traffic in the Baltic region is substantial and varying as demonstrated in 
Figure 1 about the traffic near our coast line. This is why maritime 
environment can be seen as a challenging environment for the actors 
involved. Unlike air traffic, traffic at sea is not controlled in the similar 
way that would allow us to be aware and control all the actors and actions 
related to maritime activities. Different maritime organizations in addition 
to military, such as coast guard, customs and port authorities are trying to 
secure everyone’s safety in this multidimensional maritime environment. 
Surveillance is done in cooperation within national agencies. Maritime 
Operators, MO, (in Finnish Merelliset Toimijat, METO) is one good 
example of this cooperation where Finnish Boarder Guard, Finnish Navy 
and Finnish Maritime Authority work together for the joint goal. The 
reason for collaboration is indisputable: The sea line is crucial to 
Finland’s trade; major part of the foreign trade is transported via sea. 
Therefore the awareness of the situations is important because of the 
dynamic and wide environment. Operators, individual actors in the 
Maritime Operations Centers, MOCs, are trying to gain adequate level of 
awareness of the activities at the sea in the area of their responsibility. 
Many nations, including Finland, do surveillance around their local areas, 
but cooperation among nations is becoming more and more relevant. As a 
result of this, it is a common interest to secure our waters even though 
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there may be cases where these interests do not match. This task in the 
demanding environment requires new, major investments for the nations 
involved. Collaboration is one of the key elements in achieving the goal 
of tackling the problems caused by the uncontrolled, increased traffic.  
The maritime environment reflects common elements such as time 
criticality and possible crisis situations. This gives the justification for the 
inspiration to use maritime environment as the baseline for understanding 
elements that need to be taken into account when analyzing criticalities 
related to gain adequate situational awareness (SA), and to support 
decision making. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of the traffic around Finnish coast line 
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1.2 Research area definition (multinational maritime 
collaboration) 
 There is a number of reasons, including security and economy, why 
co-operation is needed in the maritime environment. Terrorist attacks, 
illegal immigration in addition to drug and human trafficking are issues 
that concern many nations. When operating internationally, shared 
situational awareness plays a significant role in the maritime 
environment. Many issues from cultural differences to language barriers 
can influence the effectiveness of co-operation and basic working 
practices within a Maritime Operation Centre (MOC). The scope of this 
dissertation has been to observe operators in MOCs working in a 
multinational environment by collaborating with other nations MOCs in 
order to understand the context of the maritime activities and how 
situational awareness is gained; what are the challenges and supporting 
elements that can be found in this environment.  
I have had difficulties in defining the theoretical angle, from which 
point of view this dissertation should be looked at. Figure 2 (original 
University of Jyväskylä, 2012) allows me to try to locate myself and this 
dissertation to somewhere between empiricism and hermeneutics. I justify 
this definition leaning to the basic definition of empiricism as viewing the 
situations as the bases of the formation of knowledge.  The research 
process was guided by my perceptions of the studied phenomenon and the 
generalization of the knowledge acquired through my observations and 
experiences along this research journey. (University of Jyväskylä, 2012, 
see also Markie, 2012).  
The reason why I want to locate this research closely also to 
hermeneutics, is because hermeneutics focuses in understanding and 
interoperating processes and phenomena by replacing individuals and 
their intentions to have various meanings. With the fundamental ideology 
that knowledge is formed through perceiving relationships between 
phenomena and their contexts, gives justification for the research strategy 
in this dissertation, since in hermeneutics knowledge is seen as a 
continuous process in which interpretations and knowledge are reformed 
(University of Jyväskylä, 2012, see also Demeterio III, 2010).   
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Figure 2: Identifying the philosophy of science affecting this dissertation 
As presented in Figure 3 (original University of Jyväskylä, 2012), this 
dissertation does not follow just one research strategy, but in fact it is a 
combination of multi-methods research (see for example Spratt, Walker 
& Robinson, 2004), qualitative and quantitative research from the used 
methods perspective, (see for example Walker, 2004; Woodley, 2004) 
case study and experimental research because of the case studies form the 
Multinational Experimentation series. One could argue that at some level 
this also fit the profile of ethnographic research (see for example Genzuk, 
2003). Dotted oval in Figure 2 and Figure 3 indicate my research focus. 
After locating this dissertation to the theoretical field and after 
introducing the combination of chosen research strategies, we can carry 
on with the context were the research was conducted: Since information 
sharing and situational awareness are the key definitions, before 
continuing further to explain the problem statement, we need to separate 
the situational awareness and information sharing from each other.  
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Situational awareness is needed by the individual him/herself alone or 
as a member in a team in order to perform the needed tasks. The 
individual needs to have adequate level of awareness of the processes and 
information requirements and after these the needed level of awareness of 
the devises that support the actual information sharing.  
 
 
Figure 3: Here we are: Research strategies 
From the information sharing perspective we can identify issues that 
affect the actual information sharing and those are categorized to social, 
technical and organizational issues explained in more detail when 
representing the case studies. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to focus from the collaboration 
perspective in the maritime environment to information sharing 
framework that is affected by the level of SA of the operators. 
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 The case studies introduced in Chapter 3 and 4 gave me the 
opportunity to observe these intriguing elements affecting situational 
awareness and decision making. My intention was to scale down to focus 
on individuals inside the MOC teams and interactions within and between 
the teams. Influences from and to the higher decision making level were 
left out of the scope since the amount of issues affecting even the chosen 
scope is quite large itself. Nevertheless, the findings and 
recommendations from this journey will support also the higher decision 
making level, since the findings will provide guidance for the higher level 
of the organization to allow proper adjustments to be made to procedures, 
technologies and training in order to support the team members in gaining 
the needed level of awareness in the information sharing framework.  
The information sharing framework was identified to be time strained, 
not a regular day at the office, but not also a life threatening situation for 
the participants themselves. This is due to the fact that psychological 
differences in human behavior can vary a lot when we enter the level of 
individuals facing a life threatening situation (See for example Lambert & 
Hogan, 2010; Hoge, Auchterlonie & Milliken, 2006; Cooper, Dewe & 
O'Driscoll, 2001; Zapf, Dormann & Frese, 1996; Cooper & Cartwright, 
1994; Quick, Murphy & Hurrell, 1992; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 
1981). It would have been difficult with the used methods to capture the 
differences and influences of factors when the psychological element 
would have been too strong. The purpose was not to focus on individuals’ 
mental model, but to seek for generalities and patterns that would help to 
create the conceptual model. Crisis situation without the fear of injury to 
the participants themselves was the scope of the intensity and effect.  
The setting was challenging since it required considerable amount of 
knowledge and learning from different disciplines: understanding human 
behavior, information technology, organizational theories, sociology and 
so on. This is why this dissertation is a combination of several disciplines 
contributing to understand this multi-perspective research area. Even 
though this dissertation focuses on time critical and possible crisis 
situations leaving out normal day to day basis work, the findings and 
lessons learned may still be applied in organizations to support all the 
organizational levels in preparing for incidents such as described in the 
case studies. 
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These tools and processes are the means to share information, but it is 
always up to the individual to make the decision on whether or whether 
not to share information inside and outside the team. In another words, we 
need to support the individuals in gaining the adequate level of situational 
awareness so that the decision of sharing or not sharing is based on 
accurate facts. The developed conceptual model aims to support this 
dilemma. There are numerous different situations when the individuals 
are not aware that others might need the information one possesses or 
does not know who the relevant actors are, what tools could be used to 
inform others or that is the person allowed to do so etc.  
The creation of this dissertation has been an amazing journey, a 
research process that consists of two separate case studies and this 
dissertation concludes this journey with lessons learned and developed 
from the research data given by the maritime case studies. I have had the 
honor of being Finnish lead analyst in these MNE5 MSA and MNE6 
MISA-EM case studies that provided me the front seat to see all the 
possible elements that have an effect on individuals and teams while 
trying to create an adequate level of situational awareness in challenging 
situations.   
Next, I will present the case studies, research structure and goals from 
both of the case studies. As a conclusion of the learning experience of 
these case studies, the created conceptual model focuses on revealing the 
social, technical and organizational factors that support the information 
sharing. Addition to this the conceptual model presents evidence based 
ways to support the individual in gaining situational awareness (SA) and 
this is done by the created concept. We need to cut back everything that 
might weaken the individuals’ decision making to be based on facts and 
to reflect the actual situation at hand. This is why the level of awareness 
of the information requirements cannot be highlighted enough. Once the 
individual has gained the level of awareness the support for information 
sharing becomes crucial. This is why the list of guidelines will be 
provided for the higher decision making level to ensure that the 
individuals have the organizational support along with tools and ways of 
working. The influence of social factors is difficult to measure and to pin 
point but it is very closely present. This is why also the mental processes 
and social factors are closely related to the research focus.  
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1.3 Case studies 
This dissertation is supported by two case studies from Multinational 
Experimentation 5, Maritime Situational Awareness (MNE5 MSA) and 
Multinational Experimentation 6, Multinational Interagency Situational 
Awareness of the Extended Maritime environment (MNE6 MISA-EM). 
Case studies are part of a wider Multinational Experiment series led 
by US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). MNE series started from MNE1 
in 2001 to develop better ways to plan and conduct coalition operations. 
Over ten years the MNE community has developed structures, processes 
and tools that are designed to make future multinational engagements in 
crisis interventions more effective and efficient  (MNE5 Final Report, 
2008. For more information see USJFCOM, 2003; 2005; 2007; 2010; 
2011). 
Figure 4 demonstrates the dialect between case studies and my 
dissertation process. Both case studies addressed maritime related 
challenges from different agendas and perspectives but both of the case 
studies had the same elements, need for situational awareness and 
information sharing that created a strong linkage to this dissertation and 
supported the creation of the conceptual model. The challenging nature of 
the maritime environment requires understanding of crisis context, 
complexity and change as critical elements affecting the studied 
environment. These factors are addressed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Both of the introduced case studies gave crucial information to create the 
developed conceptual model from different perspectives: The MNE5 
MSA case study focused more on technical information sharing but 
allowed to collect also data related to individual decision making and 
gaining of situational awareness. MNE5 case study required 
understanding of technological artifact’s influence and more 
understanding of individual psychological elements and military decision 
making. These types of aspects are introduced in Chapter 2 by presenting 
the social elements and activity theory as guidelines that supported in 
understanding the case study environment. 
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Figure 4: Overview of the overall learning process 
MNE6 case study focused more on team interaction, capturing and 
measuring situational awareness. This type of case study environment 
required understanding of the theoretical aspects of situational awareness 
but also organizational aspects that are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2. Since the created conceptual model is a creation of collective 
understanding along the process structured according to NATO Concept 
Development and Experimentation (CD&E) structure, the basic elements 
of the process are also introduced in Chapter 2.  
Overall, the literature review is a collection of all the important 
aspects that I felt were important to recognize and understand while 
studying the case study environments, in forming research questions for 
the dissertation purposes, and in the process of creating the conceptual 
model. 
 This dissertation was done closely related to the case study research 
and the learning process itself has impacted the case studies and research 
questions that defined the framework for this dissertation. The findings 
and reflections to the presented conceptual model were also introduced to 
health care world to analyze whether the conceptual model could be 
The dissertation process 
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applicable also in other time critical organizations outside the military 
and/or maritime context. The findings from the comparison to the trauma 
center context are presented in Chapter 7. The overall conclusion of this 
journey I will present in Chapter 8.  
Figure 5 demonstrates the overall learning process that started with the 
MNE 5 MSA case study, inspiring this dissertation, continuing with the 
MNE 6 MSA case study. With the lessons learned from these case studies 
the conceptual ideology was verified in another crisis environment, in 
health care context. From the overall results the situational awareness 
conceptual model was refined and is presented in this dissertation in 
Chapters 6 and 8.  
This journey begun in April 2008, when I first time participated in a 
meeting with the MNE5 MSA community. I had the opportunity to 
influence to the factors that we would as an analyst team be interested in 
discovering. This first inspiring meeting gave me the courage to start 
drafting my dissertation research plan. Although the experimentation 
design had already been almost defined, we had the opportunity to 
implement our qualitative methods to the scenarios and get the needed 
data to analyze and understand the influences of the technological 
capabilities from the experimentations. The learning experience from the 
MNE5 MSA gave me good insight of the maritime context and with the 
learning experience from this case study I was able to support my new 
team in MNE6 MISA-EM with the lessons learned from the previous case 
study.  
One major lesson learned was the importance of the experimentation 
and analysis documentation and following the agreed design. Also in the 
experimentation team it was important to understand the research goals 
and how all the elements from the scenario planning, experimentation 
design and analysis planning were important and needed to be linked to 
each other. For me it was important to highlight the theoretical framework 
and its importance to the research study we were aiming for in MNE6 
MISA-EM. I had an amazing team and the entire MNE6 MISA-EM 
community understood the importance of the theoretical framework. I 
was honored to be the involved in the creation of the MISA-EM concept 
and contributing to the concept development with the theoretical aspects 
that gave the foundation to the conceptual work.  
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Figure 5: Research process  - linkage between case studies and dissertation 
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As the MISA-EM work continued, it was easy to see how the 
theoretical framework gave the multinational team a common language 
and thinking structure. For me personally this has been my greatest award 
from the multinational cooperation to be able to contribute and influence 
the common interest and to support our team effort to succeed in our 
goals.  
MNE6 MISA-EM allowed me to study the influences of SA from a 
team’s perspective and the case study provided me vital information 
related to team processes. I was also able to observe closely team 
interactions in addition to the general goals of the experimentation related 
to the case study objectives. The lessons learned from the organizational 
perspective and seeing how SA affects the team’s performance, it also 
guided me in my dissertation work to focus my research ambition. 
1.3.1. MNE5 MSA 
In MNE5 MSA the purpose was to improve situational awareness 
against maritime threats. Official statement for MNE5 MSA was: "The 
understanding of military and non-military events, activities and 
circumstances within and associated with the maritime environment that 
are relevant for current and future operations and exercises". This 
description is based on NATO’s working definition but without the 
restrictive interpretation of the term “maritime environment”. In the 
context of MNE5 MSA, each partner is allowed to define a “maritime 
environment” most suitable to their roles, responsibilities and mission” 
(MNE5 MSA final report 2008, 13-14). Different types of Multinational 
Experiments have been conducted from year 2001, in order to enhance 
coalition operations. First experimentation was executed in November 
2001 and since then the MNE community has built up structures, 
processes and tools to improve future multinational co-operations. The 
Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) track of Multinational 
Experiment 5 (MNE5) was launched to help develop processes and tools 
in a federated and distributed environment that increase information 
exchange and collaboration between MOC’s.  
The MNE5 MSA Area of Interest (AOI) was co-led by Finland and 
NATO (ACT) with participation from the US, Sweden. The research team 
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roles consisted of technical personnel, experimentation designers and 
controllers, scenario creators, and analysts. The MOC’s consisted of one 
intelligence (intel) officer plus at least one operator.  Each MOC was 
given an Area Of Responsibility (AOR) as designated in the Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP).  Operators were also given training on 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Technical Agreement (TA), 
their own system, the SOPs, a brief overview of the other MOCs 
capabilities plus the problem planning process.  
The experimental objective was to discover issues that affect the MOC 
team’s performance, but also to observe the co-operation inside a MOC 
and between MOC teams. In international operations it is important to 
ensure that relevant information is shared among the participants to gain 
needed level of situational awareness. Operators from Finland, Sweden, 
NATO and Singapore were given the same settings and scenarios, and 
their MOC processes for information management and information 
sharing were observed as they attempted to solve scenario-based 
problems. Additionally, best practices were captured to assist nations in 
enhancing their own MOC processes. Also, at the same time the co-
operation and interaction with the technical systems and other social 
actors were studied. For this dissertation case study provided the 
possibility to focus on especially gaining and supporting the individual 
situational awareness as presented in Figure 6, which demonstrates how 
the collaboration can be studied from inside the teams and between teams, 
especially focusing on to the individual level of awareness. Qualitative 
research methods observation, interviews, NASA task load index (TLX) 
and the Social technical organizational rating scale (STORS) and The 
Analyst Assessment Report Performance Rating Questionnaire (AAR 
PRQ) were used to gather the needed data from the experimentation to 
meet the following official MNE 5 MSA experimentation goals: 
 
“Improve information sharing and collaboration by developing a 
framework to share maritime information between international partners 
and coordinate global maritime security operations promoting transition 
from a “need-to-know” to a “need-to-share” culture.  
• Identify IERs to support international maritime operations 
across multiple classification domains.  
• Improve MSA processes by harmonizing human (functional and 
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cognitive) activities with emerging technologies resulting in 
improved concepts and streamlined procedures.  
• Develop technical standards which enhance shared maritime 
situational awareness and support decision-making among 
international partners compliant with relevant information 
security regulations.  
• Develop and evaluate algorithms/tools to enhance maritime 
information collection, correlation, fusion, automatic anomaly 
detection, analysis, visualization, decision support, 
dissemination, and collaboration” (MNE5 MSA final report 
2008, 14-15).  
 
The used methods and structure of the experimentation are introduced 
in more detail in Chapter 3, where the entire MNE5 MSA case study is 
presented with the results. 
 
Figure 6: The focus was to analyze MNE 5 MSA case study from the 
individual SA perspective 
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1.3.2 MNE6 MISA-EM 
MNE5 MSA focused on situational awareness in domestic waters. MNE6 
MISA-EM focused on remote or distant areas, where local capabilities 
hardly exist and the environment is not well understood.  The case study 
provided the possibility to focus on the shared situational awareness 
(SSA) perspective as presented in Figure 7 that demonstrates the team 
interaction in a multinational collaboration.  
 
Figure 7: The focus was to analyze MNE6 MISA-EM from the shared SA 
perspective 
The Multinational Experiment 6, Objective 4.2 consisted of two 
separate Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs). The aim of the LOE 1 
was to prioritize the most important challenges in the maritime situational 
awareness in unprepared waters and analyze some of the solutions that the 
created MISA-EM conceptual framework proposed to address those 
challenges. New innovative solutions were also welcomed. The 
experiment was formed as expert panel, where both the facilitated 
discussions and the orchestrated assessments were captured through a 
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collaboration tool and analyst observations. The aim of the LOE 2 was to 
measure the level of situational awareness in the MISA-EM organization 
and compare the level of situational awareness with an organization that 
does not use the MISA-EM concept in distant theaters/unprepared areas. 
LOE 1 experiment team consisted of data collectors, analysts, experiment 
control and technical experts and SMEs. Main method in LOE was 
computer-assisted assessment (surveys). More details of the actual LOE 
and used methods are described in Chapter 4 in more detail. Based on the 
experimentation the MISA-EM conceptual framework was developed to 
create an accurate awareness of unprepared maritime environment, shared 
by the spectrum of involved stakeholders in a multinational framework, to 
facilitate safety, security and environmental protection. Used methods to 
discover the crucial elements from the LOE 2 were observation, 
structured interview, system logs and recordings, special tools designed to 
capture situational awareness elements. More details and information 
about the used methods are presented in Chapter 4. 
The general goal of MNE6 MISA-EM allowed to observe similar ele-
ments as in the previous case study, MNE5 MSA, but also to add the mul-
tinational team perspective also to the research interest. With the oppor-
tunity provided by the MNE6 MISA-EM community, the focus for the 
dissertation purposes was to analyze MNE 6 MISA-EM case study from 
the both individual and shared SA perspective and again we have the 
same dilemma: We need to be able to separate the process of situational 
awareness and information sharing process from each other even though 
they are closely related. In order to the information sharing to be reaso-
nable and effective, the participants in the information sharing process 
need to have certain level of SA.  
1.4 Problem definition 
The objective of this dissertation is to create a concept to support indi-
viduals in their attempt to gain situational awareness in crisis situations 
with a multinational collaboration in a complex environment. The overall 
goal is to present how an organization in changing situations can be sup-
ported by improving the level of situational awareness of the individuals  
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and teams to support decision making in all levels in the information 
sharing framework. Focus is mainly on how the roles and task division 
are done inside the team and how the tools and processes support their 
work and gaining situation awareness in the information sharing 
framework.  
The presented different case studies provided the possibility to 
discover elements that support in developing the concept to support 
gaining of situational awareness. I had the opportunity as the Finnish lead 
analyst to be a part of the multinational experimentation team to the see 
all the interesting elements found in the case studies and to learn more 
about the context to create this dissertation.                                                                               
The main product of this dissertation is the situational awareness con-
cept to support gaining of adequate situational awareness in an 
information sharing framework from three different perspectives: 1) 
Technological solutions that include monitoring tool and guidance for the 
usage of technological tools, 2) organizational processes, implementation 
of the conceptual model and listing of critical functions and 3) social 
influences, all the elements that can be identified and supported in the 
information sharing framework. MNE5 MSA and MNE6 MISA-EM case 
studies gave the view of the maritime activities that provided a good 
example of the complex and time critical crisis environment.  
From the organization perspective the focus has been limited to ge-
neral view, modeling of the organizational functionalities and developing 
of the working processes and gaining support for the higher decision 
making level of all the crucial organizational elements that have an im-
pact on the end results. The social aspect is supported by acknowledging 
possible challenges reflecting to the findings from the case studies. The 
problem formulation is focused on the Process of Situational Awareness 
Support for information sharing (PSAS) that guides individuals and sup-
ports their attempt to gain situational awareness. From the technological 
perspective a lot of things could be studied but due to limited resources I 
was forced to limit focus on to the usability and information sharing pers-
pective that were the most critical views that guided the observation of 
technological challenges in the chosen framework.  
As described above, the main objective of this dissertation is to model 
crisis situation support to gaining of situational awareness in a multina-
tional collaboration. The presented case studies support modeling of the 
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maritime environment and gave a good starting point for understanding 
time critical crisis environments. This research answers the following 
questions:  
 
· What are the elements that support or hinder information sha-
ring in co-operations?  
· What factors affect the individuals in gaining situational 
awareness in co-operations? 
· How can we support individuals and teams in gaining situa-
tional awareness in co-operations?  
 
How these objectives and research questions are met, is analyzed in an 
iterative process between the case studies and reflecting the created Con-
cept to the case study findings. My goal and intention was not to create a 
list of facts and claim that by following these steps from the beginning to 
the end, you will avoid miscommunication in a crisis or there will be no 
system failures if these procedures are taken. On the contrary, my aim has 
been to develop the concept along with processes and guidelines to help 
individuals inside the organizations realize and familiarize themselves 
with factors that are – based on the evidence from the case studies – 
proven to be crucial elements that have huge impacts on the organizations 
tasks all the way from the individual and team level to the highest deci-
sion making level. This aim to connect the different pieces of the infor-
mation sharing puzzle for the understandable framework that includes all 
the affecting and related elements that exist in cooperation is presented in 
Figure 8, explaining how collaboration can be examined also from inside 
a team, from individual perspective. The support is given to gain adequate 
level of SA for the individuals to make decisions related to information 
sharing based on facts relevant to the co-operation. 
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Figure 8: The support for decision making in the information sharing 
framework 
1.5 Scientific contributions 
This dissertation presents the concept, created with inspiration from 
the maritime environment, to be used as a general support for other chal-
lenging environments as well. To formulate the findings and support to 
the maritime environment as well to other environments, the concept is 
written to follow the ideology of NATO concept development and ex-
perimentation (CD&E) process. To begin this journey, along with me I 
had a set of data, theories and methods that provided me the framework 
for this research. I will draw a storyline all the way from the maritime 
operation center to the health care world. As a testimony of this journey I 
hereby claim the following contributions for my dissertation in the order 
of importance:
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Contribution 1: Development of the conceptual model to support 
gaining of SA in the spirit of Endsley’s theoretical approach is 
presented in Chapter 7. The Conceptual Model consists of three different 
separate products: 1) SA model to support the higher decision making 
level of the organization and 2) Supporting Process for the operators in 
MOC teams for training purposes, 3) Monitoring tool that will provide 
for the information systems development an instrument to view SA 
criticalities. Second product was originally presented in Stockholm’s 
contribution in Military Technology, No. II, 2010, p. 121-139. Third 
product was originally presented in Journal of Military Sciences, Vol. 1, 
No. 1, 2010, p. 55-77. 
Contribution 2: Modeling of the maritime environment and its 
elements related to situational awareness by introducing the case 
studies and comparing them from both national and multinational 
perspectives are presented in Chapters 3-5. I will take you to the world 
of maritime environment, the setting where the data was collected. I will 
draw a picture of the fascinating maritime environment of the case 
studies that provided a lot of vital information from all the elements 
affecting the level of awareness and decision making in the information 
sharing framework. Insights from the experimentations are provided from 
both national and multinational perspective. I will also analyze how 
national organization (from the MNE5 MSA case study) versus 
multinational organization (from the MNE6 MISA-EM case study) 
functioned with a certain structure, discovery of the benefits and 
downfalls. Case study analysis is presented in User’s view on battle 
space systems in Finnish National Defense University Department of 
Military Technology, Ser. 3, No. 9, 2009, p. 23-41, and in Tiede ja Ase, 
No. 67, 2009, p. 86-109. 
Contribution 3: Creation of the situational awareness concept to 
support information sharing in a multinational collaboration presented 
according to the NATO CD&E process is presented in Chapter 2 and 
analyzed in Chapter 6. 
Contribution 4: Verifying the conceptual model in a health care 
environment. I will present the developed conceptual model and SA 
concept applicable for different crisis organizations that have similar 
time-critical and emergent situations part of the organizational function, 
as demonstrated with the health care environment. Health care 
environment and maritime environments are not identical, but they share 
similarities due to the crisis environment where the need for supporting 
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situational awareness and decision making in time critical events is 
required. Health care environment was a good context to reflect the 
conceptual maturity. Discovered findings are presented in Chapter 7. 
Contribution 5: The dialogue between theoretical aspects of 
situational awareness and organizational theories, their combination 
and output for the practice is presented in Chapter 2. This dissertation 
brings theoretical discussion and demand for practicality closer together. 
My goal has been to demonstrate how theoretical frameworks and 
methodologies can have important influence on real life development and 
how theoretical thinking can be used as a bridge builder for multinational 
collaboration. This dissertation focuses more on practical implementation 
than theoretical debate but the influence of the theoretical impact is 
indisputable: The dialect between supporting theories and real-life 
applications hopefully encourages other researchers also to take a stand 
for the practical implications of theories. I used process modeling and 
design rationale as supporting methods for capturing the essential phases 
of this learning experience. Lessons learned from this venture are 
presented in Chapter 8.  
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature related to theoretical 
aspects to understand the information sharing framework and situational 
awareness (SA). Case study from MNE5 MSA, especially from the na-
tional perspective, focusing on individual aspects to situational aware-
ness, is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents case study from the 
MNE6 MISA-EM, especially from the multinational perspective focusing 
on team aspects to shared situational Awareness (SSA). The comparisons 
between the case studies from the national and multinational perspective, 
and from the individual and team level, are presented in Chapter 5.  The 
created conceptual model and product related to the entire conceptual 
model is introduced in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 evaluates the usefulness of 
the conceptual model in other environments by comparing its 
functionality to the healthcare environment. Conclusions of the 
development process of the concept in the form of situational awareness 
concept and also guidelines for future research related to this field are 
presented in Chapter 8. 
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2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The complexity of the maritime environment required the contextual 
elements such as change and crisis need to be included in the theoretical 
discussion. Also military decision making in terms of the Observe, Orient, 
Decide and Act (OODA) model is introduced as one model to view the 
decision making process. Since the outcome of this dissertation, the 
conceptual model, is created according to NATO standards, also the 
Concept Development & Experimentation principles are introduced. The 
theoretical foundation of this dissertation underlies in organizational and 
social theories that give the basic ground to understand how organizations 
function in this particular framework. Situation Awareness (SA) theory 
gives the insights of the elements that as a combination affect the 
framework for sharing information. The literature review is a combination 
of an information asset that I needed in order to understand the case study 
environments. All the relevant basics are presented to the reader to 
demonstrate the wide variety of elements needed to be taken into account, 
when creating conceptual framework of this complex environment. 
2.1 Information sharing frameworks 
In the literature review focus is on the issues surrounding this fascinating 
field of situational awareness reflecting the organizational perspectives. 
The approach was from the beginning to learn about different organiza-
tional aspects that support in understanding the framework related to the 
conceptual model that has been created to support situational awareness 
in co-operations. This Chapter presents the findings related to the theo-
retical dialect and literature. While searching through potential theories it 
was possible to build up the level understanding of the organizational 
aspect, influence and contribution to the conceptual model. In this 
Chapter, reader will be walked through the interesting views and 
interpretations of from the field of organizational theories that supported 
understanding the information sharing framework and the process of 
creating and developing the conceptual model. The organizational and 
individual perspectives are also presented. Since actions and more 
24 
 
distinctively decision making is one of the main focus in this framework, 
it is only natural to include understanding of the activity theory to 
understand the elements related to activities in organizations. One of the 
elements in this context is also the technological tools that will be 
highlighted since technological capabilities play also an important role in 
information sharing as an enabler of communication. Since the case study 
environment and context are challenging because of rapidly changing 
situations, also the influence of crisis need to be studied. Let us start by 
focusing to crisis and change perspectives and their influence to the 
collaboration environment. 
2.1.1 Crisis and change – understanding the environment  
First it is important to focus on analyzing the meaning of crisis in or-
ganizational theories to get an understanding of its meaning in this con-
text. We need to notify that small unusual events all the way to crisis have 
both individual and organizational level impacts. As Wang (2008) recog-
nizes that even though effects of crisis have been recognized, still there 
has not been enough effort put to tackle this issue. As Wang (2008) high-
lights, the need is to realize the dynamics and interconnectedness of crisis 
management, organizational learning, and organizational change since 
current organizations function surrounded by uncertainty, risk, and tur-
bulence. Despite of the scale, crisis events have impacts on both indivi-
duals and organizations. Wang (2008) talks about avoiding or reducing 
impacts, by practice of crisis management. It is evident that in order for 
organizations to survive, adaptability, competitiveness, and long-term 
viability are required (Reason, J., 2004; Barnett & Pratt, 2000; Clampitt, 
& Williams, 2000; Ulrich, Mitroff, 1993; Jick, & von Glinow, 1993). 
These requirements fit the profile of the maritime environment. This is 
why it is grounded to study organizational crises from different perspec-
tives to get a better understanding of how crisis is been seen in the re-
search community. Psychological perspective brings forth the essence of 
crisis as formation of uncertainty, complexness and emotional events in 
limited information processing capabilities. Irrational behavior and errors 
affect individual’s decision making and this is why the role of individuals 
cannot be highlighted enough in organizational crisis management.  
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From the social perspective Weick (1993) and Habermas (1975) see 
problems in role structure, leadership and cultural norms, Turner (1976) 
describes crisis occurring as a breakdown in collective sense making. All 
of this emphasizes the individual’s way of reasoning and acting in sudden 
and unpredictable situations where normal rules do not apply. Even 
though literature still treats crisis management as combination of plan-
ning, preparation and prevention as key issues, Pearson and Clair (1998) 
see crisis management efforts when sustaining and resuming operations, 
minimizing stakeholder losses and applying lessons learned for the future.  
Albritton (2010) states that even though change management and used 
information systems fit the organization’s needs, the next, implementation 
creates the challenge: The complexity of information technology and 
continuously changing environment appear often unexpectedly since the 
information systems enable these rapid changes. It is challenging that 
changes, even though how controlled and organized, create usually also 
unanticipated changes. This is why it would be preferable to focus on 
recognizing and accepting the changes and instead of focusing the energy 
to controlling and planning change management. As Albritton (2010) also 
highlights that the focus should be on flexibility, when the general goal 
and objectives drive the potential changes.  
Information technology and technological changes make issues more 
complex and this is the reason why improvisation and sense making are 
factors that have a huge difference since organizations include different 
actors with different assumptions and expectations inside the organiza-
tion. This view underlines also the need for the “map” to understand or-
ganizational needs related to change since the organizations are combina-
tion especially of the actors that with the given technological tools do the 
tasks that are related to the goals of the organization. Individuals act 
based on their interpretations of the world. This is why it is important to 
understand how individuals make sense also of technology. It is evident 
that in major technological changes misaligned expectations, contradic-
tory actions, resistance, skepticism, and poor appropriation of IT may 
occur (Davidson 2006).  But when we are focusing on organizational 
changes and emergent situations, it is not just about technological change 
but the focus should be, as Davidson (2006, 26) mentions, in frames re-
lated to information technology features and attributes, frames related to 
organizational applications of IT, and frames related to incorporating IT 
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into work practices.  
McLoughlin et al. (2000) point out related to introduction of new 
technologies that we need to recognize and understand the processes by 
which the organizational outcomes of technological change are shaped. 
This is relevant also with the existing technologies when changes in situ-
ations and usage occur. We should not forget that not all changes are 
planned and expected. Crisis situations can have huge impact on the pro-
cesses and performance of the organization. Weick (1988) characterizes 
crises by low probability/high consequence events that threaten the most 
primary goals of the organization. Since the low probability, these events 
challenge interpretations and impose severe demands on sense making 
(For more information related to sensemaking, see for example Hutton, 
Klein & Wiggins, 2008; Klein et al., 2007; Klein, Moon & Hoffman, 
2006a; Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006b Gioia & Mehra, 1996). 
These issues related to crisis and change have briefly identified issues 
such as influences to organizational processes and primary goals, used 
technological tools and especially the influences on the individuals be-
havior inside organizations. (For more information, see for example Grant 
& Marshak, 2011; Smith, & Graetz, 2011; Choi & Ruona, 2010; Latta, 
2009; Blokdijk., 2008; Kling & Lamb, 1999).  It is important to under-
stand the environment and how the emergent situations and changes af-
fect the organization and the individuals working towards the common 
goal. After identifying these affecting elements, we can move on towards 
for the attempt to understand the context related to complexness and un-
certainty: introducing the key elements and reflections to the organiza-
tion.  
2.1.2 Complexity and uncertainty – understanding the context 
A refreshing view to crisis comes from Power’s ideology and state-
ment on how complexity and uncertainty are issues that should be taken 
into account. He emphasizes that this complex phenomenon in organiza-
tions do not follow the traditional forms of risk management (Power, 
2007). From aspects mentioned, it is possible to learn and develop met-
hods to avoid failures in emergent situations. According to these ideolo-
gies, learning is an important element to take into account (see for exam-
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ple Senge, 1993). As Kuchinke (1995) mentions elements that crystallize 
organizational learning to use past experience as learning basis, collecting 
knowledge, organizational change, identifying, preventing and resolving 
problems and using the organization as the unit of analysis.  Kuchinke 
refers learning as “a fundamental mechanism by which organizations, as 
open systems, interact with their environment, process information, and 
adapt to changing external and internal conditions” (Kuchinke 1995, 
308). One major impact to the organizational change is the discussion 
about shifting to address change and recognition of the importance of 
context as Sturdy & Grey (2003) states. Kahneman et al., (1982, 508) 
define uncertainty as a  
 
“…fact with which all forms of life must be prepared to 
contend. At all levels of biological complexity there is 
uncertainty about the significance of signs or stimuli and 
about the possible consequences of actions. At all levels, ac-
tion must be taken before uncertainty is resolved, and a 
proper balance must be achieved between a high level of 
specific readiness for the events that are most likely to occur 
and a general ability to respond appropriately when the 
unexpected happens.”  
 
It is challenging to understand and measure how individuals learn to 
operate in such uncertain situations. How to measure and identify the 
level of tolerance for uncertainty? Again, this aspect seems to be more 
related to individual ability and it is up to the organization to create the 
working environment to support individuals in situations where the comp-
lexity of tasks and uncertainty exist since certainty is defined by Campitt 
& Williams (2000) as something that is fixed or settled, with the notion 
that distinction between certainty and uncertainty is not an either/or prop-
osition. In the end it is up to the individuals, how they embrace uncer-
tainty and illustrate their tolerance level. Hofstede (1984) identifies socie-
tal rules, rituals, educational standards, religious orientations, and tech-
nologies to be recognized as cultural forces that shape an individual's res-
ponses to uncertainty.  It is safe to say, that organizations differ from each 
other from the complexity perspective but every organization have their 
own challenges due to the complexity of the working environment and 
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uncertainty factors. Emergent and evolving situations create circums-
tances where the actors face situations that challenge their working con-
text and performance. This is why complexity and uncertainty are 
elements that need also to be taken into account when trying to find ways 
to support the individuals and the entire organization to maintain the ade-
quate level of performance despite the changing and challenging situa-
tions. The jump from complexity and uncertainty to the action level to 
understand the social element – actors – is the next logical step in trying 
to understand how these elements match and mismatch.   
2.1.3 Actors and actions – understanding the social element 
King, Felin & Whetten (2009) want to emphasize the distinctive qualities 
of organizations. They raise important question on how does the organi-
zations differ from the social forms? Organizations consist of individuals 
interacting with each other and it would be natural to see organizations as 
network of social actors working together to reach a common goal, al-
though the common goal can be argued to not be the same for all the indi-
viduals even though that would be the ideal state. Actors are identified 
according to King, Felin & Whetten (2009) the way they are perceived 
and interpreted by others. This is presented as actors capability for deci-
sion making and behaving of own volition, to make decisions. Actors are 
hold accountable for the made decisions also in the individual level. 
These factors distinguish actors from other entities. King, Felin & Whet-
ten (2009) see organizations as actors since the society, legally, practi-
cally and also linguistically grant the status for organizations. As Bauman 
& May (2001) also identify organizational status deriving from others. All 
this comes down to action level and it can be agreed with the view that 
actors are seen through the ability to take action.   
le Roux & le Roux (2010) discuss about the role of sense making as 
framework to study organizational contexts and roles in facilitating coor-
dinated action. Sense making is individual’s continuous effort to under-
stand and act efficiently in an environment as a combination of people, 
places and events. We as individuals build up our frame of reference of 
tacit knowledge while trying to understand otherwise ambiguous social 
and situational information. With these frames we are able to position, 
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observe, identify and label signals that are produced by their contexts. 
These steps shape our individual interpretations of organizational events 
and guide us to make sense of the situations and to take actions. Even 
though individual sense making is something that only the individual 
possesses, le Roux & le Roux (2010) mention shared frames and 
collective cognition, that support the fact that sense making and support 
of individuals construction of their social reality can be supported by or-
ganizational structures and organizational ways of working. But this is not 
an easy task, as Weick (1995) warns that sense making as a social process 
should not be handled as equivalent with shared understanding since joint 
actions might not need shared frames. It has not been solved how these 
frames are sources of innovation, but more importantly it is critical to 
understand that individual interpretations and organizational context are 
relevant elements when trying to create structures and/or processes that 
support individuals in their attempt to gain the needed situational aware-
ness to complete their tasks. (For more information see for example 
Freese, 2009).  
After identifying elements related to sense making, it is time to move 
forward to explore more relevant elements that contribute to the 
individual’s actions. Next the Activity theory is explained.  
2.1.4 Activity theory – understanding the relevant elements 
contributing to the action 
Activity theory gives insights to elements that focus to functions that 
are surrounded by the context. After understanding the activity theory, it 
is important to know how the community and its rules and division of 
labor are connected together from the organizational perspective. As 
Kuutti (1995) has stated that the action is focused on the target which 
means that actions are separated from other activities through objectives. 
When we change the target to result that we are aiming for, it motivated 
the existence of the action. Like in the maritime context, the target is the 
maritime traffic and when we transform the target to result, such as ma-
king sure that we have a the needed recognized maritime picture (RMP), 
where all the vessels and actions are identified, we are motivating the 
existence of the action. Or, like in health care, the patient’s welfare is the 
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collective motivation and the driver for the action. In order to proceed 
with the object and action, the individual, actor, needs to have also all the 
other elements from the activity model, including rules to regulate acti-
vities, tools used by the actor, subjects that are the actor engaged in the 
activities, objects to be the targets of the activities, community providing 
the social context and division of labor giving the hierarchical structure of 
activities as presented in Figure 9. For more information, see Engeström, 
1993; Engeström et al., 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Activity theory elements 
2.1.5 Tools, tools, tools and technology 
Like demonstrated in the activity theory model, technological tools are 
seen as one crucial element. In the maritime environment, technological 
capabilities play an important role and this is why the technological 
perspective in action needs to be taken into account.  
Orlikowski (1992) highlights structuration as a social process where 
rules and resources used by the individuals mediate human action. As she 
is referring to Giddens notes (1984. p. 22): "All social actors, all human 
beings are highly 'learned' in respect of knowledge which they possess 
and apply, in the production and reproduction of day-to-day social en-
counters".  
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According to Giddens (1979, 144) it is important to acknowledge that 
knowledge of individuals (Actors) is to an extent limited by the nature of 
action, the difficulty of articulating tacit knowledge, unconscious sources 
of motivation, and unintended consequences of action. Orlikowski (1992) 
has tried to seize the technological perspective to structuration by 
understanding how the technology can embody rules and resources 
constituting the organizational structure. Even though technologies are 
created and changed by humans, we use technology to accomplish some 
of our actions. The amount of actions related to technology is increasing 
every year. This is why the structuration and technological awareness 
needs to be raised, as Orlikowski (1992) refers to the duality of 
technology. This model consists of human agents that are defined to be 
designers, users and decision makes. Technology is identified as material 
artifacts and institutional properties of organizations, including 
organizational dimensions as presented in Figure 10 (Orlikowski, 1992; 
410). 
 
Figure 10: Orlikowskis Structurational Model of Technology  
The explanation of the arrows and influences of the Orlikowskis 
Structurational Model of Technology are explained in Table 1 (Orlikows-
ki, 1992; 410).  Orlikowski & Barley (2001) raise a question how agency 
shapes the way technologies affect work practices and organizational 
structures. 
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Table 1.  Orlikowski’s Structurational Model of Technology  
Arrow Type of 
Influence 
Nature of Influence 
a Technology 
as a Product 
of Human 
Action 
Technology is an outcome of such 
human action as design, development, 
appropriation and modification 
b Technology 
as a medium 
of Human 
Action 
Technology facilitates and constrains 
human action through the provision of 
interpretive schemes, facilities and 
norms 
c Institutional 
Conditions of 
Interaction 
with 
Technology 
Institutional Properties influence 
humans in their interaction with 
technology 
d Institutional 
Consequences 
of Interaction 
with 
Technology 
Interaction with technology influences 
the institutional properties of an 
organization, through reinforcing or 
transforming structures of signification, 
domination, and legitimation 
 
 
While technologies are considered to be both social and physical 
objects, it is essential to understand that technologies reflect human 
agency in many ways: we attend to shape the implications of technologies 
when they became part of our everyday tradition (Orlikowski, 2000). 
Related to technological capabilities, definition Quality of Service (QoS) 
is also important when analyzing the level of quality of the technological 
solution used as an enabler of communication. Originally QoS was 
designed to include technical parameters such as service response time, 
loss, interrupts etc. (For more information, see for example Sanchez-
Macian, 2006; Lock & Sommerville, 2005; Liu et al., 2004) 
This is why Barley (1986) states that since similar technologies can be 
embedded in many different ways to different social systems it will create 
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altered social outcomes. 
Barrett et al., (2006) raises again the importance of ICT (Information 
and Communication Technology) associating with several aspects of or-
ganizational change, as presented in his early work. The connections bet-
ween ICT and change, has not been studied as much as needed and as Or-
likowski & Barley (2001, 158) declare:  
 
“research that embraces the importance of simultaneously 
understanding the role of human agency as embedded in 
institutional contexts as well as the constraints and af-
fordances of technologies as material systems”. 
 
Like Avgerou (2000) has already discovered in a long-term historical 
case study that Information Technology (IT) cannot be seen a merely res-
ponse to organizational change dynamics. Just the opposite Avgerou 
(2000) argues that IT itself with its own set of norms and patterns is an 
institution that interacts with organizational practices. It is an alarming 
signal to see current organizations struggling with IT problems that reflect 
more severe problems than just technical malfunctions. The unfortunate 
trend has been to create new IT systems, but forgetting the main part of 
the organizations: the actors, the individuals working for and committed 
to achieve the goals of the organization.  
As Barrett et al. (2006) have also pointed out that technological as-
pects in organizational change need to be viewed both from the organiza-
tional and information system studies in order to understand fully phe-
nomenon related to IT today. In this dissertation both sides of the coin 
will be studied order to get best possible view of the field today. Berends 
& Lammers (2010) talk about the comprehensive 4I framework that 
integrates and extends previous findings, while its conceptualization of 
interacting processes at multiple levels allows for the analysis of complex 
process dynamics. The framework created by Crossan et al. (1999) inc-
ludes processes that are intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutio-
nalizing. This framework is interesting since it also includes important 
aspect, collective sense making from the interpretation level all the way to 
institutionalizing level, where the learning of individuals and teams is 
embedded to organization level.  
Chiva & Alegre (2005) discuss about technological frames and how 
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they are constructed by organizational actors who discover how technolo-
gies can be incorporated into ones specific activities in the organization. 
The case studies presented later on, can confirm that individuals are 
innovative and they can find multiple ways of using technology in their 
tasks. This can be seen as a beneficial asset or it can be seen as a chal-
lenge and deviation in organizational processes. Nevertheless, this issue 
needs to be acknowledged and tackled in order to support the work of the 
individuals and by that to reach the organizational goals. (For more tech-
nological perspectives, see for example Hugh & Holtzblatt, 2009; Me-
nold, 2008; Mausolff, 2004).  
2.1.6 Organizational knowledge and learning  
As mentioned earlier, it is important to understand how technology has an 
wide range impact to the organizational change as well as individuals 
using it. This is why it is also important to mention and discuss about 
organizational knowledge and learning as well.  
Chiva & Alegre (2005) define organizational learning as social acti-
vity since the organizational learning arises from social interactions in the 
working place. This is why the organizational learning focuses on 
individuals’ interpretations and/or sense making of their experiences at 
work. If we agree on that reality is a product of social construction, and if 
we accept that knowledge is based on social interaction, we treat 
knowledge as an act that constructs or creates – not just represents as 
Chiva & Alagre (2005) define it. This highlights the importance of 
supporting individuals at work in their learning processes and team effort 
in order to perform the tasks at hand. (For more information related to 
organizational issues, see for example Miller & Lin., 2011; Fischer et al., 
2005; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005; Nevis, Ghoreishi & Gould, 1995; 
Meindl, Stubbart & Porac, 1994; Lyytinen & Nurminen, 1992). 
2.1.7 Military decision making – OODA-loop 
Since the case study environments are related to maritime and military 
environment, it is evident that this context also influences the chosen 
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perspectives. The Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA)-model is 
well known in military studies and logical approach to use to analyze the 
case studies and try to develop the framework.  
OODA-loop, originally defined by John Boyd (1987), consists of four 
main steps: observe, orient, decide and act. Modified loop of OODA is 
presented in Figure 11 (Grant & Kooter, 2005; Brehmer, 2005).  
 
Figure 11: Modified OODA-loop 
It has been identified, that OODA-loop does not address an important 
parameter such as time. The basic foundation of the OODA-loop is in the 
sequential way of collecting information, processing it, making decisions 
based on the information and acting according to the decisions. This 
simplified way of presenting the decision making lacks the dimension of 
multi-processing, that is today implemented in real-time systems, also in 
this model the decision making is seen as sequential event instead of 
parallel process.  
OODA-loop fits to a world of sequences, to the step by step moving 
processes, but when the focus is shifted to crisis situations, is the process 
staying continuously in the decide-phase? This way in the decide-mode, 
the decisions are made based on the rules from the orientation stage and 
inputs from the observe stage. The decisions are the outputs that reflect 
the act-stage in the original loop. It has also been identified, that OODA-
loop does not consider all the possible delays that affect the reaction time 
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since individuals processing abilities are limited, which causes delays 
especially in the observe and orient stages. 
Dynamic decision loop in Figure 12 presents relevant sources of delay 
that are ramp up time, meaning the time between the initiation of an act 
and that when the act starts, the time constant, which is the interval 
between start of the action and taking effect, and information delay, 
which is the interval between achieving the result and decision maker 
being aware of the result. One relevant source of delay is also the 
decision time, the time from information to decision, which relates to the 
observation stage (Grant & Kooter, 2005). 
Guitouni, et al. (2006) underline that in the Command and Control 
(C2) context, OODA-loop has been useful from the military decision 
making perspective to understand the commander's decision making 
process. The critique focuses on OODA-loop being deficient in a 
common context.  
Figure 12: Dynamic Decision Loop   
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It is obvious that several uncertainties, effects and outcomes are 
involved in military decision making but as Guitouni et al., (2006) also 
state that despite the organizational function, decision making also in 
other environments influence the behavior and the wellbeing of 
organizations, employees and in some cases also communities and 
countries.  
This dissertation focuses especially on decision making in the MOC 
team level by supporting the individuals in their attempt to gain needed 
SA for decision making. Higher decision making levels benefit from the 
end product, the conceptual model, which aims in better situational 
awareness that influences also the higher decision making levels.  
Since the goal is to create a concept to support gaining adequate level 
of situational awareness, in order to have enough relevant information for 
decision making, OODA-loop and aspects related to military decision 
making are also relevant. Since the attempt is also to focus on adaptability 
and to create a concept that is applicable in other environments, the 
literature presented in this dissertation gives the empowerment to pursuit 
this goal since it has been noticed that there are many correlations from 
the military environment to different organizational contexts.  
Next, more literature reviews of theories behind situational awareness 
are presented and explained how they can be used as an supporting way 
of understanding the multinational collaboration with all the possibilities 
and challenges. (For more information related to decision making, see for 
example Gustavsson et al., 2011; Strong & Volkoff, 2010; Walker et all, 
2009; Klein & Steele-Johnson, 2007; McLucas, 2003; Heath & Sitkin, 
2001;  Weber, & Hsee, 2000; Corner, Kinicki & Keats, 1994).  
2.2 Theoretical foundations of situational awareness 
By being aware of what is happening around you, in order to understand 
how information, events and your own behavior will affect on your goals, 
you have situation awareness. SA is required especially in working 
environments where information flow can be high and serious incidents 
may occur based on poor judgment and decisions. In order to make 
successful decisions in complex environment and dynamic situations, 
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it requires SA. (See for example Durso & Sethumadhavan 2008; Carayon 
2006). As Wickens (2008) states that when addressing situational 
awareness, we need to understand that it is not action or performance. It is 
not either same as long-term memory knowledge or the SA product is not 
same as the situational awareness updating process.  
If we continue further deeper to SA, we need to understand that in 
order for the team to perform effectively, SA is needed to support the 
collaboration. Endsley (1993) states that generally speaking one might 
expect reduction in SA to be associated with reduction in performance but 
the loss of SA simply puts the actor at increasing risk of a performance 
error such as false action. In a challenging environment such as maritime 
operation we want to minimize that risk of making a wrong decision 
(Artman, 1999, 1998; Endsley & Rodgers 1994; Endsley 1993). 
2.2.1 Individual SA 
According to Endsley (1995b) the main stages of SA are perception, 
comprehension, and projection. The first level of SA, perception is to 
perceive the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the 
situation. It also involves the processes of monitoring and simple 
recognition, which leads to multiple SA elements (objects, events, people, 
systems, environmental factors) and their current states.  
The second level is comprehension. It involves a synthesis of 
disjointed perception elements during the pattern of recognition, 
interpretation, and evaluation. Comprehension requires information to be 
integrated to understand how it will impact upon the individual’s goals 
and objectives. A comprehensive picture of the world or of the portion of 
the world is being developed.  
The third level is the highest level of SA, projection. This level 
involves the individuals’ capability to project to the future actions of the 
environment’s elements. Individual achieves the level of SA through 
knowledge of the status and dynamics of the two previous steps and by 
using this information forward in time to define how it will change the 
operational environment’s future state.  
It is crucial to understand that individuals have their own awareness 
and elements that inside a team are being shared in a different setting 
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when the ways of communicating, the team processes and shared models 
affect the team performance (See Bolstad & Endsley 2003a; Redmiles 
2002; Endsley & Jones, 1997. For further reading about team 
performance, see also Bresman, 2010; Solansky, 2008; Mathieu et al., 
2000). Perception is recognizing elements around you, comprehension is 
interpreting information, creating understanding of the situation and 
projection of what will happen next. It is also important to include the 
temporal and spatial elements to the SA discussion (See Langan-Fox, 
Sankey & Canty 2009).  
2.2.2 Team SA  
When we are looking at team SA, it does not mean that every team 
member needs to have high SA about everything, but they need to have 
high SA of the factors that are relevant for their tasks. Inside a team the 
team SA consists of the individual team members SA from their own 
responsibilities. Figure 13 presents the team SA, where each team 
member with their own goals contribute to the team goal by having 
needed SA level of their own SA requirements. It needs to be noted that 
situational awareness is not symmetric, as discussed later related to the 
shared situational awareness (Endsley & Jones 1997, 36). 
 
Figure 13: Team SA   
40 
 
Similar to team SA, which has been defined as: “the degree to which 
every team member possesses SA required for his or her responsibilities” 
(Bolstad & Endsley 1999, 1), important element in the co-operation is the 
awareness of other teams and participants involved in collaboration.  
2.2.3 Shared situational awareness 
 
Shared SA is a challenge within teams and between teams especially in 
cases, where teams are distributed in terms of space, time or physical 
barriers like demonstrated in the case studies (Bolstad & Endsley 1999).  
As Endsley & Jones (1997, 38) stated the shared situation awareness 
means the state where the individuals inside the team possess the same 
SA on shared SA requirements. Figure 14 demonstrates the basic 
structure of SSA according to Endsley & Jones (1997), where team 
members as A, B and C. Areas marked as AB, BC, and AC represent the 
extent, where the team members are creating a common situational 
awareness. ABC represents the same SA on shared requirements inside 
the team. In order to build Team SA, it requires SA of team processes, 
team devices, team mechanisms and team requirements. SA steps from 
creating an individual level SA to team SA requirements guide towards 
the shared SA (SSA) Endsley & Jones 1997, 38). Endsley’s model raises 
important question about, how we see team SA and SSA, reflecting the 
Figures 13 and 14. They can demonstrate the reality, information that 
individual truly possess, relevant for the team. This leads to the question 
of individual differences and asymmetric activities. This, on the other 
hand, gives the possibility to see the Figures 13 and 14 also as 
descriptions of the ideology, on what individuals should possess, in order 
for the team to gain the needed level of awareness. This highlights the 
dilemma in research, since we cannot observe individuals own SA 
directly and measure it. How can we be sure of the level of awareness of 
the individual being observed? The study requires observing also the 
reactions to the injects and information given and received by the 
individual. This always has the possibility of misinterpretation, both 
ways, since individuals creation and maintaining SA is not aligned with 
others. 
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Ideology or reality – main support from the models is the understanding 
of the challenge of gaining and maintaining SA. It is very individual 
depended but also team is facing challenges in getting adequate level of 
awareness to function better as a team towards set goal.  
Figure 14: Shared Situational Awareness  
If we simplify, SA stands for knowing what is happening around you 
(Endsley, 2000a). Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse (1993); Peterson et 
al., (2000) describe shared mental models as cognitive representations of 
task requirements, procedures and role responsibilities that members hold 
in common. Shared mental models are seen as concepts aiming for the 
development of shared understanding among group members. In order to 
work as a team in a coordinated way, a shared understanding between 
group members need to be established (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & 
Converse, 1993).  
Rapidly changing environments, such as the maritime environment, 
forces team members to perform in complex situations. If team members 
have identical models of how their team, their task and their environment 
function, they can coordinate their actions implicitly, even though is not  
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necessary or even a wanted that the team member would have completely 
overlapping awareness (Peterson et al., 2000). 
There are identified differences among individuals on what their 
ability is to develop needed SA according to Endsley & Bolstad (1994). 
The demanding military environment causes challenges for developing 
SA but there is also a significant difference between individuals on how 
well they are able to detect and assimilate information and to gain a 
complete understanding of the situation. Endsley et al. (2000) state that 
number of factors most likely have an effect on SA ability and they may 
involve pattern matching skills, perceptual speed and attention sharing 
capacity. Having said that about the basic capabilities, it is necessary to 
point out that training and experience support the development of mental 
models in order to form SA. This is one of the key issues: First we need to 
identify the needed elements to support us gaining the adequate level of 
awareness and then we need to focus also on the training and providing 
the team members with concrete situations where they can develop their 
abilities and get more needed experience.  
As Endsley et al. (2000) point out the need for training and 
experience; Strater et al. (2001) emphasize the importance of feedback in 
learning process. It is not useful to repeat tasks without the knowledge of 
results on what was done right and what needs to be improved. Strater et 
al. (2001) point out studies that have shown the improvement in 
individuals performances in trials were feedback was given as a part of 
the whole process. Also, the organizational level feedback has been 
recognized to be highly valuable: To support the individuals in 
understanding how their actions have an impact also to other 
organizational levels, can be a motivation factor. Nofi (2000) 
characterizes SA to be a subjective view which elements are affected by 
different circumstances. This means that SA changes are dependent upon 
individual’s situation, and how situation evolves. SA is a dynamic 
phenomenon that constantly evolves, and for that reason it is also 
important to understand why and how individual and team level SA differ 
from each other.  
Nofi (2000) describes individual SA as personal attributes that reflect 
the world based on our structural factors such as cultural background, 
education, experiences and personality. Situational factors such as 
mission type and circumstances affect also the individual SA. This is why 
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the measurement of individual SA seems like mission impossible, but that 
has not diminished the effort and attempts that have been taken in order to 
understand the individual level elements in building up SA. Shared SA 
differs from individual view since it involves multiple team members 
trying to achieve the understanding of the current situation. 
Team members have their individual SA and in order for the team 
members to get shared SA, it requires building up the individual SA 
related to the task that needs to be accomplished as a team. It also requires 
individuals to share their individual SA that again requires awareness of 
other team member’s information requirements and capabilities. SA is not 
build up sequentially in these different stages because gaining of 
individual or SSA is an iterative process. How this iterative process can 
be supported, is an intriguing challenge and this dissertation aims at 
capturing the essence of it and providing alternative solutions to tackle it. 
2.2.4 Situational awareness and decision making 
Endsley (2000a, 2) wants to make a distinction between shared mental 
models and SSA to clarify the differences between them by defining 
shared mental models as “the degree of commonality among the mental 
models of two or more people” and shared situational awareness as “the 
degree of commonality among the situation models of two or more 
people”. 
Mathieu et al. (2005) remind of the importance of team work in 
complex surroundings since it allows team members to share their 
workload, monitor the behaviors of others, and line up expertise with task 
demands. This observation is applicable in both civilian and military 
environments. Bolstad & Endsley (1999) make also a distinction between 
SA as a stage separate from making decisions and performance as 
described in Figure 15 (Endsley 1995b). The individual SA is represented 
as the inner model which allows the operator to decide what to do in the 
current situation. Endsley (2000b) emphasizes the influence of IT and 
information flows; how complex the current tools are. With technological 
solutions, we are able to receive numerous amounts of data and this 
causes the problem focus to shift: The lack of information is not the 
problem but the actual problem today is to find the information needed. 
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Figure 15: Model of situational awareness in dynamic decision making 
In order to gain the required level of awareness, it is crucial to 
understand upper level goals as well. Endsley (2000b) refers to this 
challenge as the information gap which is presented in Figure 16 that 
visualizes the problematic overload of data that needs to be processed 
before the needed information is received (Endsley 2000b, 2).   
Endsley & Robertson (2000) state that in order to discover possible 
methods for improving SA is to observe in what conditions and how SA 
errors occur. Other alternative way is to identify situations when 
individuals are able to develop and maintain SA. 
Several studies related especially to aviation have been conducted to 
solve this mystery. Possible reasons for causing SA errors have been 
identified in aviation as Endsley & Robertson (2000) present and there are 
some general observations that are also applicable in the maritime 
environment such as workload and distraction, communication and 
coordination issues, improper procedures, time pressure and 
unfamiliarity.  
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Figure 16: The information gap  
As Endsley et al. (2003) argue that need for processing and 
understanding large volumes of data is – not only a military issue – but  
relevant in other environments as well. This justifies why it is essential to 
realize that in these complex dynamic environments the need for SA to 
support different level of decision making is evident. This is why all the 
necessary steps related to, for example technological and procedural 
actions should be taken into account in every organization. 
In the respect to these views of organizational studies and theoretical 
background of SA the journey continues with the presentation of the case 
studies where these issues were intensively engaged.  
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2.3 Processes and process modeling 
Process modeling can be used to support research in understanding the 
environment and elements of the research target. Process modeling 
ideology has also supported with the case study research used in this 
dissertation. Discovering elements within the fascinating collaboration 
context offered by the MNE case studies has been also a learning process 
in many ways. This dissertation and research questions have affected the 
case studies and vice versa. This is why it is important to also take into 
account the process perspective affecting the overall end product, the 
conceptual model. Bandara et al. (2007) present procedural guidelines for 
process modeling. Guidelines include six core phases; goal identification, 
process identification, information gathering, process model generation, 
analysis, and continuous improvement.  
It seems obvious that identifying goals is a good starting point but in 
this overall process, I need to be honest and confess that the goals have 
been identified along this journey related to this dissertation. In similar 
ways, the learning process of this dissertation has affected the 
experimentation goals of the case studies.  
Process identification is according to Bandara et al. (2007) identifying 
target processes and the prioritizing, which should be modeled, analyzed 
or improved. This has been generally done in an ad hoc manner, as 
described by Bandera et al. (2007). When focusing to the case studies, the 
research motivation from the dissertation perspective affected especially 
from the best practices perspective, when I had the opportunity to transfer 
the knowledge and lessons learned from a case study to another, and also 
the same effect concerns the end result of this dissertation.  
Information gathering means according to Bandara et al., (2007) 
critical information that is needed for creating models. Bandara et al., 
(2007) state there is not a lot of formal empirical research that examines  
the process by which model information is collected. It could be argued 
whether this dissertation is one step towards presenting a formal way 
providing the examined information in a formal way explaining the 
process how the information was created and used in different stages.  
The last elements, model generation, analysis and continuous 
improvement are according to Bandara et al., (2007) yet unknown for 
larger audience and the suggestion is to integrate change management as a 
part of the process modeling lifecycle. When referring to the learning 
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process all the way from the beginning of the MNE5 MSA case study, 
through the MNE6 MISA-EM to the finalization of this dissertation, it 
can be stated that the learning curve and process is a contribution to this 
way of thinking. As my knowledge increased along the case studies, I was 
able to implement the evolving knowledge to the case studies and at the 
same time I was able to improve the research process and get clearer 
vision of the goals I wanted to reach with this dissertation. As a 
contribution to the continuous improvement, I hope that this dissertation 
reaches the decision makers that are responsible and able to decide how to 
continue with multinational experimentations, and how this type of 
process modeling can be used to support the learning and improvement of 
our actions in a more systematic and analytic way. 
One supporting ideology is Design Rationale that is defined by Lee & 
Lai (1992) to be historical record of the analysis that has led to the choice 
of particular feature as demonstrated in Figure 17. This type of way of 
thinking is a tool to demonstrate the main highlights of the entire lessons 
learned along this several year experience. The main decision points and 
changes are demonstrated in the final Chapter 8 along with the 
conclusions. 
Buckingham Shum & Hammond (1994, 8) and Lee & Lai (1992, 31) 
present the Decision Representation Language (DRL) notation as 
demonstrated in a simplified model in Figure 18. DRL includes elements 
of decision problems, alternatives, claims and goals (see also Branham, 
Harrison & McCrickard, 2010). This type of notation is beneficial in 
reconstructing the learning process, how we ended up with the results we 
ended up with. As Lee (1997) talks about representing rationales, the 
attempt in this dissertation is to give the reader a clear image of the entire 
process and how the discovered findings and decisions made during this 
journey have affected the end result, the conceptual model. 
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Figure 17: Design rationale simplified ideology  
 
 
Figure 18: Design Representation Language (DRL) notation 
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Analysis 
•What is? 
Explanation 
•What is, how, why, when and where? 
Prediction 
•What is and what will be? 
Explanation and prediction 
•What is, how, why, when, where and what will be? 
Design and action 
•How to do something? 
As Lee (1997) highlights, the representation depends on the language. 
Lee (1997) refers to services and systems but by using reconstruction, I 
am also producing design rationales without systems, using the data from 
the field work and case studies. Gregor (2006, 620) has determined theory 
types as presented in Figure 19. According to this type of classification, it 
gives support as Bandara (2007) states that this could be used as a way to 
position work related to new areas that are not clearly defined. I have had 
difficulties in finding myself clearly in a particular corner with theoretical 
foundations as discussed in Introduction Chapter. The Figure 19 allows 
me to define this dissertation research to be a mixture of analysis, 
explanation but also design and action.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Theory of  Classification 
Applying the theoretical view for analysis can be seen according to 
Bansera (2007) as describing and classifying characteristics or 
dimensions and the case study description fit the analytical perspective. 
From the explanation view this dissertation provides one possible way to 
view the complex time critical environment by explaining the 
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phenomenon. As Bandera (2007) identifies this to how “why” and “how” 
are asked and answered. As the main contribution of this dissertation, 
applying the theoretical approach for design and action, is the most 
important aspect. As Bandera (2007) and Gregor (2006) stated, in this 
type of theoretical approach we are discussing how to do something and 
providing guidelines by describing the tasks and steps needed to be taken 
in order to obtain a certain goal.  
2.4 NATO standards and definitions 
 
Since capability is defined to be “the ability to execute a specified course 
of action or achieve a certain effect,” (NATO MC 0583, 2010) this can be 
expanded to include functional components of DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and 
Interoperability). It is crucial to understand that capability is more than 
one piece of hardware or software. It is a combination of one or more of 
these functional elements: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability. How to define a 
concept to support the capability development? Concept is determined to 
be “solution-oriented transformational idea that addresses a capability 
shortfall or gap” (de Njis 2010, 9; MC 0583 2010). 
The level of effect of the concept is defined by concept’s scope. By 
following NATO standards and definitions, the scope can be strategic, 
operational or tactical. Once we have defined the purpose of the concept, 
we are able to identify its type that can be capstone, operating or 
functional. Capstone concept is defined as  
 
“An overarching concept with the purpose of leading force 
development and employment primarily by providing a 
broad description of how to operate across significant 
portions of the complete spectrum of operations and 
describes what is required to meet strategic 
objectives”(NATO MC 0583, 2010). 
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Operating concept is defined to be  
 
“A concept that describes how a commander will perform a 
military function or type of operation. It identifies the effects 
necessary to achieve the end state and the capabilities 
required” (NATO MC 0583, 2010). 
 
Functional concept is described to be  
 
“A concept that describes a particular capability and/or set 
of effects which suggest a solution to a specific or applied 
requirement. Its purpose is to identify in a detailed manner 
how to solve an explicit or practical capability problem and 
what solution sets, tactics, techniques and/or procedures 
should be employed” (NATO MC 0583, 2010).  
 
When a concept process is started, fundamental issues need to be 
clear: We need to be able to articulate what is a concept and why it is 
needed. After visioning this we should have some ideas on how it might 
be done and suppose capability examples needed in order for the concept 
to succeed in its goal. We need to keep in mind the concept development 
provides the foundation for the DOTMLPFI capability development and 
implementation. Certain qualities, such as consistency, credibility, 
authority, clarity, robustness and timeliness are elements of a constructive 
concept.  
2.4.1 DOTMLPFI stages  
Doctrine is defined by NATO as: “Fundamental principles by which the 
military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is 
authoritative but requires judgment in application” (NATO glossary of 
terms and definitions, AAP-6, 2008). This is through the strategic level all 
the way to tactical level.  
Organization and different views to it have been discussed earlier but 
the meaning and challenges related to organizational issues cannot be 
highlighted enough. Organization that consists of individuals working as 
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teams contributing to different tasks in order to achieve the collective goal 
that is defined by the organization.   
As presented in the case studies, the meaning of training is also 
critical. Despite the capacity and advancement of technical tools and 
processes designed to aim for the common goal, if the individuals 
working in teams are not properly trained, the performance levels will 
decrease since individuals are not able to gain the needed awareness.   
Material can be seen in this context as all the technological 
equipment and tools that are used to share information.  
Leadership is needed in order to set goals and making sure the goals 
are reached. In the military context, for example Singapore Armed Forces 
Centre of Leadership Development has defined it (2006) as  
 
”A process of influencing people to accomplish the mission, inspiring 
their commitment, and improving the organization.” Canadian Forces 
Doctrine defines (2005) it as “Directly or indirectly influencing others, by 
means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance 
with one’s intent or a shared purpose.” And also as “Directing, 
motivating and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally 
and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute 
to mission success” (Australian defense doctrine, 2006). 
 
Personnel are the formation of the individuals that perform in the 
organization. All the social elements identified from the case studies are 
related to the human factors of the personnel. 
Facilities provide the place where the action occurs. In this case it is 
the MOC. From the case studies I was able to get evidence on how also 
the facilities and setup of the MOC also influences on teams ability to 
work efficiently. 
Interoperability is defined in NATO as  
 
“The ability to act together coherently, effectively and 
efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and 
strategic objectives” (NATO glossary of terms and 
definitions, AAP-6, 2008).  
 
The interoperability, as all the other previously mentioned elements, is 
53 
 
crucial in co-operations. This is why these elements are tightly included 
in the capability development steps and in the concept development 
process that will be presented next. The developed SA Concept presented 
in this dissertation was build up according to the CD&E-process. The end 
product, SA Concept is presented in Chapter 6. 
2.4.2 General steps of the CD&E process 
One important part of the NATO guidelines provides 14 principles in 
order to execute an effective experimentation. The principles of effective 
experimentation are presented (briefly):  
1. investigating cause-and effect relationships underlying capability 
development,  
2. need for understanding the logic of experimentation,  
3. experiment design should meet validity requirements,   
4. integration into a campaigns to maximize the utility,  
5. iterative process formulation process,  
6. integration of studies, observations and experiments,  
7. usage of multiple methods,  
8. additional experiment design considerations because of human 
variability,  
9. conducting experiments during collective training and operational 
test,  
10. exploitation of modeling and simulation,  
11. an effective experimentation control management,  
12. comprehensive data analysis and collection plan,  
13. including relevant considerations of ethical, environmental, 
political, multinational, and security issues and 
14. frequent dialect with relevant stakeholders (NATO GUIDEx, 
2006).  
 
Next the types of experimentations that can be used in this process are 
illustrated: Discovery experimentation is described as a  
 
“…type that introduces novel systems, concepts, 
organizational structures, technologies, or other elements to 
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a setting where their use can be observed and catalogued“ 
(Alberts & Hayes 2005, 19).  
 
Hypothesis experimentation is defined as  
 
“advance knowledge by seeking to prove/disprove specific 
hypotheses or to discover their limiting conditions, …to test 
whole theories (systems of consistent, related hypotheses 
that attempt to explain some domain of knowledge) or 
observable hypotheses derived from such theories. In a 
scientific sense, hypothesis testing experiment build 
knowledge or refine our understanding of a knowledge 
domain” (Alberts & Hayes 2005, 22).  
 
Validation experimentation is described as an attempt  
 
“to provide the final demonstrated evidence that the 
prototype capability can operate within theatre and will 
improve operational effectiveness” (NATO GUIDEx, 2005, 
10). 
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3 CASE STUDY MNE5 MSA 
As explained in the introduction, co-operations are needed both nationally 
and internationally against severe threats such as terrorist attacks, illegal 
immigration in addition to drug and human trafficking. A successful 
international co-operation shared situational awareness and there are 
several issues from cultural differences to language barriers that can 
influence the effectiveness of co-operation and basic working practices 
within a Maritime Operation Centre (MOC).  
Related to previous MNE series, in August 2007 MSA Sense Making 
Limited Objective Experiment (LOE3) was conducted by U.S Joint 
Forces Command (J9 / Joint Transformation Command – Intelligence); 
Singapore Armed Forces and NATO Allied Command Transformation. 
The experimental objectives were to provide a better understanding of the 
basic activities for sense making in the maritime domain, identify or 
develop measures that assess the matches and gaps between system 
capabilities and operator requirements in maritime operations and also to 
evaluate the effectiveness of measures in testing operationally relevant 
empirical hypotheses. (Eshelman-Haynes, 2007). While this experiment 
provided good background information for this study, it did not address 
same type of research questions and approach as MNE5 MSA 
experimentation.  The Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) track of 
Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5) was launched to help develop 
processes and tools in a federated and distributed environment to increase 
information exchange and collaboration between MOC’s.  
This Chapter will address the results and lessons learned from the 
Multinational Experimentation 5 (MNE 5) MSA. MNE5 MSA 
experimentation was conducted in partnership with the Navy Command 
Finland, Naval Warfare Centre of Sweden and NATO Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT) and the Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) Future 
Systems Directorate. The main goal was to study how MOC teams are 
able to achieve and maintain MSA during two scenarios. I was privileged 
to be part of the experimentation team, as the Finnish lead analyst. The 
experiment data was a collective effort and I was able to benefit from the 
overall data collection, when analyzing discovered elements related to this 
dissertation.  
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I focused on observing the Finnish MOC and was able to reflect the 
findings especially from the national perspective. The entire research 
team worked closely together in this case study, and the results were 
compared and validated also inside the experimentation team in order to 
understand the phenomenon and to diminish the error margin. The 
collected data gave the input needed to understand the context of the case 
studies. The data also supported and guided the creation of the concept 
presented in this dissertation. 
Referring back to the case study, the experimental objective was to 
discover issues that affect the MOC team’s performance but also to 
observe the co-operation inside a MOC and between MOC teams. In 
multinational operations it is important to ensure that situational 
awareness is shared among all participants. Operators from Finland, 
Sweden, NATO and Singapore were given the same settings and 
scenarios, and their MOC processes for information management and 
information sharing were observed as they attempted to solve scenario-
based problems. Additionally, best practices were captured to assist 
nations in enhancing their own MOC processes. Also, at the same time 
the co-operation and interaction with the technical systems and other 
social actors were studied.  
In MNE5 MSA the purpose was to improve situational awareness 
against maritime threats. Official statement for the MNE5 MSA was: 
"The understanding of military and non-military events, activities and 
circumstances within and associated with the maritime environment that 
are relevant for current and future operations and exercises". This 
description is based on NATO’s working definition but without the 
restrictive interpretation of the term “maritime environment”. In the 
context of MNE5 MSA, each partner is allowed to define a “maritime 
environment” most suitable to their roles, responsibilities and mission” 
(MNE5 MSA final report 2008, 13-14).  
3.1 General goal  
The general goal was to help MOC teams detect, determine, recognize 
and identify possible suspicious behavior in the maritime environment by 
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identifying Contacts Of Interest (COI) based on the scenarios. The key 
element was information sharing between participants in order to prevent 
behavior harmful to the security, wealth and economic stability of the all 
partners involved. The scenarios were designed so that no MOC team 
could solve them without information sharing. There were a number of 
ambitions in MNE5 MSA that included for example creation of standard 
operating procedures (SOP), including recommendations and guidelines 
for carrying out maritime operations. Technological development, 
designed scenarios and concept were enabled by multiple workshops.  
Event 1 was conducted by each nation independently. The purpose of 
event 1 was to examine and baseline national MSA processes. Our 
national event 1 was conducted in the end of August 2008. MNE5 MSA 
event 2 was conducted late September and beginning of October 2008. It 
took place in Enköping, Sweden. Experiment personnel were co-located 
and the distributed environment was simulated: Finland, Sweden, 
Singapore and NATO represented separate MOC teams. Event 3 was 
conducted in December 2008 with same scenarios used as in event 2. The 
exception compared to event 2 was that the environment was truly 
federated and distributed (MNE5 MSA Final report 2008, 5-6). Scenarios 
were identical, but for event 3 life AIS feed was used instead of recorded 
data used in event 2. Each scenario began by giving the operators vessel 
of interest (VOI) lists. Intel reports were given to operators at designated 
times throughout the scenarios. In addition a white cell was established to 
role play higher authorities such as port, customs etc.   
Participating nations used their own technical systems for the 
experimentation. Finland used MEVAT, Sweden used DSG2, Singapore 
used SMART and NATO used BRITE as their technical sea surveillance 
systems in an unclassified environment. Some services were shared 
automatically (for example database information, radar and AIS) through 
systems, and MOC teams were also able to share information via chat, 
email and voice. MOC teams were encouraged to share information: 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Memorandum Of Understanding 
(MOU) and Technical Agreement (TA) were written to support the 
information sharing. Before the experimentation the MOC teams were 
given training that included technical training of their systems but also 
SOP training and problem solving process guidance. Teams were also 
briefed about other MOC teams’ technical capabilities. The idea behind 
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created scenarios was for the teams to successfully identify the contacts of 
interest (COIs) based on scenario play across two seven hour scenarios. 
Scenarios were made so that no MOC team alone could solve them 
without receiving information from other participating MOC teams 
(MNE5 MSA Final report 2008, 6-7).  
Experimentation aimed at observing problem solving and information 
sharing behaviors of MOC teams working with shared data. 
Experimentation included three separate events. First event 1 was each 
nation’s independent study of national MOC processes. In the event 2 the 
distributed environment was simulated to allow close observation and 
coordination for experimenters and analysts. In the event 3 the MOC 
teams were operating from their own actual environments. The MOC 
teams were given distinct areas of responsibility (AOR) and teams 
operated on two maritime threat scenarios.  Every stakeholder used their 
own technical systems. In the experimentation events there were four 
MOC teams each from participating parties and teams we formed by at 
least one operator and one intelligence (Intel) officer. Collaboration tools 
provided for the teams were information exchange via email, chat and 
phone, including different open source databases and web pages or usage 
of a smart board for analyzing and information gathering purposes.  
My amazing journey started in April 2008 in Ede, when I was for the 
first time introduced to my future experimentation and analyst team. After 
this workshop I had the inspiration that I wanted to focus on this type of 
research also in my dissertation. I was able to introduce my ideas about 
social interaction, when though the overall goal was mostly technical 
experimentation and improvement. This workshop was the kick start for 
my dissertation journey. We were able to create analysis plan that 
supported the experimentation plan. The timeline of the execution of 
MNE5 MSA track is presented in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20: Timeline of MNE5 MSA case study events 
10. Workshop 10 in Turku, Finland December 2008) 
analysis report, lessons learnt 
9. MNE5 MSA experimentation event 3 (1st to 5th Dec 2008) 
federated experimentation 
8. Workshop 9 in Virginia Beach, USA (27th to 31st Nov 2008) 
lessons learnt from event 2, preparations for event 3 
7. MNE5 MSA experimentation event 2 in Enköping, Sweden (29th Sep to 
10th Nov 2008) 
simulated and distributed experimentation 
6. MNE5 MSA experimentation event 1 in Upinniemi Finland (28th to 29th 
Aug 2008)
individual tools and process testing 
5. Workshop in Lillehammer, Norway  (3rd to 12th Jun 2008) 
interoperability tests, experimentation design finalization 
4. Workshop in Ede, Netherlands (14th to 18th Apr 2008) 
methodologies, experiment analysis 
3. Workshop in Turku, Finland (25th to 29 th Jan 2008) 
technical integration 
2. Workshop in Toledo, Spain (21st to 25th Jan 2008) 
storyboards, experimentation design and campaign plan drafts for the 
experimentations 
1. Workshop in Karlskrona, Sweden (12th to 16th Nov  2007) 
technical integration  
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3.2 Experimentation settings 
Events were built of two seven hour long scenarios, followed by data 
collection through surveys and interviews based on observations during 
the scenario run. Quantitative methods used in this research were the 
NASA task load index (TLX) and the Social technical organizational 
rating scale (STORS) to capture operators’ subjective view. The Analyst 
Assessment Report Performance Rating Questionnaire (AAR PRQ) was 
used by the analysts as a subjective measure of MOC performance and 
workload. The NASA Task Load Index is a multi-dimensional rating 
procedure that provides an overall workload score based on a weighted 
average of ratings on six subscales. This survey was completed by the 
MOC operators to gain understanding about their perspective of the 
overall task load during scenario play. The Analyst Assessment Report 
Performance Rating Questionnaire (AAR PRQ) was used as a subjective 
measure of MOC team performance from the analyst/observer 
perspective. After the scenario observation and post-scenario interviews 
were completed, analysts ranked MOC team performance on a scale that 
ranged from above average to below average. STORS is a 5 point rating 
scale. Listed issues were social, technical and organizational factors such 
as network connection or roles in side a team. This was the research tool, 
which was developed during the experimentation planning (Koskinen, 
2008). These types of variable measurements facilitate a better 
understanding on how factors influence performance from operators’ 
perspective.   
These surveys provided amplifying information that was compared 
with information from interviews and observation.  Post-scenario 
interviews were specifically designed to understand MOC team decision 
points about information sharing and problem solving. MOC teams also 
prepared out-brief’s at the end of each scenario and also kept event logs 
for all communications.  
Following the first scenario, the collected data was reviewed by the 
analysts and then feedback was prepared for each MOC regarding 
problem solving and information sharing strategies for the second 
scenario. Interviews were designed to elicit decision points regarding 
problem solving and information sharing. Analysts observed MOC 
operators as they worked though the inject-based scenarios. Observation 
was focused on both within and between MOC teams. Interaction 
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Diagrams were used to visualize communication between the MOC 
teams. The interactions were constructed to see how information was 
shared and the results of that sharing Interaction diagrams were used to 
visualize how the interaction occurred within and between MOC teams. 
MOC teams were asked to keep event logs for every communication, and 
those logs were used in verifying the data. After the first scenario, based 
on the collected data reviewed by the analysts, the MOC teams were 
given feedback and brief training concerning problem solving and 
information sharing strategies (Brunett, Eshelman-Haynes, Koskinen, Soh 
& Utterstöm, 2008). Event 2 is described in more detail to give the reader 
an idea of the experimentation setting. 
3.3 MNE5 MSA Event 2 
The experiment was conducted in Enköping Sweden, 29
th
 September to 
10
th
 October 2008.  First week was mostly for technical setup and testing. 
The Event was designed so that participants, including technicians, 
operators, white cell and analysts, were co-located.  The distributed 
environment was simulated; four MOCs were established representing 
each of the participating nations. This setting enabled each nation to fully 
test the functionalities before the truly distributed event, event 3,  in 
December 2008.  
MNE5 MSA experimentation event 2 focused on the influence of 
social, technical and organizational factors specifically on information 
sharing and problem solving in Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). 
These findings from the MNE MSA experimentation gave important 
information also to national level development.   
The main goal was to examine issues that affect team’s performance 
from an information sharing perspective within the Finnish MOC. Other 
participating MOC teams’ results were also reflected to the research 
questions. The first ambition was to discover the aspects from the 
research questions that occur in operators’ way of working and secondly 
to do general comparison between MOC teams to learn differences and 
similarities, and possible reasons for differences.  
When interactions within and between MOC teams are discovered and 
developed together, we were able to improve the future co-operation as 
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well. Experimentation event 2, reflecting the national study (event 1) led 
to the discovery of issues that affect the information sharing and 
situational awareness in an international setting.  
3.3.1 Technical systems and settings 
The technical system setup, including concrete firewalls and 
workstations, from the Finnish MOC perspective is presented in Figure 
21. When participants all agree to work under the Technology for 
Information, Decision and Execution Superiority (TIDE) specifications, 
they do not need to know other participants technological solutions. TIDE 
conceptual framework is shown in Figure 22. The Baseline for Rapid 
Iterative Transformational Experimentation (BRITE) is an 
experimentation framework which works by reusing existing systems and 
encouraging openness and co-operation. TIDE compliant systems are able 
to discover each other on the network and work together to provide a 
richer information environment (Goossens et al., 2006a; Cheasley, et al., 
2009). 
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Figure 21: Technical setup from the Finnish MOC 
3.3.1.1 TIDE and BRITE 
Figure 22 shows TIDE conceptual framework, which was developed 
within the TIDE initiative and describes how Network Enabled 
Capabilities (NEC) will transform raw data into intended effects to aid in 
achieving NATO’s Transformation Goals and Objectives. Baseline for 
Rapid Iterative Transformational Experimentation (BRITE) is an 
experimentation framework which works by reusing existing systems and 
encouraging openness and co-operation. TIDE compliant systems are able 
to discover each other on the network and work together to provide a 
richer information environment (Goossens, et al., 2006; Brite Overview, 
2008).  
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BRITE is an experimentation framework that enables the rapid 
implementation of new ideas and capabilities to support experimentation. 
The BRITE framework is implemented as a Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA). In a SOA environment, resources on a network are made available 
as independent services that can be accessed as required from distributed 
users and servers. The ability to discover, acquire and exploit information 
from various sources is the purpose of BRITE. BRITE can be used 
isolated from general network as it provides complete capability from the 
acquisition to the presentation of information to improve situational 
awareness and support the decision making process.  The real benefit of 
BRITE, however, is realized when BRITE is installed on a network with 
other TIDE compliant systems (Brite Overview, 2008; Goossens, et al., 
2006).  
 
 
Figure 22: TIDE conceptual framework 
3.3.1.2 MEVAT 
MEVAT is the Finnish Sea Surveillance System that is used by the main 
authorities in the maritime domain in Finland. As a multisensor 
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datafusion system, MEVAT provides the Finnish METO (cooperation 
between Navy – Boarder Guard - The Maritime Administration) 
authorities and Defense Forces the near-real time Recognized Maritime 
Picture (RMP). Operational version of MEVAT can utilize data from 
following data sources: 
· Sensors:  
o Primary surveillance radars 
o Sonar systems  
o Eye observer information  
o Mobile radar units  
o Mobile units  
· Sources:  
o Automatic Identification System (AIS)  
o Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)  information  
o Port Net (National gateway to EMSA Safe Sea Net)  
o The Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSI).  
 
MEVAT is capable of making history queries based on time and/or 
area of one or more selected vessels. MEVAT is TIDE compliant, so it is 
able to discover services and information from systems that are following 
the TIDE specifications (e.g. BRITE).  MEVAT has collaboration tools 
and it is possible to use E-mail (SMTP), Chat (XMPP), and Voice (VoIP). 
MEVAT is also able to validate the target information against different 
vessel databases by Smart Agents; some of the reference information is 
actively retrieved from the Internet (Soininen, 2008).  
3.3.2 Used Methods 
Next, the used research methods, NASA TLX, PRQ, STORS, interview, 
observation and interaction diagrams are described.  
3.3.2.1 NASA TLX 
The NASA Task Load Index is a multi-dimensional rating procedure that 
provides an overall workload score based on a weighted average of 
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ratings on six subscales: Mental demands, physical demands, temporal 
demands, own performance, effort, and frustration. This survey was 
completed by the MOC operators to gain understanding about their 
perspective of the overall task load during scenario play (NASA TLX, 
2005). NASA TLX basic structure is presented in Appendix A. 
3.3.2.2 PRQ 
The Analyst Assessment Report Performance Rating Questionnaire (AAR 
PRQ) was used as a subjective measure of MOC team performance from 
the analyst/observer perspective. After scenario observation and post-
scenario interviews were completed, analysts ranked MOC team 
performance on a scale that ranged from above average to below average. 
Between the scenarios, some teams went from below average overall 
ratings to above average overall ratings, while some teams maintained the 
same rating across both scenarios.  No teams, however, went from above 
average to below average compared to the team average in the overall 
experimentation.  The AAR PRQ included questions similar to: “The 
MOC TEAM backs up answers with facts/information;” “the MOC 
TEAM was able to report the basics of the story: who, what, when, where, 
and how;”, “the MOC TEAM description of events was organized well; it 
has a logical flow.” Answers to these types of questions established an 
analyst’s representation of MOC team performance. Basic structure of the 
AAR PRQ is presented in Appendix B. 
3.3.2.3 STORS 
Social Technical Organizational Rating Scale (STORS) – This is a 5 point 
rating scale where 1 is very harmful and 5 is very helpful, 3 meaning 
neutral. This was the research tool, which was developed during the first 
experiment design meeting in Ede, the Netherlands, when it became 
evident that the research questions were not completely clear. These types 
of variable measurements facilitate a better understanding of how factors 
influence performance from an operators’ perspective. STORS is a tool 
that helped guide us in scoping our research objectives. Using it helped us 
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determine whether to focus our efforts on social/technical relationships or 
the organizational aspects. Based on national study, event 1, and findings 
from technical testing in Lillehammer, Norway, we were able to improve 
the STORS survey to properly align it with the experimental environment 
(Koskinen, 2008). STORS structure is presented in Appendix C. 
3.3.2.3 Interview 
Post-scenario interviews were specifically designed to understand MOC 
team decision points about information sharing and problem solving. 
MOC teams also prepared out-brief’s at the end of each scenario and 
MOC teams also kept event logs for all communications. Following the 
first scenario, the collected data was reviewed by the analysts and then 
feedback was prepared for each MOC regarding problem solving and 
information sharing strategies for the second scenario. Interview structure 
is presented in Appendix D. 
3.3.2.4 Observation 
Analysts observed MOC operators as they worked though the inject-based 
scenarios. We observed the interactions within and between MOC teams. 
Based on paper surveys and interviews, we were able to verify and the 
findings from observations matched and made sense. 
3.3.2.4 Interaction diagram 
Interaction diagrams were used to visualize communication between 
the MOC teams. The interactions were constructed to see how 
information was shared and the results of that sharing.  Figure 24 is an 
example of a part of one Interaction diagram.  
Findings from the experimentation are categorized to technical, 
information sharing and experiment specific issues which were interesting 
in both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 from the Finnish MOC team’s 
perspective. 
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3.3.3 Findings from the Scenario 1 from the Finnish MOC 
team’s perspective 
3.3.3.1 Technical issues 
In the scenario 1, the Finnish MOC team’s technical system was stable. 
There were some situations where the operator did not understand how to 
use the search tool as designed. The team felt more comfortable working 
with their own technical system than requesting the information from 
other MOC teams. This was confirmed by the observation that the 
number of technical interactions was greater than that of social 
interactions with other actors. There were also some disconnections in 
communicating as results of incorrect contact lists, email addresses etc. 
3.3.3.2 Information sharing issues 
Within the Finnish MOC, actors performing as an operator and as an 
intelligence officer, later on referred as Intel, worked well as a team and 
had clearly defined roles and responsibilities. The operator searched for 
information through different technical sources and Intel managed all 
communication channels (chat, email, voice). He also maintained the 
Event log. Most of the information sharing occurred between the Finnish 
and the Swedish MOC teams. The Swedish MOC pulled mostly 
information from the Finnish MOC and Finnish MOC pushed more 
information to the Swedish MOC compared to the other MOCs.  One 
reason the Finnish MOC did not often request specific information from 
external actors was that the team did not feel that they could accurately 
articulate and formalize their questions. This also affected their behavior 
in that they felt much more comfortable relying to their technical system 
than interacting socially with the other MOC teams. Another identified 
issue was the lack of clear problem solving process. Often, the team had 
several pieces of information that they were not able to connect and draw 
conclusions. This reinforced the findings of the sense making data frame 
theory. From the information perspective, the Finnish team had difficulty 
putting together pieces of information into a logical, comprehensive story 
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of what was happening.  Often, operators were observed focusing on their 
own AOR and sometimes disregarded information from other social 
resources. When operators were not able to articulate their thinking and 
decision making processes, they had difficulty communicating with other 
actors because they lacked the necessary detail to effectively express their 
ideas. Observation and interviews confirmed that the team was not able to 
identify their actions and their problem solving process, which resulted in 
a limited number of contacts with the other MOC teams. It also made it 
difficult to maintain the record of the event log.  
3.3.3.2 Experiment specific issues 
The Finnish MOC team felt that they should have solved scenario 
problems including identifying and designating Contacts of Interest 
(COI). NASA TLX results indicated that the team felt they had to do a lot 
of thinking and there were some peaks when they had to work harder in 
order to maintain their awareness. Overall, however, they felt that the 
work load was reasonable particularly due to their familiarity with the 
systems. From an interaction viewpoint, they were pleased with their 
performance in assisting the Swedish MOC, but still they felt they were 
not able to fully benefit from other MOC team’s knowledge. The Finnish 
team felt that they should have done more to solve the problem. This 
illuminates an issue that must be clarified in the future experimentation – 
that the teams are being observed not evaluated, and successful solution 
of the scenario problem is not necessarily the goal. Rather, the goal is to 
capture processes so they can be evaluated and improved.  
After Scenario 1, analysts provided feedback to MOC operators in the 
areas of: 1) Scoping the problem space, 2) determining assumptions vs. 
facts. After the feedback session, the Finnish MOC team understood how 
to change their behavior for following scenario regarding information 
sharing and problem solving. They understood that they were to take a 
more holistic view of the problem space and relate all information to all 
actors. 
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3.3.4 Findings from the Scenario 2 from the Finnish MOC 
team’s perspective  
3.3.4.1 Technical issues 
The Finnish MOC team experienced more technical difficulties in the 
scenario 2 compared to the scenario 1. After approximately four hours of 
operation without defect, the system failed and the team was unable to 
search or query the system during the Scenario play.  Over again, contact 
lists were problematic. Even when email addresses and chat rooms were 
checked, some messages were send to wrong chat room at the beginning. 
Voice was not used at all in scenario 2 and chat seemingly replaced it. 
After the system broke down unintentionally, the team was unable search 
for vessels and the team stopped working entirely.  
3.3.4.2 Information sharing issues 
In the beginning of scenario 2, the Finnish MOC was effective as a team 
as they did in scenario 1. The team felt that sometimes there was too 
much information flowing through chat, email and other channels 
resulting in a breakdown of team dynamics.  The team was not able to 
process the received data efficiently and it sometimes took valuable time 
before they were able to make sense of it.  At times, there were two actors 
performing tasks without an awareness of what the other actor was doing. 
There were sometimes duplication of effort when actors were working on 
the same issues at the same time without knowledge of each other. When 
the team began to work together again, information sharing within the 
MOC and external to it improved; operators were more likely to push and 
pull information from other MOC teams. Also, they were able to clearly 
articulate their reasoning concerning the decisions they made with respect 
to information sharing. The team was able to better manage and process 
received information, verifying and sharing when they deemed it was 
necessary. There were several improvements compared to scenario 1. 
Excessive information led to situations where the team had to refocus and 
work more diligently in order to maintain situational awareness within the 
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MOC. In these cases, it took much more effort to filter and search for 
information that was important for the team compared to situations where 
the information flow was easier to control. This highlights a need to 
provide teams with guidelines, best practices or SOP for the management 
of information. Excessive information made it difficult to respond and 
react as quickly as participants were able to react during the first scenario. 
The team had no problems articulating their thinking process and the 
results that they were able to assemble. 
3.3.4.2 Experiment specific issues 
The feedback session between scenarios improved the MOC team’s 
performance. After the problem solving training, the team was better at 
scoping the problem and analyzing the given facts. They were able to 
think outside their own AOR and open their minds to other possibilities. 
Team also felt that interaction with other social actors was much easier 
when using the problem solving paradigm. While the open chat room 
occasionally presented excessive information, through observation it was 
clear that operators preferred it to the other communication methods. 
There can be several issues influencing this behavior such as the control 
of receiving and sending, timeliness of responding compared for example 
to phone calls; Chat messages can be read and send when it suites the 
situation best, and it diminishes disturbance of individuals thinking 
process and information management. During the second scenario, the 
Finnish MOC experienced notable technical failures; this was not the case 
in the first scenario.  These failures suppressed the team and, as a result of 
further technical issues, they became passive. Unable to assist the other 
MOC teams or respond to Request For Information (RFIs), internal and 
external communication for the Finnish MOC decreased significantly. In 
the end they stopped working completely. 
3.3.5 Overall findings from MNE5 MSA event 2 
The overall findings were categorized according to the research questions 
to social, technical and organizational aspects of information sharing. 
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Social aspects include the operators’ way of working and handling the 
information. Technical aspects address questions about how technology 
affects information sharing and problem solving process. Organizational 
aspects cover for example structural issues affecting the problem solving 
process and possibility to achieve situational awareness.  
3.3.5.1 Social aspects of information sharing 
MOC teams did not vet new information in the same way that they vetted 
information received through inject or via technical systems. Some 
participants, however, reported that they were less willing to share 
information with other MOC teams when they were uncertain about their 
analysis. To enable effective information sharing, it is necessary for 
operators to treat information from all sources with the same level of 
objectivity. Commonality in language enhanced communication, while a 
lack of commonality caused operators to be hesitant and less 
communicative. When participants decided to share information, they 
took great care in crafting the message to be sure that they had precisely 
articulated their thoughts. Operators frequently double checked messages 
to confirm that the information they were sending was correct.  This often 
delayed information flow from MOC to MOC. Cultural factors also 
influenced information sharing. The familiar ways of working and 
common cultural experiences resulted in easier working relationship for 
some participants. Lack of communication business rules, for example 
simply acknowledging receipt of messages, reduced shared situational 
awareness.  
Informal social networking was greater during scenario 2 than it was 
in Scenario 1 possibly due to an informal network developed between 
scenarios through social interaction among operators. This informal 
interaction improved MOC to MOC communications too.  When scenario 
2 began, Finnish MOC team was much more comfortable contacting 
operators from other MOC teams compared to the scenario 1. The 
informal network enhanced less formal method of communication and co-
operation, (e.g. chat) when the information could be shared without 
formal RFIs that took time for the operators to prepare. Another factor in 
scenario 2 that enhanced networking was the existence of a clear 
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information-sharing policy, which encouraged co-operation by enabling 
MOC teams to interact with each other directly without asking permission 
from higher authority.  
From the operators point of view based on the STORS, it was possible 
to identify future challenges.  The data showed that the variables with the 
highest overall ratings were non-technical: (1) Team roles; (2) social 
interactions within the MOC; and (3) past experience. Variables with the 
lowest overall ratings were largely technical in nature: (1) Anomaly 
detection; (2) interaction with technical system; (3) ability of system to 
filter noise; and (4) flexible database query.  The STORS survey results 
helped guide our experiment design by focusing our ambitions. Event 2 
showed us that operators view social factors as important supporting 
elements to accomplishing their tasks. Social factors that affected the 
teams were analyzed to be team roles, willingness to share, cultural 
differences, informal social networking and different experience levels. 
Still, there are many technical factors that must to be tackled in order to 
support the MOC operators work in the future. 
3.3.5.2 Technical aspects of information sharing 
The main technical aspects that were found to have influence on 
information sharing were information sharing process, data types, 
channels of communication and information management. All Event 2 
data was treated the same. At the technical level, raw AIS data was shared 
and meaning that stakeholders contributed to a common AIS picture. The 
distinction between raw data and value added data was not revealed to 
participants, so they had little awareness of the difference between these 
two types of data. When faced with decisions about information sharing 
during the first scenario, MOC teams chose to contact their national chain 
of command (i.e. White Cell) for guidance, for even the most basic 
information such as vessel identity and position. Between scenario 1 and 
scenario 2, MOC teams were given permission to freely share information 
through a simulated Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). During 
Scenario 2, operators understood that they were allowed to share without 
requesting further guidance from their national chain of command. This 
change was made to gain a better understanding of how information 
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sharing policies affect information sharing (Brunett, Eshelman-Haynes, 
Koskinen, Soh & Utterstöm, 2008).  
Less formal channels of communication like chat seemed to facilitate 
information exchange. Chat made it easier and faster to communicate and 
react to information requests and replies. We also observed that operators 
did not handle information received from other MOC teams in a such 
critical view as they did with information received from their technical 
systems. From this study we conclude, that it was easier for actors to trust 
information from other human actors that from technical systems. Actors 
must be trained handle every piece of received information with the same 
level of objectivity, whether the source is technical or another human 
actor (Brunett, Eshelman-Haynes, Koskinen, Soh & Utterstöm, 2008). 
3.3.5.3 Organizational aspects of information sharing 
The main organizational aspects, MOC structure, SOP, organizational 
cultures and rules and training are factors influencing information 
sharing. The organizational structure for the event 2 was very artificial. In 
some cases, operators had difficulty understanding who and how to 
contact when requesting information.  An experimental White Cell  (WC) 
was created to manage MOC RFIs from external entities such as national 
intelligence or port authority. The internal MOC structure was decided 
informally and as a result it led to some mismanagement and duplication 
of effort. It was not unusual to see two people in the same MOC working 
on the same task.  In addition to frustrating operators, the redundant 
tasking caused delays and resulted in some information being missed or 
dropped from awareness. Operators did not receive clear guidance for 
information sharing. Though operators were provided with 
communication channels (e.g. voice, chat, phone), there was no guidance 
on how and when to share. There was some misunderstanding about using 
private chat and public chat.  Also, in the scenario 1, operators had 
difficulties with email addresses, which led to miscommunications for 
some of the MOC teams.  
During the first scenario, operators tended to view the problem space 
from their own comfort zones and AORs.  In addition to helping with 
problem solving this discussion was intended to highlight the interaction 
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between problem solving and information sharing. By linking these two 
important aspects together and giving a process that helps co-operation 
with other MOC teams it is possible also in international operations to 
ensure shared situational awareness among all participants. This means 
that we must find ways to support teamwork.  
Organizational policy should provide clear guidance and empower 
operators to share information across traditional boundaries. Operators 
have to believe that they are "safe" to share the information they possess, 
from both security and legal perspectives. Current work practices 
encourage the operators to use the technical systems rather than interact 
with other MOC teams. Social interaction with external actors should be 
considered by operators to be an equally valuable tool or a resource 
among the technical tools and other resources. When technical systems 
failed, operators stopped the problem solving process and, at times even 
stopped working.  
 Should be trained in the event of technical failures to proceed with 
the problem solving process and explore other possible solutions (e.g. 
other MOC systems) (Brunett, Eshelman-Haynes, Koskinen, Soh & 
Utterstöm, 2008; MSA experimentation event 2 documentation). 
Figures 23 and 26 show how information sharing changed between 
scenarios 1 and 2. The amount of information sharing increased, 
especially in the Finnish MOC, when the MOC teams were briefed about 
the problem solving and information sharing.  Teams were able to scope 
the problem and articulate their way of thinking much more clearly. The 
policy that encouraged co-operation enhanced sharing of information. In 
the end, operators were much more confident about communicating with 
other MOC teams to push or pull information. Improvement in problem 
solving and information sharing is also evident in Figures 24 and 25. 
These Figures are representative examples of interaction diagrams that 
present the communication flow between MOC teams during both 
scenarios. 
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Figure 23: Example of broken information flow in scenario 1 
 
Figure 24: Graph of information exchange type in scenario 1 
 
 
 
send to all 
send to all 
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Figure 25: Graph of information exchange type in scenario 2 
In Figure 26 MOC team D receives information from MOC team A 
but MOC team D does not react on it. The information does not cause 
actions and the team does not even acknowledge the other team about the 
information. Later on, MOC team D receives information from another 
source and acts on it, but does not inform other MOC teams about it.  
 
Figure 26: Example of good information flow in scenario 2 
In Figure 26 MOC team A receives information that the team shares to 
other MOC teams. That increases other teams’ situational awareness and 
MOC team B reacts and sends more information to MOC team A.  
send to all 
 
send to all 
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In this information flow is shown how the situational awareness is 
increased through sharing and how the information sharing can activate 
others to react to the situation. When MOC team A suffers from technical 
difficulties, they contact other MOC teams for assistance.  
3.3.6 Conclusions from the event 2 
Reflecting back to the research questions, MNE 5 MSA experimentation 
event 2 revealed there are number of factors about information sharing 
that affect also problem solving and operators’ situational awareness. 
Aspects can be categorized to social, technical and organizational factors. 
Social factors include issues such as operator confidence and culture. 
Technical factors can be tools that hinder or enhance social interaction 
and information sharing. Chat was a good example of a technical tool that 
enhanced information sharing. As a method of communication, chat also 
caused information overload occasionally. In the future, operators should 
be trained to use a problem solving process and information management 
best practices to cope with the volume of incoming data and information. 
From an organizational perspective, information sharing policies play an 
important role. Clear information sharing policies and rules for 
information exchange support co-operation and sharing. In this study, 
when MOC teams were allowed to interact directly (scenario 2), the 
quantity of MOC to MOC communication and information sharing 
increased. The study also addressed research question about work 
practices, and it was clear that training on the problem solving process 
improved teams’ ability to manage information and view the problem 
holistically. One output of this experimental event was more formalized 
problem solving training material for event 3.  
 
 
3.4 MNE 5 MSA event 3 
 
The experimentation was conducted 1
st
 to 5
th
 December 2008. Event 3 
reused the event 2 scenarios but in a truly federated and distributed 
environment. Each nation participated from their home base either the 
national MOC or in NATO’s case from US 6
th
 fleet using a combination  
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of NATO and 6
th
 fleet operators. The MOCs were networked technically 
through the internet. SOP and PSP training was included and new teams 
were provided with the same tools and settings as the event 1 teams. Now 
the Problem Solving Process (PSP) was given from the beginning and 
usage of the process was also observed. This section will provide the 
reader an overview of the findings from the event 3 and how the results 
relate to previous event. The difference from the event2 is the truly 
distributed environment. The Finnish MOC located in the Navy 
Command HQ, Turku, Finland. The event 2 gave a lot of good 
information about the factors affecting the team’s ability to work with the 
scenario-based problems. PSP was added from the beginning to the 
operator training. Operators were different persons playing with the same 
scenarios as in the event 2. Since the experimentation setting and used 
methods were described earlier, next the findings from the event 3 are 
presented.  
3.4.1 Overall findings from the MNE5 MSA event 3 
Figure 27 shows an example from the observed MOC receiving 
information from an external source then utilized the technical system to 
verify it and search for more information. The team then received a 
Request for Information (RFI) and responded to it.  Figure presents the 
information flow from different MOCs with different tools.  
There were six aspects that are considered to be social and affecting the 
team, that are MOC structure, trust, process model, confidence, language 
and networking issues. Main factors found from the experimentation to 
influence on information sharing that are MOC structure, trust, language, 
individual level confidence, process models, and networking. Some 
MOC’s structure was very organized. Roles were clear; operator using the 
technical system and Intel giving instructions and using the 
communication tools.  Structure also affected problem solving and the 
usage of different tools and interaction with others.  
Trust was also one major factor: For some MOCs it was easier to trust 
the given information from MOCs with same cultural experiences than 
from MOC that they did not share common culture. This was identified 
both from the observations and interviews. 
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TIME SUBJECT MEDIA                                                                                 WHITE CELL     MOC 1     MOC 2      MOC 3      MOC 4
746 RFI for Vessel X Email PULL
849 FAILED CALL TO NATO for clarification Voice
851 RFI Vessel X Voice
853 RFI Vessel X Voice
853 Vessel X position Voice
856 Asking CATES in WC detention records Email
of Vessel X
904 No information from CATES Email
911 For MOC 4 there is nothing we found on Chat
Vessel X besides the position we given you
915 For MOC 3 TY for looking Chat
919 MOC 4: my information shows two similar ships with Chat
the same IMO number with Vessel X, 
propable name changes Vessel Y, Z
934 Re: RFI for Vessel X Email
940 COI DESIGNATION FOR VESSEL X Email PUSH
949 Action for Vessel X Email PUSH
1021 Re: Action for Vessel X Email
1048 Vessel X information Email
1311 Re: Action for Vessel X Email
 
Figure 27: An example of interaction diagram from the Finnish MOC team’s 
point of view 
Result of communication should not rely on actor’s personality and it is 
an important aspect to be notified.  
In event 3 the actors made personal decisions about what source to 
trust and what not. Teams should critically analyze the received 
information and compare their own information to that. The supporting 
process model, problem solving process (PSP) could be seen in action but 
every time something interrupted (new information, technical search from 
the system) the problem solving loop stopped. When there were low 
phases, the model was used but as soon as more information and 
distracters appeared, they skipped the process. AOR played a huge role. 
There were many situations when MOC teams stopped acting on a vessel 
after it was leaving their own AOR or was not coming to their AOR. 
What had changed from event 2 was that now there were more interaction 
and information sharing so that other MOC teams were given information 
about those vessels. AOR needs more rethinking, because you have a 
responsibility towards others to notify if some information is crucial for 
others to get true maritime situational awareness. Confidence depended 
on individuals personality and confidence can be encouraged by clear 
instructions and training.  Language can be an issue, like in event 2, but it 
was not an issue in the event 3. That depends on individuals language 
skills. Networking is supported by the familiar ways of working and 
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common cultural experiences which resulted in easier working 
relationship for some participants. MOC teams got crucial information 
from other MOCs and without sharing they would have not been able to 
find right vessels. 
There were five major technical factors such as information analysis, 
information push and pull, information access and data that affected the 
operators. First of all data needs to be clarified when dealing with raw 
data vs. value added data. It caused confusion. This needs to be defined in 
more detail. We assumed that in the Event 3 we would see lower 
communication between MOC teams because of automation and 
automatically shared data but it did not happen. We were able to see more 
sharing including Inter Reports (IR) and a lot of Request for Information 
(RFIs) through chat, email and voice. A lot of informal communication 
like asking for more details happened through chat and formal messages 
and information sharing happened through email. In some cases Vessel 
Of Interest (VOI)-lists were also shared through email so automation did 
not decrease the amount on social information sharing.  
Information analysis experience levels of teams varied a lot. Lack of 
intelligence experience affected the analysis of the scenario. One MOC 
had to rely to other MOCs information because they were suffering from 
user errors with using their own system. This demonstrated that the 
source-thinking and training had worked. Using encryption and Gmail 
caused frustration at times because there were so many details needed to 
remember in order to send encrypted RFIs, those were factors that slowed 
down the information analysis and problem solving. This is a common 
problem; Information security solutions have weakened usability because 
of the extra work demanded by the security solutions. This overall 
diminishes the easiness of communication.  
Chat was used often as a tool for asking for more information. At 
times when a lot of information was coming at the same time, the teams 
made decision of prioritizing messages and that caused that they forgot 
the previous messages when they received new data. Also, when trying to 
use other teams technical services, there were failures a couple of time in 
information access. The automation of technical information sharing did 
not decrease the amount of human interaction. Email, chat and voice were 
used to share information and sharing was crucial in order to teams put 
pieces together to solve the scenario. The automation did not decrease the 
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amount of pulling information. Different types of communication means 
were used to pull information. 
There are three organizational level factors such as MOC structure, 
SOP and training are affecting the team. As a result the problem solving 
process needs to be implemented as a SOP. SOP should be built on 
problem solving process. MOC teams understood the basic idea of the 
problem solving process but the implementation of it in the teams during 
the scenarios was not executed well.   
We need to have more practical instructions how to execute the 
problem solving process and provide the tools for that. White Cell (WC) 
was organized in a sufficient way. There were times when the teams had 
difficulties using all of the available resources because they felt limited 
because of the scenario. Limitations regarded issues such as contacting 
higher headquarters, getting historical data and mismatches in the AIS 
feed related to the scenario. Nevertheless, the White Cell’s role was as 
clear as it can be in this kind of experimentation. Some MOC teams were 
well structured so there were not people in the same MOC working on the 
same task without knowing about the duplication. If the MOC teams had 
informally decided the division of tasks, it was possible to see redundant 
tasking. SOP was not used efficiently enough. It did not support as much 
the MOC teams as it could be. In the future problem solving process 
should correlate with each other.  
 The MOC teams were not trained with an example scenario that 
would have helped them to understand the experimentation. Lack of 
knowledge of other MOC team’s technical capabilities caused some MOC 
teams to hesitate contacting and asking for more information from other 
MOCs. Knowledge of other MOC team’s capabilities is vital when teams 
are encouraged to share information and consider other team’s 
capabilities as sources and tools. 
3.5 Overall MNE5 MSA findings 
According to Bolstad & Endsley (2003a) supporting of situational 
awareness can be done through the use of collaborative tools and 
techniques that support different type of collaboration and co-operation. 
The list of collaborative tools is quite wide; face to face interaction, video 
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conferencing, audio conferencing, telephone, networked radio, 
chat/instant messaging, white board, file transfer, program sharing, email, 
groupware, bulletin board and domain specific tools (Bolstad & Endsley 
2003, 1). In MNE5 MSA experimentations we provided voice, chat, 
email, file transfer and whiteboards as the main collaborative tools for the 
participating teams to interact within the team and with other teams. In 
Table 2, depending of the type of and need for co-operation, collaboration 
characteristics can be described as follows according to Bolstad & 
Endsley (2003): 1) Type of collaboration – whether the collaboration will 
occur at the same time (synchronously or asynchronously), 2) 
predictability of collaboration – whether the collaboration will occur as 
scheduled or at unscheduled times 3), place of collaboration – whether the 
collaboration will occur in co-located or distributed environment and 4) 
degree of interaction – whether the collaboration will need simple one-
way communications or a lot of interactivity (Bolstad & Endsley 2003a, 
3-4; see also Bolstad & Endsley (2003b). 
The basic types of communication have distinctive features. Real-time 
and interactive communication such as phone call and video conference 
require simultaneous presence. This interruption can affect individual’s 
concentration. One way, real-time communication such as bulletin boards 
and radio have the problem of verifying at the information is received. 
Two ways, non-real-time communication such as chat and email are less 
distractive and allows prioritization but the interaction suffers and there is 
a possibility for misinterpretation. Spoken communication is easier and 
faster way to communicate but the difficulty is that is not repeatable. 
Written communication is more accurate, although it also includes the 
possibility for misunderstanding, but it is easy to refer back to the text and 
check the content.   
Table 2 describes how tools can be categorized based on the 
collaboration characteristics. The original tool category includes wider list 
of special type of tools. In Table 2 tools used in MNE5 MSA 
experimentation are described. Like in the Table 2, different levels of 
interactions were also seen in the experimentation. Depending on the 
collaboration characteristics, tools were used in different situations. The 
most used collaboration tool was chat. It was informal and easy way to 
get in contact with other teams for more information. 
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The collaboration characteristics (Table 2) reflect also the 
experimentation; in the distributed environment teams received almost 
instant reply or feedback after sending messages via chat. Teams were 
more aware of each other while using chat. The usage of email was more 
formal and times to reply where a lot longer than with using chat. Teams 
were focusing a lot to the format and form of the email which caused the 
time delays. Informal chat communication was unstructured and more 
efficient way for quick communication and details. It is also an important 
aspect to understand that if there were several cases going on, following 
of the chat discussion might be more challenging but in this particular 
setting it supported efficient information exchange (Bolstad & Endsley 
2003a, 4, Table 1). 
 
Table 2. Taxonomy of collaboration and collaboration characteristics 
 
 
  Collaboration characteristics  
Tool 
Category 
 Time Predictability Place Inter-
action 
Face-to-
Face 
Synchronous Scheduled or 
Unscheduled 
Collocated High 
Telephone Medium-High 
synchronicity 
Unscheduled Distributed Medium-
High 
Chat Med-High 
synchronicity 
Semi-scheduled 
or Unscheduled 
Distributed Medium-
High 
White board Synchronous or 
asynchronous 
Scheduled or 
Unscheduled 
Distributed or 
Collocated 
Mode-rate 
File transfer Asynchronous Unscheduled Distributed or 
Collocated 
Low 
Email Asynchronous Unscheduled Distributed or 
Collocated 
Mode-
rate-Low 
Domain 
Specific 
Tools 
Synchronous or 
asynchronous 
Scheduled or 
Unscheduled 
Distributed or 
Collocated 
Low 
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In Table 3 tool characteristics are divided to three different categories:  
1) Recordable/traceable - does the tool provide traceability of the 
collaboration,  
2) identifiable – does the tool reliably identify others involved in 
the collaboration and  
3) structured – does the tool allow unstructured or structured 
communications?  
From the experimentation we got evidence that when team 
members had a good level of confidence in identifying other 
participants and collaboration was more unstructured, participants 
were much confident using tools and sharing information (Bolstad 
& Endsley 2003a, 4, Table 2). 
Table 3. Taxonomy of collaboration and tool characteristics modified for 
the MNE5 MSA framework  
 
Bolstad & Endsley (2003a) also identify different Information Types. 
The degree to which the various collaborative tools support the 
transmission of different information types is presented in Table 4 as 
modified version of the original  Bolstad & Endsley (2003, 5, Table 3). 
Information types that may be involved in collaboration include:  
 
1. verbal (speech) information,  
2. textual information,  
 Tool characteristics  
Tool Category Recordable Identifiable Structured 
Face-to-Face No High Unstructured 
Telephone Possible Good Unstructured 
Chat Moderate Good Unstructured 
White board Moderate Moderate or Good Unstructured 
File transfer Good ?? Unstructured or 
Structured 
Email Good Good Semi-structured 
Domain 
Specific Tools 
Low Poor Structured 
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3. spatial/graphical information,  
4. emotional information – including for example workload, 
competence, and anxiety, 
5. photographic information and  
6. video information.  
 
In face-to-face communications it is possible to include the transmission 
of all these information types, but there are also tools that are very poor or 
unable to support the transmission of certain information types well 
(Bolstad & Endsley 2003a, 5, Table 3).  
Table 4. Taxonomy of collaboration and information types modified for 
the MNE5 MSA framework 
 
  Infor mation types   
Tool 
Category 
Verbal Textual Spatial/ 
Graphica
l 
Emotional Photographic Video 
Face-to-Face Good Good Good High Good Good 
Telephone Good None None Moderate None None 
Chat None Good None Poor None None 
White Board None Moderat
e 
Good Poor Good None 
File Transfer None Good Good None Good Modera
te 
(pre-
recorde
d) 
Email None Good None Poor None None 
Domain 
Specific Tools 
Poor Good (if 
program 
supports
) 
Good (if 
program 
supports) 
Poor Good (if 
program 
supports) 
Good 
(if 
progra
m 
support
s) 
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The tools used in the MNE5 MSA experimentation, support in 
different ways the shared situational awareness that is crucial for a 
successful co-operation. In face-to-face interaction and using telephone 
the support for the shared SA is in the level of Medium-High, but when 
teams start using chat or email, shared SA is at Moderately-Low -level 
according to Bolstad & Endsley (2003a, 5-6, Table 4). Dedicated specific 
tools are ranked to have high-level support to shared SA but this means 
systems that are dedicated for supporting data gathering and information 
tracking. In MNE5 MSA this meant teams’ own technical systems such as 
MEVAT.  
After the description of the experimentation environment, 
technological setup and used methods, we can continue to analyze the 
findings according to the previously described theoretical basics of 
situational awareness affecting information sharing and co-operation. 
Based on the lessons learned from the overall MNE5 MSA an improved 
process model was developed and it will be presented after the MNE6 
presentation.  
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4 CASE STUDY MNE6 MISA-EM 
While MNE5 MSA focused on situational awareness in domestic waters, 
Multinational Experimentation 6, Multinational Interagency Situational 
Awareness of the Extended Maritime environment, MISA-EM, focused 
on remote or distant areas, where indigenous capabilities hardly exist and 
the environment is not well understood. MISA-EM conceptual framework 
was developed to create an accurate awareness of unprepared maritime 
environment, shared by the spectrum of involved stakeholders in a 
multinational framework, to facilitate safety, security and environmental 
protection. I was, like in MNE 5, the Finnish lead analyst, co-leading the 
case study experimentation with my Spanish colleague. The data 
collection was a team effort and I was able to closely observe the MISA-
EM team. All the data was verified also with the experimentation team to 
diminish the error margin. Basic data collection methods, such as 
observation and interviews and special methods to capture SA were used 
to understand the entire collected raw data in order to understand the 
whole. The basic raw collected data form the case study provided critical 
insights to develop the concept presented in this dissertation.  
The Multinational Experiment 6, Objective 4.2, MISA-EM was 
divided into two separate Limited Objective Experiment (LOEs). LOE 1 
was organized in Helsinki, Finland 9
th
–11th March, 2010. The aim of the 
LOE 1 was to 1) prioritize the most important challenges in the maritime 
situational awareness in unprepared waters and, 2) analyze some of the 
solutions that MISA-EM conceptual framework has proposed to address 
those challenges. 3) new innovative solutions were also welcomed. The 
experiment was an expert panel where both the facilitated discussions and 
the orchestrated assessments were captured through a collaboration tool 
and analyst observations. Scenario-based LOE 2 took place in Cartagena, 
Spain 26
th
 – 30
th
 April 2010. The MNE6 MISA-EM timeline is presented 
in Figure 28. 
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13. Concept development in Helsinki, Finland (4th to 7th Oct 2010) 
lessons learnt, concept finalization 
12. Concept development in Riihimäki , Finland (17th Aug 2010) 
11. Concept development in Madrid, Spain (21st to 23rd Jun 2010) 
10. LOE analysis in Madrid, Spain (24th to 28th May 2010) 
analysis report  
9. Technical capability demonstration in Turku, Finland (11th May 2010)  
8. LOE 2 in Cartagena, Spain (26th to 30th Apr 2010)  
7. LOE 2 rock drill in Cartagena, Spain (22th to 25th Mar 2010) 
tool and procedure testing 
6. LOE 1 in Helsinki, Finland (9th to 11th Mar 2010) 
5. Concept Development in Singapore (18th to 22nd Jan 2010)  
data collection plan 
4. Concept development workshop in Madrid, Spain (24th to 26th Nov 2009) 
theoretical framework 
3. Concept development workshop in Cartagena, Spain (5th to 9th Oct 2009)  
2. CD&E training in Tuusula, Finland (1st to 3rd Sep 2009) 
experiment design draft 
1. Concept development workshop in Madrid, Spain (27th to 29th May 2009) 
 
Figure 28: Timeline of  MNE6 MISA-EM case study events 
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4.1 MNE6 MISA-EM LOE-1 
In the LOE 1 the expert panel was separated to three groups. Three 
sequential sessions: 1) information requirements/cultural aspects, 2) 
processes/structures and 3) technological aspects) dealt with information 
sharing and interaction or coordination among the relevant stakeholders in 
building better situational awareness. The experiment was executed via 
facilitated discussion with pre-drafted challenges and solutions 
(statements), together with computer-assisted assessment (surveys) and 
information collection. The facilitators were given freedom to adjust and 
focus their group discussions to maximize the yield of new insights and 
innovations. Facilitators had to find the balance between creative 
discussions and more orchestrated assessments and surveys. All three 
facilitators created different but successful approach to reach the goals. It 
should be noted that the groups differed in their voting pattern: Group1 
stopped using the voting system after the first session – thus all data from 
sessions 2 and 3 are from groups 2 and 3 (Koskinen, Vuorisalo & 
Boseaus, 2010).  
4.1.1 Session 1: Information requirements and cultural 
aspects  
The presented challenges and solutions in session 1 were related to 
understanding other actors, sensitive information, new information and 
cultural understanding. The challenges and solutions were developed by 
the MNE 6 team to test the participants’ views on information 
requirement and culture related issues. The proposed challenges and 
solutions were taken as such, and results were analyzed reflecting how the 
experimentation audience reflected their own views to these issues. 
(Koskinen, Vuorisalo & Bosaeus, 2010).  
Highlights relevant for this dissertation context from the session 1 are 
presented below. For example participants felt that understanding other 
actors, issues related to sensitive or new information and cultural 
understanding solutions are affordable but they are not complete. 
 Observations and Subject Matter Expert (SME) comments are 
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categorized by themes, in bold. Quotes from SME inputs are in italics.  
The conversations focused on reasons to share information; it should 
not be based on each ones benefit but on the goal of the project, the 
common good. For example comments on stopping the piracy and asking 
the question to whom to share information. Groups identified 
actors/stakeholders. Participants listed actors such as communities, 
owners, government, secure, non-secure, industry, taxpayers, public, 
research, military, environment protection, safety, other countries, media, 
criminals, terrorists, commercial companies, international agencies and 
consumers. Different domains such as government secure and public, 
research, industry/owners (economical), environment, communities, and 
tax-payers were mentioned. Identifying different stakeholders raises also 
the importance of being able to identify all the stakeholders that may have 
an impact related to the situation we are building the SA of.  
 
“When different actors are involved we have to face the different 
interests these countries or entities have with regard to this particular 
state.” 
“Some technical solutions exist like ontologies and culture free map 
symbologies. Much more could be done on technical level starting 
from different ways of communication in different cultures: in some 
cultures you cannot talk just straightforwardly face-to-face etc. 
Culture dependent communication processes should be analyzed.”  
“It is important to analyze each stakeholder: using the willingness to 
share vs. capable to share matrix. Only then, you can identify each of 
the stakeholders´ need. For someone who is not willing to share, then 
you develop confidence building measure, for someone who is not 
capable to share, then you develop capacity building program, and for 
those who are willing and capable to share, then you develop 
interoperability solutions.”  
 
After identifying the actors around the maritime environment, the 
question of sharing rose. There was a question of individuals and 
organizations wanting to receive but not having the willingness to share. 
There was also discussion about “what’s in it for me?”  How the 
information sharing needs to be institutionalized beyond simple point-to-
point contact. Sharing was seen as a risk, so discussions were linked also 
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to cultural awareness.  
A lot of discussion concerned the lack of trust and trust meaning 
willingness to share. Trust was seen the basic building block that supports 
and allows sharing of information. The SMEs emphasized the issue of 
trust is crucial: Trust is more important than technology. While building 
trust, one should also build a process of cooperation and not only focus on 
information sharing. The cooperation should build on common goals and 
interests and should highlight the benefits of cooperation. Moreover, it is 
important to highlight the benefits of cooperation and cooperation should 
also include local actors.  
 
“Cultural and legal issues need more analyzing”. 
“More training and awareness is particularly required to ensure trust 
is achieved between owners and third parties.” 
 
There was also the question of the nature of the information. 
Information was considered as power. It is also important to understand 
financial, legal and cultural aspects of other actors. There are actors that 
do not share because they are afraid information misuse. The different 
levels of information were discussed. There were also comparison of 
maritime traffic and air traffic; what are the similarities and differences in 
these contexts that we could learn about?  And also we need to categorize 
the type of information that we want to share; whether it is AIS, radar, 
satellite, Intel, etc. In another words, we need to identify the information 
sources but also content, whether is secure or non-secure and also 
different data types. The focus need to be not only on security advantages, 
but also maritime safety and environment protection as well, according to 
the discussions of the participants. 
There was also the question of the quality of the information, and 
understanding others capabilities, if we are expecting higher quality than 
we are receiving.  There are real life examples, how the information 
control is done and group comments stated that global network is the 
solution but the problem is how to build it.   
According to the discussions, there should be a commonly agreed 
standard how to share information.  Context also became an issue; are 
we talking about normal situation or crisis. What are the motivations for 
sharing information? There should be a permanent basis for normal 
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activities to help confidence building.  
Trust is always built on respect. It is important to acknowledge that 
there are also issues like corruption affecting possible collaboration. 
Based on the conversations, respect is the starting point. Only then can a 
fruitful co-operation work. It is also important to respect the limitations 
given around the information being exchanged. But first we need the 
need for exchanging. Key issues raised are: Common concern, basic 
global structure, framework that is scalable, mechanism to distinct 
relevant information, a system to rank information in terms of usefulness. 
We need the basic building block, the foundation before we can talk about 
technology. Information sharing at all levels is very difficult to achieve. 
Common goals must clearly be defined for all stake holders to achieve 
success, referring to the discussions of the SMEs.  
A set of predefined information requirements should be developed for 
each general or broad area such as piracy and human smuggling, etc. 
Stakeholders can agree in advance on levels of information sharing.  
 
“Every kind of information is not needed by every stakeholder. Only 
those who are legally authorized to act and use sensitive information 
are able to use it. They can of course ask help for actions from other 
actors.” 
“Organization and individuals need to have adequate understanding 
about the independencies between the stakeholders to balance 
between trust, risk, effort and reward in sharing information. “ 
 
Technology is not an opposite to trust or similar issues, as stated in 
the results of the discussions. Technology does not solve the problem of 
trust, but it can be used in a way that it supports the establishment of trust 
and enforcement. Technology is not one single-shaped thing but can have 
bad or good implementations. Developing trust-making human processes 
and technical development should advance as an iterative process.  
 
“Once the trust and purpose has been established, the overcoming of 
legal and cultural aspects can be made easier. Technology is just an 
enabler, not the solution.”  
 
The SMEs comments included situations where many persons within 
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the intelligence community mistakenly use their security clearance as an 
indication of their competency - just because they have clearance. This 
creates a false impression. Most classified information may be scrubbed 
and then availed to the greater group for the greater good. Often agencies 
will "hide" behind a classification in order to protect that information 
from being shared. There were also comments that the 'intelligence' 
community should only collect intelligent data. Base or core data that is 
not sensitive should be collected by another agency so it is freely 
available for other purposes. There was a discussion about sharing raw 
data because most "raw data" is not classified. Most of the "elaborated 
information" is sensitive. Raw data exchange could work as a confidence 
building tool. After this the next step is when elaborated information is 
tailored by user. There has to be mechanisms to request for information 
(pull).   
Sensitive information is not automatically shared with everybody 
(push). There is the possibility that competition may prevent from sharing 
even if trust exists. There is also information that can be time sensitive. 
The participants also need the permission to share – in an operation the 
mandate (e.g. UN) allows stakeholders to share data. SMEs noted that 
sensitive information is often used as an excuse for not sharing 
information and that it takes time to make people understand that we 
should move forward to achieve a real "need to share" environment. 
Further, it is quite a different problem to share information within your 
own coalition and build up co-operation with local actors. 
 
“Meta information for datasets should be available when dealing with 
sensitive information. Sometimes you have to give information without 
conditions in order to create functional conditions. Follow up is 
needed. Solution should discuss more about declassifying information, 
making it less sensitive in order to share it with others. “ 
“Again the benefits of exchange should be the motivation for the 
information sharing. This should be stated in the agreement.  There 
has to be a will, a clear need, and a strong agreement before one can 
start sharing sensitive information. “ 
“Acknowledging differing security environments is an important 
step.” 
“More emphasis should be made on simplifying how sensitive 
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information is classified and on declassification. “  
“There is a challenge in putting the system in affect.”  
“How to enforce non willing actors to cooperate and give the 
information demanded?”  
 
There was discussion about the will and an agreement. Trust is 
always built on respect. It is important to understand the difference of the 
trust in the person with whom you are sharing, value of the information 
you are sharing (risk to share), effort you need to expend to share and 
reward you would expect from sharing. Organizational agreements can be 
in conflict with individual values. There may be a political unanimity but 
still the individual attitudes can vary. 
How to pull and push new information? When developing something 
it is important to remember that without being open you'll end up 
situation with different models, approaches etc. Based on the discussions, 
there is a need for procedures on how to navigate and operate in new 
areas. These rules should be discussed and accepted by all the parties 
(stakeholders). These rules should include procedures how to inform of 
your movement when entering the area.  
There are a lot of challenges that individual actors face in new 
cultures, next challenge is about comprehensive cultural analysis. Some 
of the audience felt that if the aviation can do it there is hope for the 
maritime environment as well. But we also need to understand that the 
environment is always a context-driven. There was also a question could 
certain areas/environments be monitored continuously to make them more 
well-known? We would need to emphasize info sharing in that way as 
well.  
Trust is built upon treating parties, but the trust might not be equally 
built. Sophisticated interagency sharing is achievable but after first 
identifying common and mutual benefits about why to share. Issue of 
lowest common denominator information exchange by other groups was a 
very valid point. It is always the operators that benefit from shared 
information as they have to deal with changing operational situations. 
There was a discussion about the need for a baseline agreement; each 
stakeholder will provide minimum level of information. Terms of 
reference (TOR) are to be created. Cohesion is an important issue; 
baseline should be created according to the participants’ discussion. 
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“Once political will has gathered countries or any other stakeholders, 
there is evidently room to share info. Now the most efficient way to do 
so seems to quickly identify the lowest common denominator (in terms 
of sensitivity) that will gather the largest number of actors. Any more 
enriched info or Intel should be shared from point to point. From my 
experience, this enables to address 80 pct of a problem.”  
 
There is also the challenge of creating generic solutions for a 
successful MSA. Solutions should derive from a unique context. An 
example of MSA around the Gulf of Aden was given. All agencies 
involved are keen stakeholders who are ready to go cross-sector in this 
operation. Connecting all the countries in Europe is a completely different 
issue.   
Overall discussion included concerns about in what ways we can find 
out information, how to learn about other countries when we are going to 
areas that we are not familiar with. How to define and get relevant 
information, different stakeholders, different needs and what are the 
relevant stakeholders. Presented challenges seem to reflect the 
participants’ views. The solutions were a good starting point for 
discussions but there are still several steps need to be taken before we are 
able to build concrete solutions to address the information requirements 
and cultural aspects. One might disagree with the views given by the 
SMEs but their explanations are good examples of the complexity and 
multi-layer environment we are dealing with. Different stakeholders and 
interest groups have their own professional and personal views, how they 
reflect the reality. In this dissertation the comments are considered as one 
possible way interpret the co-operation framework. From the SME’s 
comments and discussions, it was possible to gain point of views to 
support the creation of the conceptual model. (Koskinen, Vuorisalo & 
Bosaeus, 2010). 
4.1.2 Session 2: Processes and structures  
 
The challenges and solutions in session 2 were related to commonly 
agreed processes, co-operative structure, modeling and preparedness for 
98 
 
transitions. The challenges and solutions were developed by the MNE 6 
team to test the participants views, related to processes and structures 
issues. The proposed challenges and solutions were taken as such, and 
results were analyzed reflecting how the experimentation audience 
reflected their own views to these issues (Koskinen, Vuorisalo & 
Bosaeus, 2010).  
The highlights relevant for this dissertation from the session 2 are 
described below. For example participants felt that understanding other 
actors, issues related to sensitive or new information and cultural 
understanding solutions are affordable but they are not complete. The 
SMEs were not convinced of the adequacy, feasibility or affordability of 
the challenges and solutions. Observations and SME comments are 
categorized by themes, in bold. Quotes from SME inputs are in italics.  
Rather than looking at information sharing mechanisms it was 
suggested that focus should be drawn on standards for information 
sharing. Moreover, when discussing mechanisms, classified information 
sharing mechanisms should not be left out. A good way ahead could be 
the identification and definition of the Information Exchange 
Requirements (IER) and based on these build up a Business Process 
Model (BPM). There were some examples given during the conversations 
about airlines and banking/credit cards; how to take advantage of existing 
global system, which has already tackled most of the information sharing 
issues. A model is a step towards measurements and verification of the 
goodness of the solution. In the model creation process we need to take 
the risk management and planning and before that we can do the 
stakeholder analysis.  
For the co-operative structure a challenge is that there is no historical 
data from distant waters, understanding of the new area of interest, we 
have not been successful in integrating the different actors and 
coordinating it. There are issues back home that need to be tackled before 
understanding activities in new areas of interest. Without modeling there 
is no comprehensive approach. Activities will never be realized as they 
were modeled, but it is important to learn the modeling process so that it 
can be applied when needed in the real situation.  
Different interests of different actors raised concern. It was noted that 
setting the info-sharing governance in place is key because sharing of 
maritime info across agencies and countries is not inherently natural. The 
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navy may find it what the big deal of sharing AIS info is but the 
commercial companies may not think so. Therefore it is fundamental to 
set the governance right in info-security and assurance when debating 
information sharing. 
Human intervention/participation in info-sharing process is an 
important aspect. Face to face communication prior to an event 
(crisis/operation) is essential to establishing trust during a crisis. It should 
be noted that the question of trust was articulated across sessions and 
challenges. The fact that processes have a very strong human dimension 
should not be forgotten. Often opinions tended to focus on technical 
issues.  
When creating SA, pre-crisis action was discussed. There is a need to 
identify possible crisis scenarios and then establish small permanent cells 
that will become the basis for the co-operative structure when crisis 
escalates. The competence of those local experts and liaison officers is 
deemed important, in order to have an information network already before 
the crises situation. Some SMEs felt that creating common operating 
centers in distant theatres is difficult or impossible, and at the same time 
others felt that common coordinating center can be achievable.  
 
“Very feasible. Perhaps a concept for a standard common situational 
awareness center could be agreed among key players before any 
crisis.” 
 
The need for a standard operating procedure was recognized in 
suggestions that the framework could be kind of standard procedure 
which ensures the right communication between all the stakeholders.  
When developing models you need validation platforms to 
understand their accuracy and reliability. Models of co-operation and 
development of situational awareness is based on observations and theory 
on communication contexts. When the first model is outlined it is then 
tested in various exercises or real life situations. This model can help 
actors to find their roles and relationships as well as the various 
communication modes that are useful in different contexts.  
We should not look information sharing as processes only. 
Information is shared in different contexts and identifying them is 
important. Various contexts overlap and in one "process" many types of 
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communication happen.  
Complement the solution explaining that validation of the model must 
be done through the observation of exercises.  
To really know if a model is sustainable it has to be tested over time. 
Only then does one know if it has the capability to change with the 
challenges.  
The use of existing solutions was highlighted. For example in 
modeling, we should take into account: existing architecture frameworks 
such as NATO Architectural Framework (NAF) or Ministry of Defense 
Architectural Framework (MoDAF) etc. Moreover, research on 
communication and information contexts was mentioned. 
 
“Use of recognized models will enable more ready acceptance by the 
various actors, rather than creating a new one.” 
 
Transitions raised a lot of debate and inputs from the SMEs. 
Regionalism was emphasized in claims that the definition of the challenge 
should be more oriented to the achievement of a regional solution for the 
maritime situational awareness rather than host nation. The SA capacity 
development must be seen and planned in the overall Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) framework. Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) is 
essential for any nation, and part of nation building. Nation building and 
local ownership were themes that were also present in the inputs, while, at 
the same time recognizing that transitions might increase the mission 
scope since a successful transition might require support beyond the dock. 
 
“Local ownership is probably more important than an optimal 
solution. “ 
“Local ownership probably requires compromises between optimal 
solution (from coalition point of view) and what sustainable and 
doable and needed from the local perspective. “ 
“The need of transitions is not situational awareness but capacity and 
infrastructure building. “ 
  
During the session 2 the focus were on the procedures and finding 
concrete working examples that could be modified and modeled to serve 
the maritime community. Discussion focused on social networking, the 
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need to put people before technology. There was a discussion of proactive 
steps. 
Evolving network of highly committed stakeholders that requires 
common interest, common benefits and open sources. Standard 
foundation (products & services) that needs to be mutually beneficial and 
have a dataset/baseline. Need to feed the social network by identifying 
point of contact.  
There was a discussion of information sharing: Fear, loss of power of 
control, over clarification/de-clarification, dependency on technology. 
Real power is in the social networking. The challenges related to 
processes and structures are tried to tackle with issues such as 
standardization, common models and procedures but the solutions still 
lack the element of concrete steps to take upon. The discussion related to 
the processes and structures confirm that these issues are important and 
need to be tackled to support the collaboration and gaining adequate level 
of awareness. (Koskinen, Vuorisalo & Bosaeus, 2010). 
4.1.3 Session 3: Technology  
The challenges in session 3 were related to information sharing, 
interoperability, missing information, customer focus and information 
overload. The challenges and solutions were developed by the MNE 6 
team to test the participants views, related to processes and structures 
issues. The proposed challenges and solutions were taken as such, and 
results were analyzed reflecting how the experimentation audience 
reflected their own views to these issues (Koskinen, Vuorisalo & 
Bosaeus, 2010).  
The highlights related to this dissertation of the session 3 are 
described next. For example information overload and interoperability 
where considered to be most challenging regarding the completeness of 
the proposed solutions. SMEs were not convinced of the adequacy, and 
they also raised questions of the feasibility of the challenges and 
solutions. Observations and SME comments are categorized by themes, in 
bold. Quotes from SME inputs are in italics.  
Overall, the technological frame suffers from issues of technological 
maturity and legal acceptability. Moreover, the cost-benefit ratio of 
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building new vs. enhancing existing systems should be examined. 
Overall, technology’s role should be to help with decision-making, that is, 
technology should not be developed just for technology’s sake. Further, 
all technological possibilities should be explored when aiming to gain a 
better situational awareness. 
Smart agents and anomalies were often at the center of attention as 
smart agents were seen as key to detect anomalies and anomaly detection 
is the key to reduce workloads.  
 
”I see here the smart agents as a generic set of tools to analyze data 
and visualize it for decision making. System can be designed to 
concentrate to anomalies, thus helping operators job.” 
 
It was discussed that detection of anomalies happens in two phases: 
first analysis of the data sets and identifying the "normal"; then 
comparing the situation with the normal behaviors and detection the 
difference. Critique was raised as well: 
 
”Need to define terms. Anomaly means different things to different 
organizations.” 
 
Moreover, it was felt that smart agents were still not enough. Filtering 
of data is needed to gain the wanted information, and all computational 
methods (not just “smart agents”) are needed in this task. It was suggested 
that a more general term than smart agents is used in the solution, for 
example, advanced computational and visual methods. This term covers 
all from programming smart agent type solutions, use of spatial-temporal 
statistical analysis or other spatial data mining (Trajectory data mining 
methods) like identifying typical patterns, densities etc.   
Harmonization was seen as important:  
 
“Here harmonization is a key word and the joint agreed interfaces for 
data transfer“, yet it was also stated that “This shouldn't only be 
about harmonization. Also, completely different types of info should be 
fused.” 
 
Regarding the question of interoperability, the solution would make 
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it difficult for a new actor to partake in a process. If this actor is deemed 
as important, a new system would have to be constructed anyway. 
Moreover, there are four aspects to Interoperability between applications:  
1. It is partially a technical question; this part can be 
solved by applying standardized data formats and 
interfaces.   
2. Another issue in interoperability is the harmonization 
of the data bases, data contents; that can be solved by 
ontologies up to some extent at least.   
3. The third question is then the organizational part; how 
easily organizations want to follow the standards and 
participate in the harmonization process.   
4. The fourth part is the presentation of the data contents; 
that can be solved by generating common symbologies 
for example to the situation picture map. 
Furthermore, when thinking about interoperability, ongoing 
interoperability initiatives, such as the ones managed by the EU, should 
not be ignored. The SMEs commented on interoperability actively: 
 
”It is risky to state that organizations need to develop their own 
systems because there are already developed systems that could be 
shared by different organizations.”  
”There will be legacy systems. Need to adopt parallel tracks to 
interface legacy systems and at same time to agree on 
protocols/standard for new info sharing systems.”  
”Need to focus on problem solving and less on getting more data. “ 
“There are still some technical issues if we want to include interfaces 
to new technologies such as S-AIS for instance. IMO and IMSO should 
be seen always as key for the achievement of standardization and 
interoperability.” 
“Again a new temporary actor would have it difficult to integrate into 
the new community. A plug and play solution-platform might therefore 
be important, at least as a complement.”  
 
AIS Information always stayed in the debates, focusing on the fact 
that smaller vessels are not required to have AIS and AIS for larger 
vessels not always required to be on, that is to say that AIS is insufficient. 
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One suggestion was that: 
 
”AIS information should be encrypted and verified so that there will 
be no possibility to switch it off, give false information or even to use 
another ship's transponder in another ship/boat.” 
 
The importance of trust remained underlined – especially in a situation 
where anyone can access and add data etc. Then, we come immediately to 
the problem of trust. When the system is open, nobody can guarantee 
the quality of the information.  
When sharing information, there is the issue of public vs. private 
information, and how to identify the source of information.  
Switches between operator vs. decision-maker –point of view was 
observed as some solutions were seen to benefit operators rather than the 
decision-makers. 
 
”Scalability must be very well analyzed because there are tools for 
filtering information also for the decision makers and not only for the 
operators.”  
 
Pre-crisis action was emphasized in this session as well. 
 
”The challenge is that the capability needs to be built before the 
mission. Multi-sensor tracking is fairly difficult to implement. “ 
 
Moreover, local ownership was discussed once more. Dialogue with 
locals was seen as an ideal, yet one must be careful that this is not 
misused (against the coalition / for internal political purposes). Moreover, 
it should be realized that information is not the first in a list of needs: 
often there is a greater need for basics, e.g. electricity.  
 
“..local ownership is crucial. A) The local communities need to have a 
stake in building SA - not just selling info, but using it too! B) 
Technical solutions need to be configured to support the local ways 
and culture - there is no one size fits all solution, especially in terms of 
technology.” 
”Also need to bear in mind the overall local security capacity 
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building. Link and synergies e.g. to overall criminal investigation or 
intelligence capacity building should be made. Relating to this, one 
needs to make sure that the capability that coalition is building is not 
being used A) against the coalition B) as a tool for repression or 
internal power play.” 
“Human intelligence is probably as important in addressing 
communities.”  
”A close dialogue with local communities must take place in order to 
listen to their requirements, instead of imposing them a solution.”  
 
It was also considered that are current internet security protocols are 
valid to protect the kind of info needed to share? This underlines the 
importance of validation. In addition, other SME comments included. 
 
“Use unmanned vehicles.”  
“The solution has to focus on the AOR. (Area of responsibility).”  
“Solutions already exists using public interfaces (for example 
BRITE.)”  
 
 The discussion related to technology shows that technological 
solutions are only enablers and in fact the steps need to be taken are more 
related to standardization, information availability and relevance. The 
discussions related to technological solutions confirm that right type of 
challenges has been identified but there need to be work done in order to 
implement the solutions. Once again the comments from the SMEs can be 
critically analyzed and argue that they are relevant/ not relevant. For the 
context related to this dissertation the most important aspect is the 
participants’ interpretations of the problems and solutions, their view of 
the reality. Since decision making should be based on the best facts 
available, one more challenge is revealed with these answers: The 
individual influence and perspective to comprehend and interpret is a 
relevant and influencing factor in both gaining situational awareness and 
making decisions. SME’s comments also highlight the demanding 
maritime environment, where several dimensions need to be understood 
to support the collaboration and adequate level of information sharing. 
(Koskinen, Vuorisalo & Bosaeus, 2010). 
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4.1.4 Conclusions and recommendations from the LOE-1 
A useful visualization tool was built based on the discussions, reflecting 
the data gained from the experimentation. The willingness-capability 
matrix, presented in Figure 29, can be used to map stakeholders. If the 
willingness exists, it is possible to focus on building needed capacity to 
enhance interoperability. If the capabilities exist, it is important to focus 
on building trust in order to enhance the interoperability (Koskinen, 
Vuorisalo & Bosaeus, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Willingness-capability matrix 
Instead of any detailed final solutions, a logical generic procedure to 
build “common” situational awareness should be shared and implemented 
before crises emerge. An incremental approach should be utilized. 
Technology gets better but it is not the only possible solution. The issue 
remains in understanding the interdependencies (mutual benefit) and the 
power of networking. Understand - and recognize - other stakeholders’ 
objectives, activities, intentions and capabilities.  
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This may be obvious but calls for changes in resource allocations and 
education (comprehensive mindset and cultural awareness). Individuals 
and organizations need to have adequate level of education to balance 
between trust, risk, effort and reward in sharing information. Need for 
early regional inclusion and later local capacity building and transitions. 
Concentrate on collecting, analyzing and sharing the most relevant and 
workable (often unstructured human-to-human) information, instead of 
most/all data between the systems. Much of that information can only be 
changed bilaterally between trusted individuals and only in certain 
circumstances. It is important to make clear that while technology is seen 
enablers, they process information with black and white-mentality. With 
technological solutions we can ensure that the information is transferred 
to the sender without any changes but human behavior is much more 
complicated than zeros and ones. The human logic and inner thinking 
process allow the usage of different grey-levels as well. This has both 
good and bad influences and because of this conflict the human-
technology interface is challenging. These aspects are also taken into 
account in the created conceptual model presented later. 
4.2. MNE6 MISA-EM LOE 2 
 
The ideology behind MISA-EM was to look into new affordable, 
sustainable, scalable, deployable and flexible SA-solutions taking into 
account the multinational and interagency nature of the maritime 
environment. MISA-EM included the development of situational 
awareness of maritime environment, shared by many different involved 
agencies in a multinational framework in order to enable safety, security 
and environmental protection against deliberate attacks in distant areas 
where local capabilities hardly exist.  
4.2.1 Experiment objectives 
The objective for the LOE 2 focused on the suitability of MISA-EM 
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processes and structures to solve the situation awareness problem at the 
maritime realm in support of a military operation in distant theatres. The 
objective of the experiment was to measure the level of Situational 
Awareness in the MISA-EM organization and compare the level of 
Situational Awareness in organization that does not use the MISA-EM 
concept. Goal was to analyze the data and information fusion process 
using deployed mechanisms in remote areas while being supported by 
relevant stakeholders. Mission was to explore whether a standard data and 
information set is suitable to support the required level of situation 
awareness and also to analyze the use of collaborative tools, technology-
related and pull-push procedures as part of the MISA-EM solution. The 
experimentation was build up to three different MOCs that were 
cooperating, designated and deployable MOCs. Skills and functionalities 
of INTERPOL, ECSA, UN, CFCA, NGO and HHQ were played by role 
players. These role players were character actors that helped to establish 
the environment for the experiment by representing, international 
agencies and local entities. (Alvaréz, Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
4.2.2 Experiment design and execution 
 
The LOE-2 was conducted during five days in the ALMART HQ in 
Cartagena, Spain (26
th
 – 30
th
 April 2010). The first day was devoted to 
training the audience, three days of actual experimentation, and a final 
day for hot wash-up and first impressions reports. With this time 
available, instead of using one experimental unit and conduct multiple 
runs with different treatments, a multi-group design was chosen. Separate 
treatments were administered to two different MOCs and the same 
scenario was run simultaneously for both; The baseline treatment 
consisted on a set of tools and procedures already available in a standard 
MOC. BRITE was used as the standard COP tool with all the on-line 
help, additional applications, data bases and smart agents. The SOP for 
the baseline MOC was based on the Maritime Operation and Surveillance 
Centre, Centro de Operaciones y Vigilancía de Acción Marítima 
(COVAM) procedures tied with add-ins from contributing nations. 
MISA-EM treatment consisted on a different Standard Operating 
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Procedures that included a more detailed stakeholder analysis, a data set 
with an automatic classification matrix and a collaborative portal for 
interagency interaction. MOCs were physically separated in two rooms 
and they were working in different networks so that information flow was 
not possible from one MOC to the other and vice versa. MISA-EM MOC 
consisted of the following roles: Watch Captain (WC), Assistant Watch 
Captain (AWC); two Tool Managers, and Information Manager. Roles 
inside Non MISA-EM MOC consisted of Watch Captain, Assistant 
Watch Captain, Data Base Manager, Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) 
Manager and Information Manager. For Inter Agency (IA) roles there 
were two persons. For the experiment control Experiment Control 
(EXCON) team consisted of EXCON Leader, two EXCON Supervisors 
(one for each MOC), two EXCON Operators and two Technical 
Operators. In the experimentation there were six data collectors for each 
MOC and one data collector for each IA experiment player. Analysis 
were handled with lead analysts one for both MOC and four analysts, two 
for each MOC. 
 The specified observations made during the experimentation are 
presented from the MISA-EM MOC 1 and observations are focusing on 
the leadership role of the Watch Captain (WC). The Experiment Design 
and hypothesis with the MISA-EM treatment and none MISA-EM 
treatment is presented in Figure 30 (Alvaréz, Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 
2010). 
 
 
4.2.3 Experiment design and execution 
 
The scenario for the event was set in the Gulf of Aden and the eastern 
coast of Africa where data gathering is difficult and conditions match the 
MISA-EM definitions for unprepared theatres. Circumstances required an 
interagency and military effort to build up SA in support of a 
multinational maritime. Three main vignettes were prepared for each one 
of the experiment days.  
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Figure 30: Experiment design 
The scenario involved up to seven different agencies with which the 
designated MOC had to interact to solve and clarify the picture and obtain 
situation awareness. The scenario injects were given from different 
sources, by smart agent detection and reports send to the MOCs by the 
Higher Headquarter (HHQ) or directly by the stakeholders using the 
established communication channels. These channels were the 
collaborative tool and email for the MOC 2 and fax/email for the MOC 1.  
 
 
4.2.4 Experiment design and execution 
 
MOC teams were building up SA while they were reacting to scenario 
injects. Used methods were Situation Awareness Global Assessment 
Technique (SAGAT) presented in Appendix G and subjective SA for self-
based evaluation, Situation Awareness Behaviorally Anchored Rating 
Scale (SABARS) presented in Appendix E, interviews and  observations 
in addition to system logs and recordings to measure the levels of SA 
attained by each team. Unstructured interview is presented in Appendix F. 
The subjective SA test was designed to capture the confidence of each 
operator on their performance and ability to perceive data elements, 
comprehend the situation and make projections of future event in support 
of the team SA. Many SA studies have used these subjective measures as 
an interesting way to compare what the players think they knew about the 
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developing situation with what they actually did know. These tests were 
administered to operators via Internet by sending links to the web site 
once for each experiment session (morning-afternoon). Observer-based 
measures were designed to capture subjective performance of MOC 
operators as well as single actions in respond to scenario injects and 
reasons behind these actions. A simple data collection tool was developed 
and distributed to data collectors for this task. For the purposes of this 
dissertation it was possible to observe especially MISA-EM treatment 
MOC, the MOC 2 and reflect observations particularly to teams 
subjective scoring and test results. (Alvaréz, Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 
2010). 
4.2.5 Observation and findings 
Mental demand followed by temporal demand, effort and frustration were 
the most significant factors that affected the operators’ tasks during the 
experiment according to the NASA TLX findings. Workload measure is 
constructed by combining scores for the six different factors of the NASA 
TLX index presented in Appendix A. Both of the MOCs workload are 
presented in Figure 31 (Alvaréz, Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 31: Workloads of both teams 
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Figure 32 is visualized as sliding transition from each experiment 
session to make the graph more readable, like the other following graphs 
related to the experimentation. It needs to be noted that in reality there 
were breaks between the Experiment sessions described. For example 27-
1 is reflecting to the 27
th
 of April’s first session, 27-2 reflecting to the 27
th
 
of April’s second session.  
Both MOC teams started with the same TLX weighted rating and they 
moved forward in opposing directions. The level of frustration for MOC2 
was high at the beginning, which was probably related to the new 
collaborative tool and the lack of training on both, the tool and the MISA-
EM processes. During the first session of the second day, this level was 
even lower than the one shown by MOC 1, which was still struggling to 
find the correct way to contact stakeholders. These findings seem to 
support the hypothesis of two different learning curves for each team, and 
also the fact that having a collaborative portal and a comprehensive 
stakeholder analysis eases the task for MOC 2 operators.  
  
 
Figure 32: Both MOCs performance and frustration levels  
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Figure 33 present performance and frustration levels of the MOC 
teams adjusted by the group member average. As the frustration level 
went down, the perceived performance did just the opposite. As operators 
advanced in their knowledge of the scenario, tools and processes, their 
perceived performance went up except for the afternoon of the second day 
in MOC 1, whose curve shows a local minimum. MOC 2 performance 
curve follows very closely the frustration level. 
 
 
Figure 33: Global Subjective SA for a) the MOC’s and b) the WC and AWC. 
Lower score represents more confidence and better picture of the situation, 
since the Likert scales were determined to be (1= very effective, very well, 
totally agree, 5=very ineffective  
It was seen during the experimentation and could be captured with 
subjective measures that frustration levels correlate with the performance: 
When the team had issues such as problems with the systems, or too 
much information to be handled, it increased the level of frustration and 
decreased the level of their performance. The change of trend for the 
MOC 2 is outcome of the team starting to feel more confident in their 
performance. MOC 2 began to use the collaborative tool more effectively 
to exchange information as seen in Figure 32 (Alvaréz, Koskinen & 
Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
Operators had different roles and the scores obtained were individual 
perceptions of the workload they were experiencing. The sum across all 
members of the team to get an overall index of task load for the team 
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seemed appropriate for several reasons. The scores for the global SA in 
Figure 33 present how the teams rated the subjective SA. Larger changes 
occurred comparing the decision makers of the teams (Watch Captain 
(WC) and Assistant Watch Captain (AWC)). MOC 1 decision makers had 
smoother level of SA during the entire experimentation while the MOC 2 
started to increase their level of SA at the afternoon session during the 
second experiment day. This concurs with the level of confidence that 
they gained during the experiment presented in the Figure 34 (Alvaréz, 
Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 34: Both MOCs performance and effort levels 
Figure 34 presents both MOC teams workload related to performance 
and effort. It does not seem to be relevant to compare MOC 1 with MOC 
2 related to the performance and effort in the context of this dissertation, 
since they are formed with different individuals and different structure 
and tool set. But what is relevant, and can be learned from this, is how 
both teams felt at times that they had to put much more effort and they 
were not able to perform as effectively as they would have wanted to.  
The issues affecting this phenomenon are much more interesting and 
relevant.  
For the MOC 1 the performance curve seem to have clear ups and 
downs: At the start of every session, the team felt performing better, but 
the performance started to drop during time. For example during 
afternoon Session at the second day, the team felt they had to put more 
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effort related to the rated performance during that time. For the MOC 2 
the graph support observation findings: when the systems and inner 
working process started to work, the team members did not need to put so 
much effort in order to keep a good level of performance compared to the 
beginning of the experimentation. This also points out the value of the 
decision making process, the human involved and tools used in order to 
get the needed awareness to make valid decisions. 
The SAGAT scores proved to be very useful to get SA objective 
measures. Even though, some questionnaires were difficult, operators 
somewhat managed to remember key things that were needed to build up 
the SA picture. The following Figure 35 shows the raw data grouped by 
MOC for each SAGAT query (Alvaréz, Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 
2010). 
1-1, 1-2 to 3-6 are referring to the SAGAT questions. The teams were 
asked a total of 18 question patterns during the experimentation. First 
number indicates the day of the experiment and the second number is the 
ordinal number of the query. 
MOC 2 got higher scores on almost every SAGAT query. The first 
thing observed was the variability of the data related to the Figure 36. 
This was presumably caused by the difference on difficulty from one 
SAGAT query to the next. Even though probe questions were semi-
randomized, it turned out that some queries were more difficult than 
other. This is why it made more sense to look at the difference in means 
than to look at the absolute values of the SAGAT scores.  
At the beginning of the day, there was little difference in MOC’s SA, 
since each day was started with a new vignette. But the differences grew 
larger as the experiment days went on. In the initial phase of seeking key 
information there were not much difference in the SA, but later in the day 
when the needed to build up SA, MISA-EM processes and tools improved 
teams SA.  
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Figure 35: SAGAT scores for MOC 1 and MOC 2 and the difference between 
them. The values were obtained summing the individual scores of all the 
operators of the MOC for each query 
It was interesting to study the level of SA that could have been 
possible to reach by the MOC teams, had they perfectly shared 
information among all team members. To answer this question, a new 
measure was devised. Instead of getting a score for each operator for each 
SAGAT questionnaire did earlier, the number of questions that remained 
unanswered were counted and taken into account of all team members. 
(Alvaréz, Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
The theoretical maximum of SA score is presented in Figure 36. For 
example, in the last SAGAT questionnaire, MOC 2 might have had a 
perfect score of 100 % (instead of 60 %) if they had shared all the 
knowledge. Same issues occur for example related to the SAGAT 
questionnaire 2-5. If we go back to the Figure 35 and take a look at 
SAGAT question from the second day (2-5), we can see that the scores 
are equal (~55 %) for both teams but when comparing to the theoretical 
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maximum, it shows that theoretical maximum for MOC2 was ~70 %, 
when the theoretical maximum for MOC 1 was ~90 %. This also reflects 
to the same issue, if the teams had shared all possible, relevant 
information, they would have had a possibility to gain higher level of 
awareness of the situation. This may reveal the issues around the team 
work validate the need for supporting teams in information sharing and 
managing the information inside the team. These graphs intrigue and 
guide in the search for explanation for these variations but not everything 
can be interpreted based on these graphs. These can be used very 
effectively to point out interesting exceptions and changes in behavior 
that can be further studied with the support of for example observations 
and other methods used in the experimentation (Alvaréz, Koskinen & 
Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
The SABARS instrument represented a developed subjective scale of 
situation awareness behaviors that could be useful tool for evaluating 
maritime operation centers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Theoretical maximum team situation awareness score  
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Since SABARS analysis is provided by several data collector as an 
uncontrolled source of variability, it does not give any added value to 
compare grades obtained from the data collection observers, since distinct 
observers look at operators through different point of views. There are 
two ways to proceed with the analysis, either normalize the data or look at 
the values of the paired differences between MOC’s scores; and examine 
one-to-one grades looking for trends and patterns instead of absolute 
scores. The following Figure 37 shows the sums of scores for all members 
of the MOC as well as the difference between MOCs (Alvaréz, Koskinen 
& Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
Disregarding the absolute values of the SABARS scale, MOC 2 made 
a better progress along the execution of the experiment. In trying to 
understand the reasons of this progress, conducted a factor analysis with 
the SABARS questions supported highlighting three topics: 1) Gathering 
information and following procedures, 2) proactively seeking key 
information, and 3) focusing on the big picture. While MOC 2 showed a 
constant increasing trend on the three factors especially after the first day 
of experimentation, MOC 1 displayed behavior that was just the opposite.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Global SABARS rating for the MOC teams across time. Higher 
scores mean better attitudes, behaviors and performance  
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SSA scores were self-based measures collected via on-line 
questionnaires given to operators at the end of the experiment. They were 
designed to capture behavior, attitude towards information sharing and 
interdependence with interagency. According to the results, MOC 2 
tended to believe that cooperation was a key element of success in the SA 
building process. They were more prone to communicate than MOC 1 
with interagency partners and they felt that MOC 2 policy gave them the 
flexibility to do that. However, they showed some lack in organizational 
trust. Sometimes the team did not know what to expect from IA partners 
or what kind of information they were able to provide. Moreover, they 
had doubts about how partners were going to react or if the information 
provided to them was ever used. This might be explained by the lack of 
feedback they got from IA - played by role actors - on the collaborative 
tool and the fact that just uploading the information on the portal does not 
encourage personal communications and confidence building (Alvaréz, 
Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
4.2.6 Conclusions about the experiment design and results 
 
Technical problems caused volatility of tools and players worked around 
their way to complete their tasks. This caused some disruption in terms of 
players not following standard procedures. Some intrusiveness was 
observed of data collection into player’s tasks. One reason for this was the 
seat assignments. They sometimes did not allow for a perfect perception 
of what players were doing or how they were behaving. Other reason was 
the one-to-some allocation of data collectors to players. 
SAGAT was a valuable tool for SA measurement. However, the 
questionnaires were difficult since they required too much working 
memory; mental demand was the factor that contributed the most to the 
workload of MOC players. The SAGAT questionnaires forced them to 
memorize things that otherwise would be available in any easy-access-
data storage. For this kind of experiments it is recommended that players 
be allowed to use their notes. SA for one person in a complex situation 
such as in a MOC probably includes much more than just what is in their 
working or storage memory. The use of notes might be considered as an 
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active extension of his working memory. Sometimes SAGAT seemed to 
drive operator’s tasks. If the questions have induced an adaptive behavior 
on the operators, this should have been in favor of the best practices of 
maritime situation awareness.  
Importance of data collection was not sufficiently pointed out to MOC 
operators. They felt they were bothered with too many questionnaires that 
did not allow them complete their tasks. Data collection for them was 
secondary. 
According to the final LOE survey, almost all participants agreed on 
that scenario artificialities and injects were very realistic as well as the 
interchange information model and the role played by IA representatives. 
But there was a general lack of training on tools, processes, and data 
collection. This was partially caused by the technical difficulties 
experienced during the rock-drill. The execution of the rock-drill turned 
out to be crucial to detect technical shortfalls in time. Another extra week 
before the LOE should have been programmed just for training.  
Eight hours of experimentation in one day, was too long time period 
according to the participants opinions. We also observed a decreasing 
trend in performance and slight carelessness on the last questionnaires of 
the day (Alvaréz, Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 2010). MISA-EM tools 
and processes, as the treatment of the Experiment have proven to increase 
Situation Awareness on the designated MOC. The new suite of tools and 
procedures required longer learning times; however, interestingly enough, 
they allowed better task assignment within MOC 2. Having more 
independent jobs allowed players to focus on their tasks, find pieces of 
information using the established channels and be ready to assess WC and 
AWC in the SA building processes. The MOC showed a constant 
increasing trend in their objective SA as the experiment day went by.  
Breaking down SA into Endsley’s levels, MISA-EM helped MOC 2 to 
perceive more data and to project how the situation may evolve more 
accurately. However, MOC 2 did not prove to be much better in the 
comprehension process, the difference was lower than expected. The 
evolution across time of the SA gap index, the difference between the 
theoretical maximum SA value and the achieved SA, was favorable to 
MOC 2 only at the end of the day, when they shared the information 
obtained and collaborated with WC to assess the situation.  
This increasing trend on SA is supported by the subjective SA results:  
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Not only MOC 2 was doing better, but also they thought that they were 
making good progress. However, their perceived effectiveness was poor 
at the beginning. This might be explained by the fact that they were given 
a set of tools and procedures they were not familiar with since the 
provided training was clearly insufficient. 
Surprisingly enough, the subjective workload that MOC 2 was 
experiencing was lower than the one of MOC 1. This conveys the idea 
that the new tools did not overload operators with additional tasks as was 
expected at the beginning. The two factors of workload where larger 
differences were observed between MOCs were frustration and 
performance. The frustration level for MOC 2 was high at the beginning, 
in fashion with the unfamiliarity on tools and procedures mentioned 
above. Technical implementation of the collaborative tool was not mature 
enough and participants experienced some difficulties with logic of the 
tools.  The lack of feedback from alerts and posts on the portal decrease 
their trust in interagency representatives. They did not know who was 
reading their comments or if they were ever read. Related to this, the LOE 
2 results show a lack in confidence by MOC 2 players on how to provide 
information to partners. Even though they understood the role of IA 
players and the importance of the relationship with IA in respect to 
information sharing, there were some issues regarding the awareness of 
external actors and information requirements. Although they were 
provided with a comprehensive stakeholder analysis, the confidence, 
trust, and understanding of IA needs and capabilities was not sufficient. 
The stakeholder analysis should include some more guidance to MOCs in 
this respect. MOC standard operating procedures did not include role 
assignments and responsibilities with respect to the new tools. MOC 2 
took more time to organize themselves and to discover all communication 
channels and available tool features. This was also seen in the 
Performance Figure. (Alvaréz, Koskinen & Vuorisalo et al., 2010). 
 
 
  
122 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
5 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CASE 
STUDIES – National vs. multinational team and 
Individual vs. team level analysis  
As presented in the previous chapters, maritime related case studies 
provided useful information to succeed in the attempt to understand the 
complexity of the decision making in a time critical environment. The 
case study data collection was a joint effort and I am grateful that I had 
the opportunity to be involved in planning, designing, capturing and 
collecting the vital data that I could further use for this dissertation 
purposes. Next, the findings from the case studies are presented from the 
national and multinational perspectives as well from the individual and 
shared situational awareness (SSA) point of view based on my 
observations and drawn conclusions according to the gathered data. This 
chapter concludes the lessons learned especially from this dissertations 
research question perspective, while the case study descriptions in 
Chapter 3 and 4 were more related to the case study goals added with my 
observation notes from this focus area of this dissertation. There are 
differences on how individual level SA is formed and how it affects the 
team and gaining of the shared situational awareness and these differences 
are discussed next. 
5.1 Individual perspective vs. shared situational 
awareness perspective inside and between teams 
In the MNE5 MSA from the individual level the actions were quite 
independent and information sharing was relatively easy. There were 
some miscommunication and false conclusions, but with the support of 
the PSP (Problem Solving Process) there were improvement in gathering 
the facts and with the usage of the tools. In the MNE6 MISA-EM the 
standard operating procedures and MOC structures were different, but it 
was possible to observe how in both cases the actors changed their way of 
using the tools and roles inside the MOCs.  
Clear difference between these cases was that the PSP was not used in 
the MNE6. In the individual level inside the team the amount of 
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information pieces became so large that the entire team was needed to 
solve the issues at hand. The adequate level of awareness would not have 
been able to be attained without combining pieces of information together 
as a team. A lot of energy was wasted in both cases while team members 
where learning the new environment, techniques and roles. After the 
rough start when the team members got to know each other better, the 
information sharing started to function better. 
This is one important aspect that needs proper attention: the ways of 
working, group/team formation and roles need to be clearly defined. Used 
tools need to be properly trained and this is something that needs more 
than quick technical training. It is also crucial to have efficient level of 
understanding of other actor’s roles and their influence to your own 
actions. Understanding is required to both of what I need to do, and what 
the others are doing. This needs to be practiced so that the actions in crisis 
situations and time critical situations come as naturally as possible. 
In the case studies there were some differences in the individual level 
between teams. Individuals are able to commit to the task at hand when 
they understand the meaning of their role as well as the roles of the other 
team members. Based on that they are able to shape what information 
needs to be shared. In the MNE5 the challenges between teams were the 
interaction, understanding other teams with their abilities and needs. In 
many situations this caused problems related to the information sharing. 
There were also challenges in relying on others. Many times team tried to 
rely on own tools and the threshold for contacting others for information 
purposes was very high. This requires changes in mindsets to see that 
information possibly provided by other organizations and teams should be 
seen as important to use of own technical systems. Also, the transparency 
of the technical systems needs to be improved and the feedback provided 
for the individuals. Social contacts should be highlighted in this case. In 
the MNE6 other actors were left outside because of the portal tool. The 
information shared via portal left the team unclear whether anyone 
received their information or whether anyone would respond to their 
request for information. It was not easy to identify other parties like it was 
in the MNE5 MSA. This is why the team focused more on the 
information gained inside the team even though they tried to use sources 
outside the team as well.  
Recognition of individual needs, tasks and tools are highly relevant 
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factors in successful operations. These needs can be processed through 
different views from the individual perspective such as processes, tools 
and communication habits. It is clear that teams, in both cases, were 
different already because of the size of the teams and used tools but still it 
is highly recommendable based on the case study results that these 
findings are taken into account. It can be estimated whether the size of the 
teams affect certain behavior, or the cultural and language differences or 
whether the amount and variety of tools affect the team performance. In 
MNE5 the focus was on the entire team, how the information was 
processed and shared inside the team and between the teams. The 
Problem Solving Process (PSP) was created to support the intel officer in 
individual thinking process, and very promising results were received 
from it. In the MNE 6 MISA-EM the problems with the focus was also in 
the teams working and mainly identifying issues related to the Watch 
Captains (WC) and/or Assistant Watch Captains (AWC) role in the 
information sharing process.  
Based on the observations there were some issues that need to be 
highlighted. First of all the importance of a feedback, whether is received 
from a person inside the team or whether the feedback is received from a 
used information system. The WC did not receive feedback from the team 
whether they accomplished the given tasks or not. Since the SOP did not 
include a process support such as PSP or PSAS, it was clear that 
following of the orders was difficult for the team members because of the 
lack of clear process.  
Lack of understanding and misuse of the tools resulted in occurring 
errors that affected the team’s performance. These type of challenges 
were seen mostly in the beginning of the experimentation, but as the 
experimentation continued and they got acquainted with each other and 
the tools, the error decreased: The team had severe difficulties with the 
portal use but as the experimentation continued, the team was able to 
recognize and identify some of the technical problems and also some of 
the user errors. There were times when the WC needed to assist others 
with the use of tools. The training issues raises: Participants involved in 
co-operations, need to have proper training with all the possible tools that 
can be used in information sharing. Also, usage experience of the tools in 
actual environment gives better possibility for the individual to 
understand the logic of the system and how it can be used in real life 
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activities. There were situations when they lacked the awareness of 
whether for example there were any receivers in the portal to access and 
receive critical information from them. The amount of possible tools for 
information sharing should be carefully thought. If a team consists of 
more than 3 persons, there should be a clear understanding what are the 
situations when to use chat, phone, Skype, portal, email etc. Occasionally 
too many communication channels can cause distraction. Also, the level 
of sensitivity of the information narrows down the channels used to share 
the information. Since there was no visual tool for the WC to support his 
thinking process, he used the basic whiteboard to write down facts. There 
were also incidents where the data management was not up to the needed 
level, that caused confusion and miscommunication when the right 
information was not given to the decision making level. In many cases the 
problems were caused by language barriers and misuse of tools. 
Decision maker, here referring to the watch captain (WC), was 
struggling with the problem solving and analysis since he had to focus all 
of his energy at times just to give tasks to other members of the team. 
Information management could support in processing previous, current 
and future actions. Since the WC did not have a clear understanding of 
the current status, the given tasks for example to the data operator cause 
them to have multiple lists to follow. The number of vessels to be 
checked exceeded the capability of operators.   
There was a lot of evidence of the miscommunication inside the team. 
For example the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) manager had 
notified the WC with changed information about Vessels Of Interest 
(VOI) but the WC has no recognition of it. Many tools and ways to use 
them, different tasks and persons doing tasks simultaneously made it 
difficult to control the teams SA. WC had difficulties gaining the 
situational awareness because WC was having difficulties in doing the 
problem solving because he did not have anything to support his memory. 
He missed information about details given by the RMP manager, because 
he did not have a tool to support his memory. One major improvement in 
the future is a RMP picture that is stable and it supports the WC to draw 
the current situation to it and keep track of the changing variables. 
During the experimentation, before the last day the team gave 
feedback about the issues that were affecting their performance. They 
brought up basic issues like showing the vessel list, and map on the big 
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screen in order to go through the previous reports. The team felt it would 
be easier to follow the action from the larger screen when there were 
communication problems between MOCs and also occasionally problems 
with communication inside the team. The requested modifications were 
allowed and executed before the last day of the experimentation. 
When the team was getting to know each other better, and they were 
using more fluently the systems, they were also getting used to the 
working roles and the overall performance of the team improved. This 
verified that the support for the individuals on how to collect and manage 
data and how to do problem solving individually related to own duties, as 
part of the team, are elements that affect the level of awareness both at the 
individual and team level.  
5.2 National vs. multinational teams’ differences and 
similarities  
Based on interviews and my observations of the national teams behavior  
in MNE5 MSA and of the multinational team in MNE6 MISA-EM, some 
differences that can have an effect on the teams overall performance, can 
be identified. 
In MNE5 MSA inside the national team there seemed not to be any 
communication problems if the group members had the same cultural or 
language background. Also, the size of the team had an effect on how 
easy it is to share information inside the team, and how manageable the 
information flow is. In the multinational team in MNE6 MISA-EM the 
language issues became more relevant and dominant: The oral 
communication was not used in the same ways as in the smaller national 
group where the tasks were given orally, and thinking process was done 
speaking out loud. In the multinational team the amount of team members 
was larger and the pre-defined roles affected drastically in the beginning 
of the experimentation, before the team was able to modify tasks and 
roles after getting to know each other and each other’s capabilities better. 
The information flow improved during the three days in the MISA-
EM experimentation. There were difficulties with the language and 
communication: Individuals inside the team had information but did not 
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pass the information to the WC or to the AWC who were leading the 
team. That caused the biggest problem since WC had to constantly ask for 
information and this interrupted his thinking process. Based on the 
interviews, the overall impression from the leading perspective was that 
the team had the tools to establish communication despite some technical 
problems, but it was the lack of clear tasking and pre-determined MOC 
structure that was seen not supportive enough for the task given to the 
team. Like mentioned earlier, the MOC structure in MNE6 MISA-EM did 
not support gaining the adequate level of awareness since comprehension 
was difficult due to the lack of the memory support (need for taking notes 
and visualizing thoughts) and the support of logical thinking. Projection 
was also difficult since the team did not have in the beginning the 
maritime picture available on a screen where they could add all the 
incidents according to the information received and given. Once the team 
was able to manage their documents visually, the creation of the RMP 
picture was easier for the team.   
Based on the interviews it was possible to improve the team’s 
performance by giving more individual training on the systems and 
guidance on their tasks and of course the reliable systems are needed to 
support to complete the tasks. It is also crucial to understand other 
participants, and in this case interagency needs, this was an issue also in 
the experimentation to be able to identify and understand what 
information others are asking for and what information they need. This 
same issue rise also in MNE5 MSA, as a learning experience. It was 
discovered, that by training the participants to understand other 
participants capabilities, and letting them get to know each other, it 
supported the interaction between the teams and also supported in 
understanding their information requirements.  
As a conclusion of the findings from both case studies, Figure 38 
presents all the found elements that have impacts on situational awareness 
and information sharing.  
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Figure 38: Elements found from the case studies that affect situational 
awareness and information sharing 
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Figure 38 combines all the individual, organizational and technical 
factors that influence the situational awareness. Social factors are 
categorized related to individual work set, individual abilities and 
individual mindset. Organizational factors are categorized related to 
action enablers, background influences of actions and action framework. 
Technological factors are categorized related to information sharing 
enablers, information sharing functions and information sharing products. 
It is challenging to claim whether for example trust affects only 
information sharing, since it is also required when individual is trying to 
gain the needed level of awareness. On the other hand there are clearly 
information sharing elements more related to technological factors that 
support information sharing and from that perspective supports also 
gaining situational awareness. It can be concluded that all of the elements 
are supporting gaining situational awareness. Based on the level of 
awareness, confidence and trust, individuals make their decisions to share 
information.   
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6 BACKGROUND OF THE CREATED 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL  
As a contribution to the situational awareness concept, the baseline 
assessment and strategic environmental understanding was provided with 
the MNE5 MSA and MNE6 MISA-EM case studies. From these case 
studies it was possible to identify special needs for multinational 
collaboration in an information sharing framework. These identified 
needs and proposed solutions are also highlighted in this Chapter. The 
identified needs and baseline assessment provided the list of different 
type of requirements and gap-analysis were also gained from the case 
studies. Main focus in this chapter is the identified solutions as products 
of the CD&E process which presents the proposed solutions that have the 
potential to support gaining adequate level of situational awareness in 
order for the participants to share information and collaborate in a 
multinational environment.  
The conceptual model is not designed to be an answer to everything or 
solve all the challenges but it is designed to wake up ideas and discussion 
in different levels of organizational structure – all the way from the 
individuals to the highest decision making level. It supports critical 
evaluation of situations and how the time critical challenges are handled 
at different organizational levels.  
Challenges in communication, differences in individual SA-models, 
need for applying different procedures in different situations, and also the 
time constraint of gaining situational awareness in crisis situations are 
elements that challenge individuals in collaboration. For decision making 
it is crucial to determine individually what information is needed for 
reliable decision making and what information individual needs to share 
to support the goal of collaboration and decision making? Questions that 
can be raised in this framework are: How does the crisis situation affect 
the individual’s normal behavior? How can the conceptual model be used 
for individual purposes in self-development? How can it be used in 
organizational development? How can it be used in technological 
development?  
The conceptual model seeks to provide solutions for the challenges 
provided by the questions presented. Individual way of reacting can be 
supported with training and a process (PSAS). Organizations are  
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supported with the SA-model to reveal points that need to be taken into 
account when trying to identify possible development areas supported 
also by the check lists. This type of development can be done also from 
the technological perspective and the usability monitoring tool gives 
insights on how tools can be measured to support the collaboration and 
information sharing. These are presented next as identified products by 
the CD&E process.  
6.1 Identified solutions as products of the CD&E 
process  
In this Chapter all the created methods and processes are combined to 
form the conceptual model that is designed to support the SA and 
information sharing. Conceptual model is a combination created to take 
into account the individual and organizational level needs in information 
sharing context when the mission is to gain the adequate level of SA in 
order to perform and make fact-based decisions. Individual perspective is 
supported by the Process of Situational Awareness Support (PSAS) in the 
information sharing context. First this process will be described in detail. 
The organizational decision making level is supported with a modified 
SA-model that presents all the elements from the individual perspective 
that affect the SA and from that also the information sharing. 
Organization is also supported with guidelines and a check list to provide 
a wide range view from individual factors all the way to the technological 
issues and processes. These are presented in more detail in the second 
part. The technological affect is also indisputable, even though it is 
acknowledged that technology should be seen as an enabler, not always 
the solution, nevertheless technology has become more and more 
integrated to the line of work. The Monitoring-tools is developed to get 
the maximum performance of the technological tools that are being used 
as the moderators for information sharing. The monitoring ideology 
revisits and presents elements that can hinder or support information 
sharing from the technological perspective and it is described in detail in 
the last part. 
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6.2 Support to gain SA from the individual 
perspective  
The Problem Solving Process (PSP) was developed during MNE5 MSA 
to support operators in achieving and maintaining Situational Awareness 
from the information requirements perspective: Operators needs to have 
awareness of the pieces of information from what one gains and maintains 
the Situational Awareness and that is supported by the provided tools and 
the PSP model. The created Process of Situational Awareness Support 
was created based on the first draft of the problem solving process, since 
the usage of the process demonstrated promising results in the MNE5 
MSA event 3. Figure 39 presents the timeline of the development of the 
enhanced process and its validation steps in MNE6 MISA-EM.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Development of the Process of Situational Awareness Support 
Figure 40 presents the original PSP that was designed for the particular 
experimentation to support the operators in their work. The SA levels are 
highlighted in Figure 40. Original Problem Solving Process starts with the 
new piece of information that is reflected with different types of facts 
from the geographical, political and time perspectives and then moving 
forward listing the events on a map. It is crucial to list possible 
assumptions and separate them from the known facts and compare them. 
Next step is to search sources, meaning all the possible tools and other 
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human collaboration needed to generate a list and picture of the situation 
and question the assumptions, again reflecting back to the facts based on 
the information. As presented, the original PSP model was designed for 
the experimentation purposes. The facts are listed according to the 
maritime scenarios. Based on the lessons learned from the 
experimentation results, it was obvious that the model had potential but it 
needed to be generalized so that it can be used also in different settings.  
Experimentation methods from observation and interviews to event 
log data collection of the used communication means provided the 
confidence that the created Problem Solving Process seemed to make a 
difference in MOC team’s ability to process information and make 
decisions about whether to share the information. The process support 
should be trained using a scenario-based method at the same time with 
system training. That would help the operators to get acquainted with the 
technical tools and also to understand how systems can be used. Scenario-
based method provides a “real-life” example for the operator to study and 
exercise the usage of the tools and to practice the process of gaining and 
maintaining situational awareness. During the experimentation some 
actors also made personal decisions about how they treated information 
based on trust, familiarity and common culture. For some MOC teams it 
was easier to trust information from MOC teams with same cultural 
experiences than to trust information coming from MOC team that they 
did not share common culture with. It is alerting because teams should 
critically analyze the received information and compare it to their own 
information. As mentioned before, training the operators on how to treat 
the received information with the same level of objectivity is an important 
part of the process. Also, one important observation was that operators 
seemed to prefer less formal means of communicating. Chat (instant 
messaging) was often used as a tool for requesting more information or 
specify details. For the most part, email messages were used as formal 
and official communication where voice was used as a backup or to 
acknowledge receipt.   
Overall, MOC teams seemed to benefit from having more than one 
mode of communication. This means that MOC teams should be outfitted 
with the full spectrum of communication tools. However, operators 
should learn to accept less formal methods along with the formal 
methods. 
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Figure 40: Original Problem Solving Process 
There were also differences in MOC team behavior on which 
communication tools were preferred, but whether the differences were 
caused by cultural differences, technical capabilities, language issues; it is 
difficult to point out only one possible factor. Team members also need to 
understand why information is being requested in order to provide an 
appropriate response. That is all part of achieving situational awareness, 
by understanding all the elements involved and understanding possible 
resources that can be used for gathering the needed information (MNE5 
MSA Final report, 50-51).  
Training should provide a basic understanding of different information 
sources (MNE5 MSA Final report 2008, 55). It was seen in the 
experimentation that if the operators had technical difficulties with their 
own systems, they stopped working. That is why the Problem Solving 
Process helps the operator to identify also other sources outside the own 
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team; whether the sources are own technical systems, web-based services, 
open databases, other MOC teams and their capabilities. This aspect 
supported operator’s thinking and continuing to work even though system 
failures occurred. We were able to see for example chat and email 
communication when the MOC teams had difficulties with their own 
systems. This requires training and awareness of other team’s capabilities.  
Based on interviews conducted we learned that the lack of clear 
guidance on information sharing resulted in operators defaulting to a non-
sharing frame of reference. In several examples information was not 
passed on to other Areas of Responsibility (AOR’s) simply because it was 
never considered that it should be shared. There was a tendency to focus 
on one’s own AOR and not consider the possible connections or linkages 
with other AOR’s even when data points might have suggested that there 
were connections with other partners.  
Individual’s way of thinking and rationalizing is very complex and it 
is quite difficult to identify the logic of thinking in particular situations. 
Logical thinking can mix facts and assumptions. This is why it is 
important to support operators problem solving and decision making 
based on facts by separating the facts from the assumptions. Listing the 
facts:   
- What are the pieces of information that one knows as 
fact?  
- What are the verified pieces of the occurred 
situation?  
- Who has done what, when, where? 
 
Listing the assumptions:   
- What might have happened, where, when, and how 
- How does the incident continue?  
 
By making assumptions based on individual knowledge and 
experience, different operators might have different conclusions after 
mixing facts and assumptions. We need to support the operators in this 
challenging task. For the operators it is very demanding to process all the 
received information, and they face information overflow at times. By 
adequate training and providing support with processing the possible 
scenarios based on the received and processed facts, it is possible to 
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improve operator’s situational awareness.   
After listing the facts and possible outcomes the operators are guided 
to search for different available sources. A source is a better wording than 
system, because in co-operation it is important to realize that other 
organization’s operator and their technical capabilities. Information 
sources were not always understood by the operators. There were 
situations where the presented information was misinterpreted and it led 
to poor decision making about how to treat the presented information.  
There were cases where operators shared information from their own 
systems between MOC teams even though the sources were identical. 
That shows the lack of awareness of other participants’ technical 
capabilities. The PSP is a model that was created and validated by the 
research team in the MNE5 MSA experimentation. From that created 
model I modified and generalized Process of Situation Awareness 
Support (PSAS) that has been developed in the respect to the theoretical 
approach of Situation Awareness and lessons learned from the 
experimentation. PSAS is presented in Figure 41. 
In the experimentation we were able to discover the influence of the 
process and training on the performance of the MOC teams. But a simple 
process is not enough. Operators need training and tools; the process and 
tools need to be integrated to be a working model. Also, because of the 
information flow the MOC structure should be a combination of operator 
working with the technical system, operator working with the 
communication tools such as chat, email and Intel officer who fits all the 
pieces of information and processes the problem by using smart boards 
etc. to visualize the scenario and gives tasks to the rest of the team.  
In the experimentation the basic operator/Intel officer structure was 
not enough for the level of information sharing. A lot of information were 
missed and delayed because of the information overload. This is why the 
MOC structure is considered to be one crucial element that needs to be 
taken into account when designing teamwork in cooperation. There are 
many channels for information exchange technologically available 
together with time pressure that require clear role and task division to 
ensure that the team is able to cope with information overload.  
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Figure 41: Process of Situational Awareness Support (PSAS) 
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The PSAS is divided into different sources, individual’s inner and 
outer thinking processes, decision making and also the interaction with 
other actors. The reason for this is to point out the elements perception, 
comprehension, and projection of the SA theory: To present what kind of 
actions can occur in these stages and at what stage do the decisions affect 
others. The PSAS supports the individuals thinking process. The 
individual is contributing to the team SA while one is gaining the required 
SA needed for his or her responsibilities. From the theoretical perspective 
each team have specific SA requirements that all the individuals inside 
the team must possess in order to get the shared situational awareness 
(SSA). With the PSAS we are supporting the individuals in their thinking 
process when they have to decide which information is needed by other 
actors. This finding is critical: Not every piece of information need to be 
shared with everyone in the team. By doing so, based on the lessons 
learned from the experimentation, it causes major information overload. 
This is why the SA requirements are important elements and PSAS 
supports the operator in identifying and analyzing which information is 
needed by whom and how can the operator find resources that one needs.   
Perception phase is seen as the part of the process where the 
individual analyzes the information (what do I know), and lists the 
information available. At the comprehension phase individual decides 
what method to use to analyze the information. In this stage, while trying 
to comprehend the situation, individual also impacts the other team 
members by the choice of informing others or making a decision not to 
share the information. By analyzing the information with the chosen tool 
and trying to compare the facts and assumptions, the individual proceeds 
with the comprehension phase. After listing the facts, the individual 
reaches the point when one has to make a decision about the tools and 
actors one wants to involve. One might argue that in this phase, the 
individual actions reflect both comprehension and projection level since 
the individual needs to articulate his or her needs for information. This is 
why the line between comprehension and projection levels cannot be too 
strict.  
One might also argue, that is not possible to clearly separate facts 
from assumptions by claiming that everything needs to be categorized as 
assumptions that can be later on reversed. Based on the observations and 
results from the case studies, I would still argue, that it is beneficial to 
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stop with the thinking process, and question whether all the information 
available and connected from pieces are still relevant and fact-based, how 
much logical thinking and assumptions have affected the way of handling 
the information and understanding of the situation? The inner thinking 
and analyzing process varies among individuals. However, in this model 
it is assumed that after getting feedback from the system and/or other 
actor the individual reaches the projection phase, when one starts to think 
how to proceed with the processed and validated information. In this 
phase the individual makes the decision about how to proceed by 
knowing the facts and forming an expert analysis of the situation. The 
projection phase continues as a loop with the particular case. Every new 
piece of information starts the process from the beginning but since the 
individual already has the basic knowledge concerning this particular 
case, it continues the projection. By these steps, the individual has 
increased one’s own awareness and as an end product, increased the 
team’s SA as well.  
It is important to highlight at this point that the steps described are not 
sequential. The steps can be parallel, incidents happening at the same time 
while processing previous inputs. But for the visualization and training 
purposes, it is better to describe it step by step, even though in real life 
input processing is parallel and includes several layers simultaneous 
activities. It is possible that some of the inputs disturb and interfere 
activities, and may cause stopping of the parallel activity for a while and 
that might lead for losing some of the inputs. Individuals inner thinking 
process is constantly on going, and senses filter the stimulation through 
different physical, psychological or skill filters for example eye sight, 
attitude, stress level and language skills. It needs also to be noted, that in 
different roles and in different situations individuals may use this 
developed process for several purposes such as roles of processing of raw 
data for information, and end user of the produced data without forgetting 
possible decision makers in different organizational levels that need to 
have adequate level of awareness for valid decision making. 
It is important to notice, that there is an evident route from 
individuals’ inner thinking process to producing visible outcome, making 
decision and that decision having an impact on the target. This has been 
noted and taken into account while creating the PSAS from the individual 
perspective, to highlight key steps that affect the perception level, 
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comprehension level and finally the projection level. As one individual in 
the team affects the entire team, it is beneficial to support the individuals 
with the same general process that supports critically observing their own 
behavior and understanding issues related to team work. By supporting 
the team achieving better situational awareness, it gives the team the 
advantage to perform more efficiently.  
From the PSAS it is possible to identify issues that come from the 
outside as inputs from different sources. Individual analyses the 
information. It is seen as ones inner thinking process. Based on the 
thinking that is not visible to others, one does something concrete for 
example text on a piece of paper or asks a question, which is countered 
for outer thinking process that has visible dimensions. The actual impact 
and visibility happens in the decision phase, when the individual decides 
how to act based on the information. The decisions of acting and deciding 
not to act have consequences that affect others inside and outside the 
team. The team members and other actors outside the team can also 
influence the decisions of the particular individual. 
This process is a simplified description of the certain steps that the 
individual should go through while one is facing new situations and 
information flow. Without a structured way of operating, based on the 
experimentation observations, it was seen that operators draw wrong 
conclusions and were not able to use the available systems or resources as 
effectively comparing to the situation when they followed the structured 
process. Of course, this type of process requires enough time for training 
and actual implementation, but even with small amount of time and 
training the improvement could be seen in the operators’ way of working.  
Based on the observations particularly from the Finnish MOC 
operations in the MNE5 MSA experimentation, it was obvious that when 
the time element and data flow became harder, the team lost focus and 
they lacked a structured way of handling the situation. This is a real-life 
problem, that handling of a difficult situation is been just in the hands of 
the individuals own capabilities for problem solving and methods for 
gaining and maintaining situation awareness. With this type of PSAS it is 
possible to link the usable resources and a structured method together, in 
order to support the individual and one’s decision making so that the 
individual can make the most accurate decision possible in an emergent 
situation such as national or international operation at maritime 
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environment. Basic levels of supporting information sharing in a MOC 
are described in Figure 42. 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Problem Solving Process 
(PSP) are the foundation of the team work. SOP provides the basic 
framework for the information sharing and PSP supports the team’s work 
in processing the information and decision making. Next level is the 
MOC structure that is formed according to the framework provided with 
the SOP and PSP. MOC teams are able to identify their roles and divide 
tasks inside the team. After this, they are ready to use all the available 
tools to accomplish their tasks.  It is crucial that the team is provided with 
support with the information management. The team members need to be 
trained to know how to use the tools, to which purpose and how to handle 
pieces of information based on different categorizations.   
 
 
 
Figure 42: Basic levels for supporting team work and information sharing in a 
MOC 
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As a reflection back to the presented research question at the 
beginning of this dissertation, Table 5 shows the differences in Finnish 
MOC team’s performance comparing with the situation when they did not 
have the PSP in use to a situation when the team actively used the 
process. Table was made by gathering information from the observations 
and interviews during and after the scenarios.  
MOC teams were able to use the PSP while performing their tasks. 
There were some difficulties using the tools and that distracted the team 
at times from following the Problem Solving Process. When the teams 
were able to use the process, they were able to focus on the information 
categorizing and identifying information requirements and the context 
behind it. Based on the research results, it is obvious that supporting 
individuals inside a team supports the overall team work and improves the 
shared SA. Role definitions are important because they identify what are 
the individuals responsibilities according to the tasks and what is the 
expected outcome and input for the team.  
Table 5. Differences in Finnish team’s performance with and without the 
support of the PSP according to observation findings 
 Without the PSP With the PSP 
during the 
scenario 
unable to 
articulate and 
formalize 
questions 
better processing of the information 
-> more pushing and pulling 
information 
 uncomfortable 
contacting others 
-> rely on own 
system 
more usage of other sources than 
own system 
 difficulties 
connecting 
pieces of 
information 
better management of the 
information flow 
-> better processing of the facts 
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Table 5 
continues 
  
 difficulties 
drawing 
conclusions -> 
lack of 
confidence 
more confidence in making 
decisions based on conclusions 
 too much focus 
on own AOR 
more collaboration and extending 
the scope 
 overload in 
thinking process 
more team work 
 duplication of 
effort 
better coordination inside the team 
 miscommunicati
on 
better communication and division 
of tasks 
after the 
scenario 
  
 team felt 
disappointed to 
their own 
performance 
team had not difficulties articulating 
their thinking process 
 team had 
difficulties 
articulating their 
thinking process 
and end result 
logically 
team was able to describe the 
incidents -> draw a storyline by 
grounding the decisions based on 
analyzed facts 
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The findings and lessons learned from the case study gave important 
feedback for the development of PSAS. PSAS was developed to reflect 
the SA theory elements to support the individual in gaining situational 
awareness with certain steps and identifying especially phases when the 
individual’s decisions affect the team. The results from the 
experimentation provided measurable parameters that supported the 
development of PSAS.  
Individuals face a lot of challenges in information sharing when acting 
in a multinational cooperation. Even basic information sharing within a 
team can be interfered with too much information. This is why the 
developed and modified PSAS model supports the operator continuing the 
thinking process even though there are many distractions and side steps 
that can be taken. In the MNE5 MSA experimentation it was possible to 
see the effect of the PSP model, even though it was not completely 
integrated into use. Based on the observation from the national MOC it 
was possible to point out situations when the team used the process, they 
were able to focus better, but they still had difficulties continuously 
following the process, because of the information flow. This is why as a 
lessons learned, discovery of the roles of the team members and the used 
tools should be clarified; which tool is used for what type of information 
sharing and who is responsible for that. This type of task division is 
necessary when we are trying to build up a team that uses the available 
capabilities efficiently.  
The updated PSAS has not been validated with an actual 
experimentation. However, PSAS has been modified by implementing the 
SA theory elements and lessons learned from the usage of the PSP model 
from both of the MNE5 MSA and MNE6 MISA-EM case studies. The 
main ideology from the PSP exists in PSAS and it has been generalized 
and updated, so that it can be used in other settings as well. Because the 
updated version has the same experimented ideology, including with the 
SA-theory elements, it is recommended to be taken into consideration as a 
useful tool for team members to identify their process of gathering, 
analyzing and sharing information. The PSAS consists of smaller steps 
that have first of all impact on individuals own SA, but it also supports 
the individual to search for the crucial SA elements that are needed for the 
SSA in the team. Team SA is achieved, when everyone inside the team 
has the required awareness level to carry out their responsibilities. PSAS 
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model can support operators in gaining and maintaining situational 
awareness in complex environments, when the amount of information 
flow can cause problems in focusing on facts and prioritizing based on the 
valid information. With this type of tool, the operators are more confident 
in their work and are able to structuralize their actions. By supporting the 
team members with a process like PSAS, it is possible to help the team to 
take relevant information requirements into account and achieve better 
team SA and SSA, which will decrease the risk of possible errors in 
information sharing and decision making.  
PSAS is the first steps taken to give the individuals more support to 
gain situational awareness and perform more efficiently in a constantly 
changing environment. Generalized model reflects the theoretical 
foundations of SA and future mission is to have it implemented as one of 
the tools for the training tool pack to support the effort.  
6.3 Support to understand all the relevant factors 
affecting the team performance in the respect to 
information sharing from the organizational 
perspective  
The idea of the SA model and check list, is to give an overall impression 
of the state of the organization being monitored with this tool. Issues that 
need to be covered are technological and organizational issues. 
Individuals play highly important role in action level and this check list 
supports in making sure that the basic elements are in place to support the 
individuals in proper actions. SA model was created based on the 
requirements of the concept development in MNE6 MISA-EM, when the 
theoretical framework was established for the concept developers and 
experiment team to have a joint framework to study issues related to 
extended maritime. I had started to collect, based on my observations, the 
list of all the possible influencing elements already in the MNE5 MSA 
case study, and the MNE 6 MISA-EM provided a good forum to double 
check whether the list was valid also in that context. The SA model 
supported in understanding also the trauma center activities and with the 
support of the literature related to health care, it was possible to analyze 
its usability and scalability for other time critical environments as well. 
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The timeline of the development of SA model and check list is presented 
in Figure 43.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Development of the SA model and check list 
The overall ideology is presented in Figure 44 that combines all the 
necessary levels and factors together to support in understanding all the 
elements related to SA. The check list of categorized elements, possible 
problem areas and guidance are introduced in Table 6. I was able create 
the list based on my observations from the case studies, when I was able 
to see certain patterns repeated. The SA model captures the essence of 
Endsley’s model, and combines all the elements and levels together. It is 
possible to observe the reality from the individual’s perspective, and 
understand that these factors affect the individual SA levels.  
When the individual is a member of a team, his or her individual 
factors become an asset of the team. The individual needs to be aware of 
the team SA requirements and understand the devices, mechanisms and 
processes that are related to the team’s activities. With them one can form 
individual view of the team member SA requirements and understand 
what is needed in order to act and perform as a team towards the general 
goal. This can also be viewed from the organizational perspective; how to 
build up teams that are able to fulfill the needed SA requirements as a 
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team with the right rules, roles and tools? Eventually which individuals 
are most capable to perform as member of a team in these build 
conditions.  
Of course, also from the technological aspect the capabilities needed 
to be build up in order for a team to perform are important and should be 
viewed as well. 
 
 
Figure 44: SA model combining all the SA elements needed to be taken into 
account in the organizational level to support decision making in 
collaboration. 
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Table 6. Check list example of element affecting the performance 
 
 
 
Problem 
Statement 
Problem 
identification 
Problem owner Supportive Step 
Unclear 
leadership/ 
roles/ tasks 
Process challenge Management Process needs to be 
defined to identify 
roles, tasks and used 
tools 
Information 
sharing 
problems inside 
the team 
Process challenge Team leader Individuals need to be 
supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
Information 
sharing 
problems with 
other 
stakeholders 
Process challenge Management Individuals need to be 
supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
Problems in 
following the 
SOPs 
Process challenge Management Individuals need to be 
supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
Differences in 
participants 
levels of 
expertise 
Process challenge Management Is supported by 
training of the 
individuals 
Problems in 
social 
interaction 
inside the team 
Process challenge Management, Team 
leader 
Individuals need to be 
supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
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Table 6 continues 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem 
Statement 
Problem 
identification 
Problem owner Supportive Step 
Problems in 
social 
interaction with 
other 
stakeholders 
Process challenge Management Individuals need to 
be supported by 
providing 
information and 
guidance 
Differences in 
participants 
operational 
experience 
Process challenge Management Is supported by 
training of the 
individuals 
Conflicts in 
information 
exchange 
Process error Team leader Is supported by 
training the 
individuals both  the 
rules and tools 
Team or a task 
conflicts 
Process error Team leader Is supported by 
training of the 
individuals 
Problems 
understanding 
the command 
structure 
Process error Management Is supported by the 
management and 
training 
Problems 
accessing the 
chain of 
command 
Process error Management Is supported by the 
management 
Conflicts in 
SOPs 
Process error Management Is supported by the 
management 
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Table 6 continues 
 
 
Problem 
Statement 
Problem 
identification 
Problem owner Supportive Step 
Cultural 
aspects 
affecting the 
work related to 
other 
stakeholders 
Social or process 
challenge 
Management Individuals need to be 
supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
 
 
Language 
problems 
affecting the 
work related to 
other 
stakeholders 
Social or process 
challenge 
Management Individuals need to be 
supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
Cultural 
aspects 
affecting the 
work inside the 
team 
Social challenge Management, Team 
leader 
Individuals need to be 
supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
Language 
problems 
affecting the 
work inside the 
team 
Social challenge Management Individuals need to be 
supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
Information 
conflicts 
Technical or social 
error 
Team leader Is supported by 
training of the 
individuals 
Network errors Technical error Technical support Is supported by 
training of the 
individuals 
Usability 
problems with 
the usage of 
the tools 
available 
Technical problem Management, 
Technical support 
Is supported by 
training of the 
individuals 
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Table 6 continues 
 
 
   
Problem 
Statement 
Problem 
identification 
Problem owner Supportive Step 
Accessibility 
problems with 
the needed 
tools 
Technical problem Technical support Process needs to be 
defined 
Problems in 
information 
search of 
systems 
Technical challenge Technical support, 
Team leader 
Individuals need 
to be supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
System 
breakdown 
Technical error Technical support, 
Team leader 
Is supported by 
training of the 
individuals 
Accessibility 
problems with 
the needed 
tools 
Technical problem Technical support Process needs to be 
defined 
Problems in 
information 
search of 
systems 
Technical challenge Technical support, 
Team leader 
Individuals need 
to be supported by 
providing information 
and guidance 
System 
breakdown 
Technical error Technical support, 
Team leader 
Is supported by 
training of the 
individuals 
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•Observation notes and data 
collection from the case study 
event 2 raised the question of 
supporting information sharing 
with a tool. 
MNE 5 MSA 
•Based on the experimentation 
observations, further 
development during and after 
event 3 as separate from the 
general research agenda. 
Usability 
Monitoring •Observation related to the 
functionalities of the usability 
monitoring, whether the tools 
could be applicable in other 
team structures and settings as 
well. 
MNE6 MISA-
EM 
6.4 Supporting development of technological 
solutions to maintain the supporting tools functional 
and suitable for information sharing  
From the technological perspective, I was able to use the MNE5 MSA 
case study setting and data for discovering whether it was possible to 
create a monitoring tool that could support in avoiding challenges 
identified in case study context. It was not a part of the experimentation 
plan, but the experimentation provided enough information that could be 
used to analyze and create monitoring tool suitable for information 
sharing purposes. Figure 45 demonstrates the timeline when the usability 
monitoring development took place. It started as inspiration from the 
observations from the MNE5 MSA and I had the opportunity to observe 
from the created model perspective also in the MNE6 MISA-EM 
experimentation, whether the tool could support the function I designed to 
be. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Development of the Usability monitoring tool 
6.4.1. QoS and OODA -ideology 
 
Created monitoring tool merges ideas from QoS monitoring, usability 
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research and the OODA-loop. Quality-of-service (QoS) as defined in 
ITU-T Recommendation E.800 is a general term for all parameters that 
are visible to a user of a networked system (ITU-T). There is a solid 
engineering approach connected with technical QoS parameters. It 
involves defining QoS parameters and reference connections where target 
values for QoS parameters are given for normal and high traffic load. The 
target values for QoS are used as constraints in network dimensioning. 
They are also included in Service Level Agreements (SLA). QoS 
parameters are monitored for network management purposes and for 
checking the agreed QoS in SLAs. Well dimensioned networks usually 
satisfy the QoS target values and QoS monitoring notices problems, such 
as faults or configuration errors. Many IP networks are not dimensioned, 
and thus QoS monitoring is sometimes seen as a way to manage 
performance through feedback control. In the military environment QoS 
monitoring is seen as a way to detect problems in exceptional conditions, 
e.g. the Finnish Defense Forces use QoS monitoring in the IP core 
network for this purpose usability is presently treated as a factor that 
should be considered in the design phase, and usability research focuses 
on user trials. Then, it does not address changes in usability caused by 
network problems, different hardware/software configurations, or actions 
of the adversary. The QoS approach can potentially fill this gap. User 
experience is connected to QoS parameters by Mean of Score (MoS) 
measurements. MoS is a subjective measure given by test persons, 
typically on the scale 1-5, for perceived quality. In usability monitoring 
all qualitative tests and measures of usability correspond to MoS 
measurements, thus the QoS approach does not replace usability research. 
The methods of usability research (see Gulliksen, et al., 2004 for a list of 
typical methods) remain as the ways to evaluate user experience, find 
improvements to usability, and to obtain the MoS functions. The gain 
from the QoS approach is that it enables monitoring of usability and 
mathematical evaluation and optimization of some aspects of usability 
through technical QoS parameters when the system is operational. There 
seems to be much potential in extending this approach, especially since 
usability of networked systems is often relatively poor and something 
should be done to improve it. Aurrecoechea, Campbell & Hauw, (1998) 
states that many current network architectures address QoS, focusing to 
the provider’s perspective to analyze the network performance without 
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taking into account the quality needs from the user’s perspective.  
The ideology of usability monitoring tool is to propose a wider 
application of the QoS approach in usability research. It measures 
usability experienced by the end user indirectly by looking at technical 
parameters that are influencing usability. The presented tool is a more 
general model of usability monitoring and can be applied to a more 
restricted case of a C4ISR or a C4IS system, where a set of technical 
parameters can be selected, though they do not necessarily measure all 
aspects of usability. The usability monitoring tool has been partially 
evaluated in a case study in MNE5 MSA. From the experimentation, it 
was possible to get input for the concept development of the usability 
monitoring by creating meters that can measure OODA-loop steps based 
on QoS ideology. Service is understood in this context as a subjective 
definition of the end user; how the end user feels the system supports the 
work done by the user.  
Based on the data from MNE5 MSA event 3 allowed to confirm the 
basic principles of four different meter levels corresponding to the 
OODA-loop. This new tool will support system developers in identifying 
issues that affect the end user’s performance and decision making 
throughout the decision making loop. With the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods, it is possible to support the 
information systems development especially in the design and 
implementation phase.  
The main idea is that there is a connection between user experience 
and some measurable parameters, called the QoS parameters. While QoS 
according to ITU-T Recommendation E.800 includes a large selection of 
user visible parameters, including the goodness of customer service of the 
operator (operator here refers to the organization operating a network, 
such as a telephone company, not to the person who is called the operator 
of the C4ISR application), most of the QoS approach focuses on technical 
QoS parameters (ITU-T).  
In the early times the most important factor was the Bit Error Ratio 
(BER) but in TCP/IP protocols these QoS parameters are measured on the 
IP level and usually include the end-to-end delay of IP packets, the delay 
variation (jitter) of IP packets in a stream, and the packet loss ratio. 
Throughput is traditionally a network performance (NP) parameter, i.e., a 
traffic parameter that is not visible to the user. This is because in the 
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telephony service, the user always got the same bit rate and throughput 
was only relevant for trunks. There is another set of QoS parameters 
related to availability, such as Mean-Time- Between-Failures (MTBF) 
and Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) (Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998). The 
main idea is that the technical QoS parameters are measurable and they 
can be connected to the user experience by user tests. The user tests give 
the MoS tables and the goal is to set target values to the QoS parameters 
in such a way that a sufficiently high MoS is reached. This idea is clearest 
in voice quality. If the MoS value is at least 4.5/5, users experience the 
voice as very good. The idea is the same in all of these cases: it is possible 
to select some target values to the QoS parameters that guarantee good 
user experience. Obviously, technical QoS parameters depend on the 
connection and on the traffic. If the connection is for instance routed 
through very many nodes, connection establishment delay is bound to be 
longer. Therefore the target values for QoS parameters are given for a set 
of reference connections. Without defining the reference connections it is 
not possible to require that the QoS values are measured in the same way 
and the target values for QoS are reached. In this ITU-T approach it is 
essential that good QoS is obtained by agreeing that the target values that 
are declared in the recommendations are reached by all operators. The 
technical QoS parameters are measured and monitored by the network 
management by the measurements, usually done by the Operations and 
Maintenance (OAM). In the TCP/IP world, QoS measurements are not 
readily available and may need to be implemented, as Jormakka & 
Heikkinen (2000) states.  
Some of the target values for the QoS parameters can be agreed in 
international recommendations. SLAs between operators, and between 
operators and customers specify the target values also for non-
standardized parameters, such as the throughput. The ITU-T approach is 
an engineering practice and ITU-T Recommendations by Study Group 2 
show applications of the approach (ITU-T). The connection between the 
QoS approach and usability is that the relevant QoS parameters must be 
chosen and target values for the QoS parameters must be set. Setting the 
parameters is best done by usability trials. When the target values for the 
QoS parameters are available, the problem of reaching good user 
experience reduces to a technical problem of fulfilling the target values. 
In the ITU-T approach this problem is basically solved by dimensioning, 
157 
 
i.e, the network is built to give good QoS. Thus, the reference model is as 
in Figure 46. There is a number of problems with QoS monitoring. 
One is that traffic measurements from different points should be 
correlated. Such correlation, if done correctly, requires moving large data 
files containing packet headers and time stamps. It is too difficult to 
match requests and responses of user traffic by observing network traffic 
often used. Test traffic consumes some capacity, and especially if there is 
congestion QoS of test traffic may be different from QoS that the user 
sees for various reasons. For all these reasons QoS monitoring as in 
Figure 45 is usually not a continuous activity but done periodically to 
check the QoS level that is promised in the SLA.  
 
6.4.2 General goal of the monitoring tool 
 
The goal of monitoring tool is to widen the area of applications. In 
order to do this a better reference model needs to be found. In the QoS 
approach, the focus is on user visible problems caused by the network.  
 
Figure 46: Reference model for QoS monitoring parameters are traffic 
parameters (losses, delays, jitter, errors) or availability parameters (e.g 
Mean-Time-To-Error) 
The user visible problems in Figure 46 derive from losses, delays, and 
errors in the network, and lack of availability, delays and errors in the 
peer end system. In order to enhance the usability monitoring, end user is 
required as a part of the system. 
The end user can get confused, make errors, or not notice something 
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to find an analogy between user errors and network/end system errors. 
There is also similarity between the user being confused because of too 
many inputs and with the network being congested because of too high 
traffic. The case study supports these intuitive ideas: Analogies between 
social and technical network problems that can be seen on a higher level 
were found. Different types of errors and problems in MNE5 MSA event 
3 while observing different MOC operators interacting with each other 
were also discovered. 
In a normal situation a user is using the system in order to achieve 
some goal. Reaching the goal gives a reward. What can happen is that the 
goal is not attained and the reward is not obtained. Another thing that can 
happen is that reaching the goal takes too much time. Thus, the delay is 
important. If the delay is too long, the effort is typically abandoned. If the 
delay is short enough, it does not bother the user. Between these two 
values is some grey area where waiting for the task to finish causes some 
degree of irritation in the user.  
A third aspect is the effort needed for reaching the goal. The effort 
may be counted in some applications e.g. by the number of clicks, opened 
windows or menus etc. If the effort is too large it causes irritation. An 
application is, or at least should be, tested by a rather extensive test set 
before it is taken to wider use. Therefore, with the set of test cases 
presented that cover much of typical usage of the system can be used 
reference cases. It is possible to enhance the test set by assigning the 
effort and reward to a reference case. So far the model is very simple:  
The user has a goal – The user performs some tasks – The user gets a 
reward (or in some cases avoids possible punishment). Possible motive 
can be to reach the reward or to avoid punishment. 
 
The usability problems are: 
Failure to reach the reward. 
Delay in reaching the reward. 
Effort in reaching the reward. 
Difficulty in understanding the situation. 
Difficulty in deciding what to do next. 
Having a set of reference cases where the effort and 
the reward have been given. 
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This simple model does not describe all relevant aspects of the user’s 
experience and it does not give measurable parameters. One approach is 
to enhance the model with some existing model describing observation 
and to try to get to measurable parameters. Every model emphasizes 
different aspects and none of them fully describe the reality. A model 
must be sufficiently simple, but it is possible to add some aspects of some 
other model to our initial model without complicating it too much and 
gaining better insight to the problem. Goal is to enhance the simple model 
by the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop. It should be 
understood, as is pointed out by Grant (2005), that the OODA-loop is not 
the only model and several arguments have been made against it from a 
cognitive point of view. Nevertheless, the OODA-loop includes the 
actions of the adversary to the system in a natural way. A main goal in 
network-centric warfare is to get inside the OODA-loop of the adversary, 
and the adversary tries to mix up or to slow down decisions. Most 
decisions are made through a networked computer system, and in this 
sense usability of such systems is of crucial importance. It is valid to 
know if the system supports fast decision making and if the adversary can 
influence the behavior of the system for confusing the decision making 
process. In the civilian sector, usability of an information system is 
mainly important for customer satisfaction, and there is no adversary who 
tries to disturb the system. In military C4ISR and C4IS systems, the 
important tasks are decision making, poor usability results in poor 
decisions, and there is an active adversary who tries to gain on poor 
decisions.  
User satisfaction in usability of the system is still a secondary goal. 
The main goal is that the tasks can be done well: The system does not 
slow down decisions, cause mistakes, or make decisions harder to take. 
The main concepts of the OODA model must be given a meaning in 
usability monitoring: Observation for the user of a networked information 
system is what user sees on the screen. Orientation means understanding 
the information that user sees. Decision means deciding what to do next. 
Action is the set of responses the user makes, but here actions are 
restricted only to the new input the user gives to the information system. 
Focusing on the OODA-loop illuminates several drawbacks both of the 
simple goal-reward model and of QoS monitoring as in Figure 39, and it 
stresses the importance of time: the key to success is fast decision 
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making. Two main observations are highlighted in this case. Firstly, in 
Figure 46 traffic monitoring is needed in several places and correlate the 
measurements. This difficulty is the consequence of trying to solve the 
wrong problem. QoS monitoring is for verifying that the cause of the 
user’s problems is not the operator’s network. The correct problem is to 
monitor if the user has any difficulties in his decision making process. 
Then, it is essential to compare user’s experiences to ones expectations. 
This can be done with a set of reference cases for actions that the user can 
take and compare the real message exchanges at the user end with the 
message exchanges in the reference cases. The next observation by 
focusing on to the OODA-loop is that the simple model of goal and 
reward is actually a model only for the act-phase. If the system is slow, 
observe and act-phases are slow.  
The main problem is that the user cannot perform well in the decision 
phase but e.g. abandons the system. If the system has errors, the act-phase 
does not result in a predictable outcome and the decision maker does not 
have control. The adversary can try to deny the actions. Clearly, 
monitoring delays, losses and errors is important, but such measurements 
only cover the act-phase. Problems in the observe-phase are that the user 
does not get information or it is corrupted. It is important also to monitor 
delays, losses and errors of this data. In order to do it in the user end 
system, it is important to know when the information should be coming. 
In the orient-phase the problems are that the user cannot understand the 
situation. Finally, there is the decide-phase. Some decision systems 
support decision making by calculating different scenarios that may result 
from a choice of actions. In the general case, it is impossible to know in 
advance what information is coming to a user, but in Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) it is in many cases possible.  
In a SOA based C4ISR messages often follow the publish/subscribe 
Message Exchange Protocol (see for example Erl, 2006) where the end 
user subscribes to periodic updates of data. The SLA for the SOA service 
gives the promised update period and to monitor that the updates arrive. 
The adversary can try to deny observation by influencing the network but 
QoS measurements can detect these efforts. Integrity can be guaranteed 
by cryptographic means, therefore corruption of data by the adversary can 
also be detected. SOA based C4ISR applications are of current interest in 
many countries (Bunge, Chung, Endicott-Popovsky & McLane, 2008; 
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Russel, Lookes, Lu & Xu, 2008; Russel, Lookes & Xu, 2008; Meyer, 
2007) therefore this advantage of SOA can be used in the future. 
The nature of a particular system is an important aspect in selection of 
QoS parameters for usability monitoring because software systems have 
different purposes and the users have different abilities and goals. The 
meaning of good usability is different if discussion is related to difficult 
computer games or of bank automation. C4ISR systems are networked 
applications that have a particular set of desirable characteristics. These 
characteristics should be taken into account when considering usability. 
Some conclusions of what is important for usability can be drawn from 
these characteristics.  
Continuing to study the set of characteristics for a C4ISR application 
for situational awareness: 1) The system is transparent: the user does not 
spend effort in the system but can focus on the task, 2) the system 
demands a task to be done correctly even if it reduces usability, 3) the 
system helps the user to understand the situation correctly. The system is 
transparent - Many users want the system to be totally transparent and let 
them achieve their goal as easily and fast as possible. However, it 
depends on the particular system if the system should be totally 
transparent or if a part of a good user experience of the system is that it is 
suitably challenging and the user experiences good command of the 
system as a reward, like often is with a single person computer game or 
an operating system. The assumption is that military C4ISR systems 
should be as transparent as possible because the primary task is too 
important to take any risks of failure. This is reasonable and may be true, 
but one should keep in mind that a fully transparent system is not always 
the system that gives the best user experience. 
 The system demands a task to be done correctly – It is not necessarily 
the same thing if the user finds the system usable and if the task is done 
well. For instance, handling classified information is clumsy and time 
demanding but it must be so if the task is done correctly. This is not quite 
the same as functionality versus usability (Goodwin, 1987.) There is a 
need for a system that does not allow a task to be done incorrectly, even if 
it is clumsy. This situation often appears with security. User understands 
the situation correctly – Situational awareness is a central concept in all 
network-centric approaches, also in the Finnish Network Enabled Defense 
(NED). Situational awareness has three levels: seeing the situation, 
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understanding the situation, and being able to predict the development of 
the situation; the last level being very difficult to reach. A system should 
try to assist the second level: understanding the situation.  
It follows from transparency, that all effort in doing tasks is only a 
nuisance to the user. It is possible to assign a positive value to the reward 
and assign a negative value to the effort to reach the reward. The effort 
may be number of clicks, opened windows etc. The numerical value of 
the effort can be evaluated by usability tests. From the characteristics of 
demanding correct operations follows that users sometimes must follow 
certain procedures. Therefore it is possible to assume that users also in 
other tasks easily accept that they have to follow certain procedures. This 
means that the user interface of the system should not offer many ways of 
doing the same thing, which reduces the possible cases to be measured. 
Since a main goal of the system is that the user understands the situation 
correctly, monitoring of the understanding should be done some way. 
Understanding a situation is not a directly measurable parameter but by 
assuming that if the number of events that are visible to the user in a 
given time increases too much, then the user may find it harder to 
understand correctly. Thus, with a measure taken of events is shown to 
the user as an indirect measure of understanding. The end system often 
can be configured to take logs of events and therefore the measure is easy 
to implement. User tests are needed in order to connect the measure to 
user understanding. 
 As a conclusion, the special characteristics of C4ISR applications for 
situational awareness are quite suitable for the presented model. These 
systems do not try to present as many choices to the user as possible for 
better usability but the users are accustomed to following fixed 
procedures. Therefore, the set of reference cases that have to be 
monitored is rather small. It is possible to keep track of the parameters for 
effort and reward for a representative set of reference cases, possibly for 
all. It is also easier to match the responses of the system to each request of 
the user when there is a small set of reference cases.  
With usability monitoring it is possible to compare the logs of the 
events and identify the message chain as one of the reference cases. Then, 
it is possible to evaluate the effort and the reward of this message chain to 
the use by comparing delays, additional messages etc. to the target values 
of the reference case. The users do not like additional effort, and without 
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considering any deeper cognitive aspects of using the system than only to 
look at the effort the user must exert in order to reach the reward. The 
user effort is derived from the delays that he experiences and how many 
events he must generate. The reward is seen from the way the message 
chain completes. If it does not complete in a similar way as in the 
reference case then the user does not get a reward. A simple example is 
that the user sends a message, but it is answered with an error message. It 
is possible to detect this case. Another example is that the user gets no 
reply. It is also possible to detect this case. These examples show the 
possibility to form some measure of effort and reward to the message 
chains. Figure 47 presents local usability measurements enhancing the 
QoS measurement of Figure 46, by including measurement points to 
every level of the OODA-loop.   
6.4.3 Measurement and usage of the monitoring tool 
It is crucial to recognize that the OODA-loop and measuring the 
decision points occur behind the end system. This is why the new aspect 
for usability monitoring is needed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47: Local usability measurements missing from the QoS monitoring of 
Figure 46 
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It is recognized that the case study and the environment was much 
more complex and human factors affect the results, but still it is possible 
to point out factors that affect the performance and by that the QoS. 
Those factors can be generalized and transformed into the new tool of 
usability monitoring.  
As stated, there have been attempts to measure SA but not adequate 
techniques to tackle the C4 environment. It has been recognized that in 
order to measure SA, a technique that measures SA only is needed, it has 
the required level of sensitivity so that it detects possible changes is SA, 
and that it does not change SA during the process of the measurement 
(Salmon, Stanton, Walker & Green, 2006). 
In order to fully understand the requirements of the monitoring, 
acknowledgement is needed from the systems level; SA enables decisions 
to be made in real time. When focusing on, for example, the maritime 
environment, these types of socio-technical systems need to be orientated 
towards the dynamics of the environment (Walker et al., 2009). It is 
important to provide the operators with tools that support them building 
and maintaining SA (Durso & Sethumadhavan, 2008) but this does not 
mean only technological innovations. Focus is not only on technical 
details but widening the scope of monitoring social aspects and issues that 
need to be tackled in order to gain situational awareness in evolving 
environments with their own challenges. 
There are several causes to usability problems: System design 
problems (for example software is poorly designed), hardware and/or 
software configuration causing permanent problems (for example too 
slow machine), transient problems (for example errors or delays because 
of network load, software updates), and intentional errors/adversary 
action. In the usability monitoring approach it is assumed that system is 
well designed in the opinion of those who introduced it but it does not 
work well in the opinion of those who use it. Thus, the usability problems 
are caused by poor configuration, network problems, or by adversary 
action, and they can be found by usability monitoring. Usability 
monitoring does not measure usability, since the quantitative methods 
used in the usability monitoring notice signs that indicate poor usability 
and the qualitative methods provide a tool for understanding the reason 
behind the poor usability.  In the MNE5 MSA case study (Brunett, Choo, 
Eshelman-Haynes, Koskinen, Soh & Utterstöm, 2008; Koskinen, 2008), 
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the focus was on the system design and implementation phases. It was 
possible to identify meters for usability monitoring and performed 
qualitative usability tests that can be used for defining MoS functions. 
The development did not continue further to set reference connections and 
target values, that is, the case study does not verify the whole usability 
monitoring approach.  
The scope of usability monitoring in the MNE5 MSA experiment was 
to identify characteristics, which are important when we are monitoring 
the system and to see if it is possible to implement measurements to every 
level of the OODA-loop. From this MNE5 MSA case study a 
confirmation was established of the necessity to expand the usability 
monitoring and to develop a tool to meet the demands for adequate 
response to usability problems. Monitoring tool was created based on the 
lessons learned from MNE5 MSA. MNE6 MISA-EM supported in 
validating that same elements exist also in that setting and gave the 
confidence that the created monitoring tool can be used in supporting 
information sharing in a multinational collaboration. 
With this framework it is possible to point out issues such as different 
channels (formal/informal) for communication, types of information, and 
usage of tools. It is possible to identify issues that affect operators’ way of 
using technical systems, why and how they used certain social networks 
and to follow the information flow. Based on the MNE5 MSA case study, 
later confirmed also with data form MNE6 MISA-EM, evidence was 
found of the possibility to identify situations when it is crucial to look at 
the timeframe and focus on issues concerning QoS. All the presented 
statistics are taken from the MNE5 MSA event3 for demonstration 
purposes. When looking at the OODA loop, in the observe stage can be 
seen usage of different resources; own technical system, open databases 
or email, chat or voice to contact other MOC teams. At this stage 
analyzing of the type of data received and also the channels used can be 
done. In the orient stage target is in scoping the task and from the 
analyzing perspective focusing on the amount of data in the given time 
frame. The decide phase includes decision points when the team or user 
decides to act based on the information they received. From the analyzing 
point of view this means counting the number of decision points. In the 
act phase observing focuses on the actions based on the previous steps 
and analyzing the time to complete the task (sending information if 
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requested or finishing other type of action).  
Figure 48 is an example of the gathered data from the MNE5 MSA 
experimentation. This Figure presents the amount of information sharing 
of MOCs in two separate events; how much MOCs pushed and pulled 
information and initiated information sharing.  
Figure 48 shows the amount of initiations and number of push and pulls 
from each MOC team. This type of information was crucial when 
searching reasons behind actions. Initiations represent how many times 
the MOC team was initiating an exchange of information. Pull is referred 
to situations when MOC asked for example for more information about 
some particular topic. Push refers to situations when MOC team has sent 
more information to others.  
Reflecting back to the OODA-loop, it is possible to identify aspects 
and meters that measure how capturing and eventually measuring the time 
between the different steps of the OODA-loop can be executed. 
Figure 48: An example of MOCs information sharing amounts in both events 
o Meter 1 Observe (Type of data received)  
o Counting the types of information and the means of receiving 
and sending information.  
o How many times the MOC was unable to receive or react to 
the sent information (what means of communication causes 
delays)? 
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o Meter 2 Orient (Amount of data) 
o Too much data leads to mental overload. 
o Too little data means that the system does not offer adequate 
SA. 
o How many times there were failures (reasons for delays, social 
or organizational)? 
 
o Meter 3 Decide (Number of decision points) 
o How many decision points are found (the number of 
decision points)? 
o Meter 4 Act (Time to act from the first step) 
o Time counted from the sent to the action (information 
about time delay). 
 
With the list of meters and Figure 49 of an example of different 
meters in different stages of the OODA-loop, is presented a way to create 
meters that collect the needed data in certain stages of the OODA-loop in 
order to monitor usability. The QoS parameters are selected by taking all 
phases in the OODA-loop into account. They are not only measures of 
delays, jitter, errors, losses and availability but also contain parameters 
related to understandability. It should be understood that most of the 
variables that were measured in the experimentation were not technical 
performance variables: there is a lot of crucial information that needed to 
be collected in more qualitative ways.  
At a later stage, MoS functions should be created and target values for 
reference connections set. At that later stage ideally only quantitative data 
would be needed, such as the number of messages or response times to a 
message, i.e., only measurable numbers. Before defining the MoS 
functions, in order to fully understand the given task and the result, there 
is a need to look deeper into the process that the user proceeded with. The 
basic meters help to get pieces of the information, but in order to measure 
true performance, the pieces must be put together by using qualitative 
methods.  
Both in the MNE5 MSA and MNE6 MISA-EM experimentations 
quantitative data was interpreted with observations notes, interviews and 
surveys. In design and deployment stages of a new or updated 
information system, the QoS monitoring concept gives the basic 
guidelines where to look for problems, and it provides a framework for 
understanding the complexity of performing different types of tasks with 
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technical systems. The new concept helps evaluators and designers to 
focus on the actual challenges and how to take an advantage of the user 
feedback. Figure 49 explains the points that can be used to capture and 
count when measuring QoS in the act stage. The ideology is that from 
every step of the OODA-loop, can information be gathered for analyzing 
possible challenges reflecting to the act-phase. 
In order to understand why the response took too much time or the 
action was false, there is a need to identify the phases of information 
sharing. Measurement can be taken from the time between different 
actions with time stamps, and deeper analysis can be performed through 
observation and interviews. Data collection can also be arranged during 
run-time by collecting the data for example by online questionnaires that 
the users take part in. In the original QoS monitoring model of Figure 46 
the problems are limited to the act stage only. The new concept extends 
the scope to cover all of the stages. The act stage is simply the final phase 
which uses the results of previous stages, and that amplifies the 
importance of the other steps even more. Table 7 is an example of 
information sharing delays in the experimentation.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 49: An example of different meters in different stages of the OODA-
loop 
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Measuring the time from sending a request to receiving a reply 
naturally does not tell us much about the actual quality of service. It is not 
providing information about the situation where the information exchange 
took place, and how the information was created. By observation it is not 
only possible to capture the log files, but the actual times when the 
operators were able to read the received messages delays. It was 
interesting to discover that reasons for delays could be a technical, 
organizational or social issue. Difficulties with the technology can cause 
distractions and make access to the information more difficult.  
 
Table 7. An example of information sharing delays in the act stage 
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TIME SUBJECT MEDIA                                                                                 WHITE CELL     MOC 1     MOC 2      MOC 3      MOC 4
746 RFI for Vessel X Email PULL
849 FAILED CALL TO NATO for clarification Voice
851 RFI Vessel X Voice
853 RFI Vessel X Voice
853 Vessel X position Voice
856 Asking CATES in WC detention records Email
of Vessel X
904 No information from CATES Email
911 For MOC 4 there is nothing we found on Chat
Vessel X besides the position we given you
915 For MOC 3 TY for looking Chat
919 MOC 4: my information shows two similar ships with Chat
the same IMO number with Vessel X, 
propable name changes Vessel Y, Z
934 Re: RFI for Vessel X Email
940 COI DESIGNATION FOR VESSEL X Email PUSH
949 Action for Vessel X Email PUSH
1021 Re: Action for Vessel X Email
1048 Vessel X information Email
1311 Re: Action for Vessel X Email
On the other hand, the organizational perspective allows to discover 
issues that limited authority caused delays because operators had to wait 
for a response from the higher-level headquarters in order to respond. 
From the social aspect the actors’ own prioritizing also affected the 
response time. If the operators received a lot of information and requests 
at the same time, they prioritized and acted based on their own judgment. 
Figure 50 is an example of the interaction between different actors 
sharing information about one particular subject. From the interaction 
diagram it is possible to see in a certain time frame, what type of 
interaction happened, what kind of tools were used and with whom the 
actual interaction occurred.  
Figure 50: Interaction diagram of information sharing 
To reflect the findings back to the QoS, what actually can be seen as 
factors affecting the collaboration and usage of different tools? Based on 
the case study statistics it is possible to identify situations when it is 
crucial to look at the timeframe and focus on issues concerning QoS and 
usability monitoring. When looking at the OODA-loop and the observe 
stage,  it is possible to see the usage of different resources that can be our 
own technical system, open databases or contacting other MOC teams via 
email, chat or voice. The type of data received at this stage can be 
analyzed and also the channels used. The orient stage includes scoping 
the task, and from the analyzing perspective the focus was on the amount 
of data in the given time frame. The decide phase includes decision points 
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when the team decides to act based on the information they received, and 
from the analyzing point of view this means counting the number of 
decision points. In the final act phase focus in on observing the actions 
based on previous steps and analyzing the time to complete the task 
(sending information if requested or finishing other types of action).  
Based on the data examples from the MNE5 MSA event 3 describe 
the basic principles of four different meter levels corresponding to the 
OODA-loop were explained previously. In the design stage and during 
the deployment of new information systems the importance of usability 
monitoring cannot be highlighted enough. According to the concept by 
using four meters to measure QoS, it is possible to identify usability 
problems and challenges of the new system.  
The actual testing is done in a test environment with a test scenario 
where users are given a couple of tasks. Meters capture the data and 
interactions that occur during the test run. By following the concept and 
adding surveys and interview with observation we get crucial information 
about issues that hinder information sharing. After testing the new 
system, reference values for usability monitoring can be created and 
compared in future usage of the system.  
By combining quantitative and qualitative data it is possible to show 
the influence of delays in information sharing, whether it is caused by the 
technical system or human error or is simply a delay from using a 
formalized report form, divided to social, technical and organizational 
factors. The observe stage is measured by a different type of logs that 
record actions like sending emails, chat logs, and phone records. From 
that data statistical information is gathered about the channels of 
communication and also the amount of shared information. The orient 
stage focuses more on the amount of data and information management; 
i.e., how the user reacts to the received data. A simple technical 
measurement is not covering the entire truth, but we get important 
information with reference cases for example about the amount of data 
that can cause overload and also can capture the number of failures in 
connections. In the decide stage gathering focuses on the number of 
decision points during one task. There is no simple way to do that 
automatically, but by end user questionnaires and observation supported 
by interview it is possible to gather that type of information. In the final 
stage, act, the time to proceed with the task and possible delays can be 
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measured. Most of the meters can be formed quite easily for a run-time 
evaluation and collected for most parts automatically but in order to gain 
the maximum benefit of the method, observation and interviews are 
required. Although the level of significance of observation and interviews 
can be minimized for example by using run-time web-questionnaires in 
order to collect user’s impressions. In the MNE5 MSA and MNE6 MISA-
EM experimentations it was possible to obtain information that showed 
how the tools affected the operators’ decision making and what type of 
process they went through while solving the task at hand. As Walker et al. 
(2009) states, the focus of analysis is in information; how information is 
held, exchanged, represented and transformed by users regardless of the 
existing technological infrastructure and organizational framework. In the 
MNE5 MSA experimentation the quantity of information exchange, 
examples of the actions taken by the MOC teams and interactions 
between them where presented in order to provide a better understanding 
of the situation. This example case study demonstrates that by monitoring 
these types of measurable variables it is possible to measure the level of 
usability and analyze the user’s level of situational awareness with the 
respect to information sharing. Figure 51 represents OODA-loop stages 
and methods that can be used during each step, from counting the number 
of events all the way to making questionnaires. 
As Redmiles (2002) states that development goals generally include 
end user views distributed across many disciplines, yet there has not been 
enough research in order to monitor the usability of a system from the end 
user perspective. Redmiles (2002) ideology of activities in human-
centered software development does not address issues that are central to 
the usability monitoring concept even though he brings up the importance 
of the workplace environment and expands the meaning of end user to a 
much wider area. Cardoso, Sheth & Kochut (2002) presented ideas for 
workflows with QoS (Georgievski & Sharda, 2003a; Georgievski & 
Sharda, 2003b). They focus on business processes and for them QoS 
means analyzing time, cost, reliability, and fidelity metrics. This does not 
cover the ideology of reflecting QoS to users’ views or support for 
example decision making. Georgievski & Sharda (2003) presented a real 
time management of QoS with the three layer QoS model including user 
perspective, application perspective, and transmission perspective. One 
aim was to investigate how the user can interact with the QoS Processing 
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System in real-time. The user element was presented, but not in the same 
context as presented in the Usability Monitoring concept. It is also 
possible to study usability from other point of views, for example from 
the system perspective, and use models like ITIL (Ishibashi, 2007).  
Nevertheless, decision to focus on the human actor, the actual user 
was made, and developed the concept to support the end user by using the 
OODA-loop. End user point of view is crucial, because the actual users 
are the key actors in the organization processing the given information 
with the usable tools. By supporting the end user, support is given to the 
entire organization in achieving its goals. Related studies cover some 
parts of the metrics of QoS and represent many different ways to measure 
usability.  
 
Figure 51: Usability measurement points in the OODA-loop 
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The new created concept is based on the user’s point of view for 
monitoring usability of systems in the operational phase, and, as the case 
study shows, it is useful also on the design and implementation phase of 
new information systems by introducing collected methods following the 
steps of the OODA-loop.  
According to Salmon, Stanton, Walker & Green (2006) existing 
monitoring methods do not address the problem of situational awareness 
(SA) because current SA measurement techniques focus only on 
individual SA and approaches have issues that can detract from obtained 
SA data (Salmon et al., 2006).  As recognized, there are three levels of 
awareness that are situation awareness, team awareness and 
organizational awareness (Carayon, 2006). By focusing to the situation 
awareness also by acknowledging that the level of situation awareness of 
one user affects the team’s awareness and the overall awareness of the 
organization. That is why the focus is on the actual user and ones level of 
SA in order to improve the overall SA of the current ongoing task. 
Information sharing and collaboration has been recognized to be crucial 
elements also in air traffic situation and it has been stated that researchers 
have neglected looking at SA from a team perspective. It is also crucial to 
understand that SA is applicable to dynamic situations with changing 
variables such as in the maritime environment (Langan-Fox, Sankey & 
Canty, 2009). The definition of team dynamics is also a problematic: what 
do the actors know about their own and other actors’ workload and how is 
this supported by technology. The crucial question has been to see and 
understand that team SA needs to be more than collective average of SA 
of the individual actors in the team (Wickens, 2008). This is the reason 
why the focus with the usability monitoring is on the individual actors 
SA, because by monitoring certain steps, it is possible to gather valid 
information from all the actors involved in the specified team. This tool is 
scalable from one individual and ones SA to team SA by taking into 
account each actors SA to build up the entire picture of the situation.  
Usability is an aspect involving human factors and one may ask if the 
proposed model measures usability, or if any fixed set of technical 
parameters can measure usability. This question is irrelevant since the 
proposed model of usability monitoring does not intend to measure 
usability. Usability monitoring is an extension of QoS monitoring. QoS 
monitoring does not measure the QoS level, and does not measure all 
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aspects of QoS, but it takes continuous or periodical measurements of 
certain technical parameters in order to detect indications that the system 
does not offer adequate QoS. If such parameters are well chosen, the 
small set of monitored parameters indicates a large range of underlying 
QoS problems without specifically measuring each of them. Furthermore, 
if the system is well designed it should give good QoS unless there are 
problems, thus the lack of problems can be taken as an indication that the 
system offers good QoS. Similarly, usability monitoring does not measure 
usability but detects by technical measurements signs that the system does 
not operate in the way as it is intended. If the system is originally 
designed to have good usability, usability monitoring measurements 
satisfying target values indicate that usability of the system is as good as 
designed.  
This dissertation presents a usability monitoring tool that suits to 
C4ISR applications for situational awareness. Usability of such an 
application is closely related to the ability to make good decisions. If the 
system is slow, causes mistakes, is prone to errors, or is confusing, it 
cannot be effectively used in decision making. The improvement to the 
QoS monitoring model is the extension of the scope. Usability monitoring 
tackles each stage of the OODA-loop and gives the higher level 
management a tool to see if the OODA-loop slows down. In the MNE5 
MSA and MNE6 MISA-EM experimentations operators needed to 
collaborate in order to complete their tasks. Case studies gave a platform 
to partially evaluate the ideology of the usability monitoring tool. 
Especially, there was an opportunity to select meters for each stage of the 
OODA-loop. In the observe stage the type of channels used and the data  
received are analyzed. From the orient stage the amount of data that 
causes need for information management are identified. In the decide 
stage the information on how many decision points the operator has and 
does one have enough information is analyzed. Finally, in the act stage is 
used to collect information in order to analyze successfulness of the 
operation and how much time it took for the operator to act and finish the 
task.  
Presented case studies, especially MNE5 MSA event 3 gave provided 
plenty of usability information and gave insights on what type of usability 
problems can appear and how they are connected with measurable 
technical usability monitoring parameters. The basic technical level data 
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is collected automatically but much of the descriptive qualitative usability 
data is obtained by questionnaires, observation etc. methods that cannot 
be collected automatically. The usability monitoring tool was mainly 
developed for the design and implementation phase when it is easier with 
a test scenario to analyze the meters and evaluate the system with the 
quantitative and qualitative methods. With the case study, the idea was 
not to continue to definition of target values and reference connections 
because target values need to be set after each test scenarios in different 
environments.  
The usability monitoring is a guideline to proceed with a test during 
the design or implementation phase and collect the data with the given 
methods and set target values after identifying the gaps and solving the 
causes of errors or delays. Focusing on the OODA-loop, and by looking 
at technical measurable parameters gives us a way systematically to 
observe the usability of the used system in order to find gaps that are 
affecting the user’s situational awareness.  
6.5 Implementation of solutions 
This stage is the critical step from conceptual paper to implement the 
concept to actual use. To have witnesses the implementation of some of 
the lessons learned from the experimentations especially from the 
technological solution and procedures has been absolutely rewarding. The 
main focus in this dissertation is in the steps before the implementation 
phase to create the awareness of all the possible elements that need to be 
taken into account before continuing to the implementation stage.  
Reflecting back to the presented case studies, the components of the 
conceptual model have been, at least partially, evaluated and validated 
that they can be implemented into real life applications. Next, the 
possibility to use the conceptual model also outside the maritime context 
will be verified with a health care environment. 
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7 THE USEFULNESS OF THE CONCEPTUAL 
MODEL IN OTHER ENVIRONMENTS – 
Introduction of the framework to the health 
care environment 
While doing the study related to the maritime environment, it was 
interesting to see elements that could be seen also in other environments 
as well. This intriguing observation drove to see whether the created 
conceptual framework could be beneficial in other environments such as 
health care where the situational awareness of the personnel is crucial in 
life saving processes. The preliminary examination of the similarities of 
roles, processes and tools is presented in Table 8. To get the confirmation, 
whether the conceptual framework could support other environments as 
well, health care environment was introduced to validate, whether the 
model could be used also outside the maritime context. 
Table 8. Quick analysis of similarities in different environments 
 
 
In different environments it is crucial to identify different roles, their 
task division, organizational processes that are created to control, and to 
support and organize actions between the actors.  SA and information 
sharing possibilities are given to the individual. It is up to the individual 
Environment Maritime Health care 
Actor Operator Nurse 
Actor Intel Officer Doctor 
Main Process Sea surveillance Patience condition 
surveillance 
Sub-Process Anomaly detection Disease 
analysis/detection, 
laboratory test 
Tool Maritime sea 
surveillance system 
(MEVAT) 
Patient record system 
(PEGASOS/EFFICA) 
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in the end to make the decision, whether to share information or not. 
Information sharing is not an automated result of gaining situational 
awareness. Elements affecting the information sharing, such as devices, 
are supporting the individual or teams in information sharing affect the 
team’s behavior and also contributing to the SA. Tools and processes are 
means to support information sharing. It is up to the individual to use or 
not to use the tools or to share information. It is possible to support the 
actors in realizing the consequences and possibilities of their actions to 
improve the needed level of awareness.  
Figure 52 demonstrates the general dilemma between time and 
gaining the needed level of awareness for better decision making. There 
can be situations, when decisions are made fast with low level of 
awareness that may cause poor judgment and poor decisions. Or 
situations, where the needed information is created in a longer period of 
time, causing the decision to be too late and impacts of not making 
decision in time, more severe. For example, in hospital environment, if 
critical trauma patient is not treated fast, it may lead to the loss of the 
patient, but if the treatment decisions are made in time, but with wrong 
information and poor SA, the end result can be the same.   
Figure 52: The level of awareness versus time 
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In order to fully demonstrate, how the created conceptual model can 
be beneficial in other time critical and emergent cases, a fictive, simple 
scenario will be presented related to hospital trauma center activities. 
Imagine a situation where a truck of highly flammable material has been 
involved in an accident, where the truck is damaged and several casualties 
were caused. Some of the victims are severely burned, other have minor 
physical, visible injuries and some are just outsiders of the scene. If we 
first focus to the accident involving truck accident, it is clear that it 
involves the individuals in the accident scene; truck driver, other car 
victims, emergency call receiver, most likely ambulance personnel, fire 
department personnel, and hospital personnel. All of these actors have 
their own roles in the situation. Some of the roles are defined by the 
agencies and some roles are just taken by the individuals themselves, 
according to their reaction in the crisis situation. 
All of authorities have their own perspective to look at the situation in 
hand, and they all have their own ways of proceeding with the capabilities 
they have for these types of situations. This emphasizes the need for the 
developed conceptual model to support all the possible organizations, that 
are facing these time critical and emergent situation, that require 
collaboration and massive information sharing in order to succeed, 
whether is in saving human lives and diminishing the consequences of 
occurred environmental catastrophe.  
Figure 53 presents the overall conceptual model that is designed to 
support different levels of the organization. Conceptual model supporting 
achieving of SA in the information sharing framework and comparison 
between maritime environment and health care environment are made to 
validate the general purpose and versatile usage of this model: to reveal 
what are the elements that match and how the model could be improved 
to better support other environments as well. Next, the support given by 
the conceptual model to the scenario is explained in more detail.  
Conceptual model provides the overall picture of the elements 
affecting the organization. This general model provides the management 
level overall understanding of the important elements affecting the 
processes of the organization. Individuals inside the organization are 
supported with the PSAS in order to understand all the elements affecting 
the decision making and to understand how own actions affect the entire 
team. Monitoring tools is for the technological development.  
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Figure 53: Tool package of the conceptual model 
When the organization has understood the relevant factors that affect 
the information sharing and it has been supported by proper training with 
the PSAS, monitoring offers possibility to see how the developed 
information systems support the overall information sharing and gaining 
of the relevant situational awareness both from the individual and 
organizational perspective. 
With these tools, it is possible to support organizations also outside 
maritime context to gain adequate level of awareness.  
Reflecting back to the scenario, and the usage of the conceptual model 
to the truck accident, the scenery can be divided to be observed from 
different perspectives, such as organizational, technical and individual 
views. The possible actors were identified earlier, and all the mentioned 
organizations have their own professionals and ways of doing things. The 
important interface is the collaboration with other organizations and 
individuals: The interesting question is how the different working 
procedures and individuals with different tools and ways of thinking, can 
collaborate in a crisis situation. The scenario was created to emphasize the 
challenge of collaboration in situations where there are several actors 
involved and a lot of activities happening: While ambulance drivers take 
patients to the hospital and the trauma center takes care of the incoming 
trauma patients, while police directs traffic in the accident scene, there 
might be a situation, where no one reacts to the fact, that the chemical 
accident may cause a severe catastrophe, if relevant actors would only 
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focus on their priority tasks. For entire situation evaluation, 
communication and information sharing is relevant to support gaining 
needed level of awareness of the situation.   
Figure 54 is from the U.S Department of human health and services 
and it was created to provide guidance for decision maker’s in the event 
radiological terrorist attack in a U.S. city (U.S DHH, 2011, 12). The 
original model focuses on handling the situation of contamination, but it 
also presents same types of needs for situation assessment, prioritizing 
and understanding of capabilities available. In each decision making point 
it is highly important to understand the situation.  
Figure 55 demonstrates a modified process of emergency assessment 
and process of how injuries are categorized in an accident area. 
Emergency assessment can be taken as a good example of the medical 
personnel, doctors etc., who need to determine the level of care needed 
for the emergency patients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54: Victim handling process from the emergency 
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Figure 55: Emergency situation assessment process 
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As an example, this type of processing needed from the medical care 
personnel, and in order for them to succeed in the steps, the medical 
personnel need to have the adequate level of awareness to make right 
decisions on how to proceed. Especially in the situation assessment stages 
from the individual level activity perspective, the PSAS process can be 
used as a tool to process what information is available; how to monitor 
and predict the patient’s condition and to decide the treatment based on 
that information. The PSAS supports also in the selection of the methods 
and taking into account all the relevant participants that may need to be 
informed or who can help in the process. Like in the truck accident scene, 
from the health care perspective, it is vital to know the medical history of 
the patients, allergies to medication, diseases, things that can affect the 
patients’ medical care. But also it is important to realize that by focusing 
on one particular patient, there might be possible challenges in creating 
the needed level of awareness to support higher decision making level in 
understanding the overall picture. This type of information can be seen 
from different perspectives. For example as information resources and 
viewed them from a technological perspective: How this type of 
information can be provided to the medical care team as accurately and as 
timely as possible. On the other hand, it can be viewed from an individual 
perspective: how the medical personnel evaluate the situation and 
patient’s condition according to the medical training and information 
gained from the situation. In this view, the PSAS can be used to assess the 
situation and all the possible influential factors related to the patient’s 
condition. From the organizational view, it can be seen as procedural 
question: how organization can improve the conditions so that the actions 
done in the crisis are supported with the best possible working practices 
and mechanisms available.  
From the organizational level, it is important to understand the 
collaboration demands related to SA. All the individual SA levels have an 
impact to the team SA level, and for example personal history, stress 
tolerance, previous experience and training, all these elements affect the 
team and its way of working. The assessment of the individual 
capabilities can be done previously by the organization according to the 
individual’s strengths and weaknesses. With the support of the conceptual 
model, it is possible to identify all the individual elements in order to 
evaluate, how to support the individuals in their performance in crisis 
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situations. It is vital for all the team members to understand the value of 
their individual contribution to the team SA requirements. These types of 
collaboration scenarios are good ways of looking at possible interfaces 
and better collaboration ways to work. Different individuals in different 
roles in medical care can benefit from the conceptual model in reflecting 
their own behavior and working habits in crisis situations. 
 The conceptual model should be implemented in common routine 
activities, so that it would be more fluent in case of an emergency. The 
check list provides also a good tool for analyzing, whether there are issues 
that need to be looked into in more detail. Scenario based exercises give a 
good ground for each organization to check the individual and also 
organizational level preparedness to react in crisis situations. As 
demonstrated in the scenario, there are several changing variables 
affecting the actor’s behavior, and it is valuable to observe objectively, 
how this type of collaboration is executed. If the individuals face 
problems in information sharing, it is possible to search further and find 
out what are influencing and causing the problem; whether the changes 
can be supported with tool development, or with different types of 
working practices or with more training. 
Figure 56 presents a guideline example of the treatment of trauma 
patient that gives concrete support on how to act related to the source of 
bleeding regarding intervention and further assessment. (For the entire 
guideline, see Rossaint et al. Critical Care 2010, 19.) In the individual 
level, the PSAS can be used to identify the specific decision making steps 
and to support the individuals in the collaboration situation.  
As seen from Figure 56, different occupation, as in health care, have 
specific processes and guidelines. These have been developed and 
standardized for a long period of time, evolving year after year based on 
best practices created, as in this case of bleeding trauma patient treatment. 
The conceptual model is created to support individuals performing these 
occupation specific processes, with a general support that can be 
implemented regardless of the occupation to support the collaboration and 
gaining needed level of awareness for better decision making. The benefit 
of the conceptual model is that it is not context or role depended, it is 
scalable for different roles in different environments. In the truck accident 
scenario the medical care personnel, by following their own processes of 
handling trauma patients, are facing a challenging task.  
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Figure 56: An example of treatment modalities for the bleeding trauma patient  
They need to collaborate with several other authorities and create 
awareness in time-critical situation. With the support of the conceptual 
model, it is possible to support the medical care personnel in the situation 
assessment process, and gaining needed level of awareness to provide the 
best possible medical care for the injured patients. It needs to be also 
noted that that these context depended best practices can have down sides, 
186 
 
since the incidents occur often and options are limited. 
 This may result in usage of learned routines used in new situations, 
where the end result might be different since the situation is different. The 
benefit and addition to already existing practices, whether they are 
maritime or health care related, is that conceptual model is scalable and it 
can be used in all decision making levels with different roles of 
responsibilities as a supporting guidance on gaining the needed awareness 
in particular crisis situations – hopefully giving enough power to question 
the obvious and seeing every situation with fresh eyes.  
One important aspect needed to be highlighted again, when analyzing 
and understanding the practices, is the time criticality, as demonstrated 
earlier in Figure 51. Figure 57 demonstrates different environments and 
incidents, giving general view of the time scale. In the trauma center, 
saving lives can depend on seconds and minutes, while in the maritime 
surveillance the time scale is more related from minutes to hours. When 
dealing with an environment catastrophe, such as a tsunami after action, it 
is an operation that requires days to weeks of time.   
 
Figure 57: Time scale in different environments and incidents 
To validate the differences and similarities between the different 
working environments, the findings were presented to the representative 
of Helsinki University Hospital (HUS) trauma center, medical specialist, 
Dr. Lauri Handolin. As a general difference can be noted, that in the 
health care world the crisis situation cases are limited (disease and trauma 
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patients), but they occur in an intensive phase. In the maritime 
environment the incidents occur with lower intensity, but the cases are 
more unpredictable, compared to the health care. This raises a question of 
what is the influence of practicing certain “normal crisis cases”? Does it 
give the wanted ability to react in actual crisis situations, or does it 
actually hinder the individual’s decision making, by blurring their ability 
to see the incident as unique as it is? Since there is no ultimate answer to 
this, the conceptual model provides its aid, also in this case because of its 
scalability, and not being context depended. These types of questions 
were raised in the expert interview that provided unique opportunity to 
reflect the findings from the maritime case studies to the trauma center 
world.  
Key findings and aspects from this research were sent to Dr. Handolin 
in forehand. Research background and aim of the dissertation were 
explained in the beginning of the interview. The goal was to discover, 
whether traumatology and trauma center activities are faced with same 
type of elements, that need to be taken into account, when trying to 
collaborate in time critical situation, compared to the maritime 
surveillance environment. Dr. Handolin described in the beginning of the 
interview the biggest challenge, non-rational behavior, when processes 
are not followed. This is why the importance of training and preparedness 
is highlighted: It is in everyone’s benefit to know how one acts in time 
critical situations, under pressure. Team leading is challenging and 
important capability is clear communication. SOP reflects the agreed way 
of working and Dr. Handolin explained that there are not so many 
different scenarios; typical injuries are the same, but the difficulty levels 
of different trauma types vary. This concurs with characterization done 
before the interview: Incidents are rare in the maritime environment, but 
the scale of possible scenarios is wide, while in the traumatology, the 
scenarios are much narrower, but the variations in the difficulty levels are 
different (see for example Briere & Scott, 2006).  
One important issue highlighted in the beginning of the interview was 
the abilities of the trauma team. What individuals inside the team are able 
to do? This type of capability evaluation is not used automatically in the 
maritime environment. In traumatology the reason for this type of quality 
and ability check is obvious - if the true abilities are not known, it is a 
potential risk to patient safety. In traumatology routine check lists have 
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been created to make sure all the participants in a team are aware of the 
status of the situation. Trauma center uses ABCDE-working process 
principle that as simplified, directs the treatment from the deadliest part 
first (see for example Oakley et al., 2001). ABCDE principle to critical 
patient treatment means checking first Airway, then Breathing, 
Circulation, Disability (neurological) and Exposure (Carley & Driscoll, 
2001). This type of routine checking is not common in the maritime 
environment. The basic communication testing check-ups were done in 
the beginning of collaboration in case studies, but it was not automated to 
be done continuously during the collaboration session. The work model in 
trauma center seems to be more interactive, where the team leader keeps 
asking of the basic ABCDE-principles in the operation room. This is an 
important aspect: by engaging all the actors focusing on their particular 
tasks at times to focus on the “big picture,” can help the participants in 
being more aware of the entire situation. The check list is justified with 
the control aspect, and forcing to take a look at the broader picture. The 
communication inside the team is face to face, so called focused 
communication, where the team leader asks a specific person by name of 
the patient’s situation. Different levels of team work, important SA-levels 
and decision making points are discovered especially between patient 
transfers. Within these transfers, it is important that the needed SA is 
gained (see for example Flowerdew et al., 2012).  
In traumatology the interaction between teams is crucial; how to gain 
and maintain needed awareness of the patient’s condition, when the 
patient is handed over to different team in the process. If there are not 
standardized way to transmit and forward the information, it is impossible 
to get the needed SA (see for example FitzGerald et al., 2012). This is 
why in the trauma center, the goal has been to train also other relevant 
participants, such as the ambulance staff and emergency medicine units) 
to inform the hospital with a standardized form, and when the patient is 
handed over with a structured report to get the necessary information. In 
the maritime environment information classification related to VOIs and 
COIs are used, while in the medical environment, a MIST model is used, 
where the letters stands for M – Mechanism of injury/illness, I – Injuries 
(sustained or suspected), S – Signs, including observations and 
monitoring, T – Treatment given (see more for example Talbot & 
Bleetman, 2007).  As confirmed by Dr. Handolin and literature (see 
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Bleetman et al., 2012), the needed support for teams are  
 
· briefings and debriefings, 
· checklists, 
· effective question types, 
· assertion techniques 
· closed-loop communication, 
· standardized handover and 
· red flags to indicate loss of situation awareness. 
 
These elements are equally important and valid support in the 
maritime collaboration as well. In fact, based on the interview, the 
impression got stronger, that military functions such as maritime security 
operations and traumatology activities should interact and learn from each 
other’s protocols and processes. Since the environments have similar 
basic structures, and as demonstrated in this dissertation, the individuals 
in their activities, whether they are involved in trauma or maritime 
context, are facing the same type of basic challenges that need to be 
tackled in order to support gaining of situational awareness.  
Dr. Handolin described situations where decision points can be clearly 
identified. Different scenarios can be built of single patient, multi-patient 
and catastrophe situations. Single patient requires the same basic team 
structure with a leading doctor, and situational awareness is critical inside 
the team, when deciding and acting according to the treatment process. 
Multi-patient situation requires several teams parallel. Parallel activities 
require consultation of the order of medical imaging (for example X-ray, 
Computed Tomography (CT), Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)) and 
surgery. Making right decisions require situational awareness of the 
patients’ conditions, resources and capabilities to make operational level 
decisions. Less than 8 patients are prioritized by the responsible doctor by 
requiring situational awareness from the team leaders based on the 
ABCDE-assessment. This type of situation highlights the importance of 
standardized ways presenting crucial information – both orally and in 
writing. In a multi-patient situation, also the communication between 
trauma teams becomes important. In case of a catastrophe situation, a 
readiness leader, triage doctor is assigned to make treatment decisions, 
and to control the resources. This type of activity requires certain type of 
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character and mental pressure is larger in traumatology, especially in 
certain cases, when the patient is for example a child or the patient is 
carrying a disease, possibly dangerous to the medical personnel, causing 
more strict safety protocols. 
When discussing about the possible downsides of training, from Dr. 
Handolin’s perspective, routine activities are more challenging, when 
individuals start skipping procedures and stop objectively evaluating 
possible risks, relying too much on personal experience. This is why 
training in the trauma center is made to break the routines and to support 
reacting in emergent situations. Also, language skills, impact of 
professional slang and usage of abbreviations affect the collaboration, not 
only between different nationalities but also between Finnish 
professionals. This is why it is important to make sure that generally 
accepted formats are used, for example when ordering an ambulance.  
Once interesting point of situational awareness was raised by Dr. 
Handolin explaining, how in time critical situations the decision maker 
needs to ask a specific question or questions. Because of the time limit, 
not everything can be reported, and this is why it is important to be able 
to ask focused questions. This requires certain level of awareness of the 
decision maker to be able to ask specific questions, and it gives huge 
responsibility for the person providing the answers, according to one’s 
own level of awareness. This type of intensive interaction should be 
provided with reliable tools, to get the needed confirmation.  
Inside the team, an active engagement is required in order for the team 
members to have some level of knowledge of the overall situation. For 
this purpose, the team leader uses focused discussion by activating 
different team members with questions related to their situation 
awareness. This type of communication inside Maritime Operation 
Centers (MOCs) should be also considered, so that the leader (Watch 
Captain, officer) can be aware of the level of SA the team members 
possess. If the team leader does not have the overall picture, it is not 
possible to make fact based decisions with pieces of information. The 
decision making gets complicated in multi-layer decision making levels. 
There are situations, when decisions need to be made, even with partial 
information. This requires the ability to change plans, when receiving 
new information supporting decision making. This type of action required 
personal ability to tolerate uncertainty and to be able to follow the 
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process, such as the OODA-loop, to continuously analyze the decisions 
and the consequences of the decisions. In traumatology the psychological 
elements are much stronger than in the maritime surveillance 
environment, since in the medical care the human interaction is closely 
related directly with the patients.  
One example of the critical steps related to decision making, is the 
handover of the patient (see for example Farhan, Brown, 
Woloshynowych, & Vincent, 2012).  If the doctor, receiving the patient, 
and making decisions of the treatment, does not question the previous 
decisions and facts related to patient’s treatment history, it can cause 
mistreatment. This type of handover requires the ability to question the 
received information and to test hypotheses. This same aspect applies also 
in the maritime environment, when reflecting to the case studies, there 
were challenges in objectively handling the received information. 
Filtering and reporting is vital. Every possible information should be 
reported, but in a time critical situation the ability to filter the crucial 
information is important. This arrangement raises the question, who 
should do the filtering, the sender or the receiver of the information, since 
there are individual level differences in information sharing. Some 
individuals prefer giving raw data and some prefer analyzed information.  
Structured formats of information sharing are supporting at least 
partially, and in the trauma center, the focus is on continuously improving 
of working processes according to the analysis of the patient treatment 
results.  This type of open atmosphere and experience changing forum 
should be considered also in the maritime environment.  
When discussing about tools, everything from pen and paper to 
electrical systems are used, depending on the situation.  As a conclusion 
of the expert interview, all the elements found from the maritime 
environment, presented in Figure 38, were also relevant in traumatology 
according to Dr. Handolin. Individual skills (including stress tolerance, 
experience level), language skills as an important aspect of 
communication and effective team work were especially highlighted in 
the interview. Standard Operating Procedures that are the core of 
activities were also emphasized in the interview. In order for the team 
members to perform in the best possible way, the willingness to share 
information was also seen as an important enabler, when the confidence 
and trust among team members are supported by the working 
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environment.  
As reflecting to the interview, when comparing maritime surveillance 
and traumatology, these three main discoveries were made: 
 
1. The same influences of time criticality and emergent situations 
can be identified from both of the environments. There can be 
mild emphasis differences, but both environments have the same 
elements that are affecting gaining of situational awareness and 
decision making, those elements were presented in Figure 38. 
2. Psychological aspects and the importance of individual personal 
abilities, such as stress tolerance and expertise levels, are much 
higher in the health care. The influence and consequences of team 
work is much more sensitive when there is human lives concretely 
in question. This should be understood also in the maritime 
community, that education background and education 
requirements should be considered and individual abilities tested, 
to apply in crisis situation activities. The teams in traumatology 
are more homogeneous, based on the similar training and 
education background, comparing to the maritime surveillance 
environment, were the education background and skill levels can 
vary.  
3. Recognition of critical decision making points. There are several 
levels but there are also similarities in the phases. In traumatology 
there were three different action levels (single patient, multi-
patient and catastrophe) where decision making levels were 
different. There are similarities found to maritime surveillance 
decision making levels, at least the challenges are similar. This 
concurs with the need to support gaining of situational awareness 
and decision making. Even though action levels might have 
differences but as the concept is designed to be scalable, it does 
not have to have exactly similar decision making levels. The most 
relevant questions is, what are the elements affecting those 
decision making stages, as reflecting the overall goal of this 
dissertation. Based on the case studies and discovering elements 
also in the health care environment, there are similar elements that 
needs to be taken into account to support gaining needed level of 
awareness and decision making. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
8.1 Situational awareness concept 
Information sharing in a multinational collaboration, in the maritime 
environment has been an interesting milieu. This has been amazing 
journey, which I will conclude to the situational awareness concept – the 
actual product that I have been building up during these pages. I am 
happy to present the conclusion and the final product of this journey.  
As discovered during this journey, situational awareness is strongly 
task, role and context depended. The added value of SA measurement 
does not come from the standardized level that should be required in 
every circumstances, but the benefit from SA supporting methods and 
tools, is to support the organizations and individuals to succeed in gaining 
the adequate level needed in that particular time and case. It is up to the 
decision makers to determine, what the desired level of awareness is and 
support the organization to reach the goal of supporting it all the way 
from the individual training to implementing the changes also to the 
organizational structures.  
Figure 58 concludes this learning process by introducing the main 
milestones where the most critical changes and/or impacts occurred 
referring to the Rational Design ideology. This journey started in April 
2008, when I was introduced to the MNE 5 MSA community. The focus 
had been technical and after I joined the team with my personal interest to 
focus also to the individual level changes and issues affecting information 
sharing, we were able as the experimentation team to implement also 
qualitative measurements to collect this type of data. One good example 
of my influence was the research tool, STORS that I developed and 
introduced to the experimentation team. The experimentation preparations 
affected this dissertation since I started to visualize what type of research 
would be interesting to conduct.  
From the MNE5 experimentation data I was able to further develop 
the created PSP model and to refine my research questions related to this 
dissertation. With the lessons learned from the MNE5 MSA experience, I 
had the opportunity to bring the knowledge to the MNE6 MISA-EM team 
so that we would not face the same challenges we faced in MNE5 MSA 
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experimentation. Two important aspects are; 1) the importance of 
planning and design documentation, the awareness of the entire team of 
the research goals and what we were trying to achieve together as a team, 
2) defining of a theoretical framework to create a common language and 
understanding of the research area and goal.  
I had the honor of introducing the situational awareness model and 
theoretical framework to the concept developers and experiment planners 
to support the common goal. This presentation also influenced this 
dissertation since my personal interest related to SA aspects also 
increased. Data from the MNE6 MISA-EM experimentation supported in 
continuing development of the PSAS and SA model.  
After refining the model and after categorizing the findings from the 
case studies, I was able to compare the elements to health care world with 
a literature review and also by interviewing Dr. Handolin about the 
trauma world and possible similarities and differences of these different 
time critical environments. I also got the opportunity to participate in 
December 2011 in NATO CD&E course, where I got the inspiration to 
structure all the findings and contributions according to the NATO CD&E 
format, since the structure seemed to support the goal of this dissertation.  
As demonstrated in Figure 58, this learning experience had several 
decision points, where my choices and decisions affected the path that 
lead to this end result. Looking back and asking myself, if I was given the 
opportunity to go back in time and change something, what I would 
change. My honest response is that I would not change a thing, since it 
was a learning experience, where the used methods and theoretical 
understanding increased every step of the way. I am pleased that I was 
able to continue with the MNE-series and to transfer the knowledge I had 
gained, also to MNE7, and hopefully to future experiments as well. What 
I hope that the overall lessons learned about the support of theoretical 
thinking and framework would be standardized and formalized as a 
procedure in the future, so that all the multinational experimentation 
teams would have the benefits enabled by theoretical aspects.  
Moving back to the main contribution, situational awareness concept, 
SA is also time depended and it is important to realize, there are time 
critical situations, demanding fast decisions even though the level of 
awareness may not be the best possible. This is why it is vital to try to 
support individuals working in time critical situations, to gain the best  
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Figure 58: Critical milestones of the entire learning process  
possible end result in the challenging task. How the support can be done, 
is summarized next with the concept description. 
8.2 Analysis of the strategic environment 
Actors in the maritime environment face a lot of challenges that are 
among others the intensity of traffic, weather conditions and geographical 
restrictions. Unlike air traffic, traffic at sea is not controlled in the similar 
way that would allow us to be aware and control all the actors and actions 
related to maritime activities. Different maritime organizations in addition 
to military, such as coast guard, customs and port authorities are trying to 
secure everyone’s safety in this multidimensional maritime environment. 
Surveillance is done in cooperation within national agencies. The need for 
collaboration from our national perspective is indisputable: The sea line is 
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crucial to Finland’s trade; major part of the foreign trade is transported 
via sea. This is why the awareness of the situations is important because 
the maritime environment is so wide and dynamic.  
Operators in the Maritime Operations Centers, (MOCs), are trying to 
gain adequate level of awareness of the activities at the sea in the area of 
their responsibility. Many nations, including Finland, do surveillance 
around their local areas, but cooperation among nations is becoming more 
and more relevant. Common threats, such as security risks like terrorist 
attacks, illegal immigration in addition to drug and human trafficking are 
questions that concern many nations, not to mention the economic 
interests and environmental aspects that are valuable to nations. As a 
result of this, it is a common interest to secure our waters. This task in the 
demanding environment requires new, major investments for the nations 
involved. Collaboration is one of the key elements in achieving the goal 
of tackling the problems caused by the uncontrolled, increased traffic. 
Multinational collaboration is a good way to tackle this challenging task 
with a collective effort. Collaboration in a multinational environment also 
causes other challenges and it is important to overcome them in order to 
succeed in collaboration that requires situational awareness for decision 
making and information sharing. 
8.3 Identifying capability needs 
Based on the strategic environment, it is possible to identify the scope of 
the concept and certain areas that need more studying. Since the 
multinational environment requires collaboration, it is critical to identify 
what is needed in order to support collaboration. It is critically important 
to address the needs from different levels in the respect to organizational, 
technical and social factors that can be broken into capability needs as 
follows: 
· Appropriate structures and processes need to be identified to 
ensure successful information sharing in a multinational 
collaboration. All the possible capabilities to support different 
organizational levels need to be identified and implemented to 
support the attempt to gain adequate level of situational 
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awareness in order to make decisions based on correct 
information.  
· Individuals in teams need to be supported with clear processes 
to support the information sharing. Individual factors need to 
be taken into account since the time critical situations are also 
affect by individual’s abilities to react in emergent situations. 
· Technological capabilities need to be developed to support 
gaining situational awareness in collaboration throughout and 
beyond all the organizational levels. 
8.4 Development of capability requirements 
Since previously identified capability needs were addressed in three 
different levels, next the capability requirements are described: 
Multinational collaboration and information sharing in a complex and 
dynamic maritime environment require individuals with adequate level of 
situational awareness to perform their tasks with certain information 
sharing tools and processes. With the identified capability needs, it is safe 
to proceed forward to developing capability requirements. Figure 59 
demonstrates the capability requirements derived from the identified 
capability needs in the current state. 
8.5 Conducting gap-analysis and fulfillment 
Gap-analysis is an important step to reflect the current situation and found 
challenges. This step allows identifying the main gaps that can be 
assessed and proposed a solution for.  In this part it is possible to reflect 
whether the proposed solution fulfills the gap that has been identified in 
capability needs and formed to a capability requirement. Figure 60 
presents the identified gaps derived from all the three perspectives carried 
out through this dissertation: processes and structures, social aspects and 
technological aspects.  
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Figure 59: Identified capability needs and derived capability requirements 
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Figure 60: Gap-analysis and solution proposal 
8.6 Identifying selected solutions 
The aim of the concept is to take the capability requirements and turn 
them into usable capabilities. The previous chapters were dedicated to 
introduce the development of these capabilities in more detail. 
Three main capabilities were created in this overall process, and 
conceptual model is a combination that tries to take into account the 
individual and organizational level needs in information sharing 
framework when the mission is to gain the adequate level of SA in order 
to perform and make fact based decisions – without forgetting the 
technological aspect of the collaboration. 
 The selected solutions were at least partially experimented in the 
described case studies, or the creation and modification for example of the 
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PSAS process was impacted of the promising experimentation results. It 
was obvious that operators needed a process to follow in order to 
logically proceed with the given tasks. These observation were the main 
inspiration to further develop a model that can be used as an integrated 
part of other process and tool training related to the case studies that 
provided evidence on whether the hypotheses of possible challenges do 
exist and also whether the developed capability requirements truly are 
able to at least some part bridge that gap.  
8.7 Organizational level support: SA model and 
checklist 
Organizational level support is provided with the conceptual model and 
guidelines. The idea of the conceptual model and guidelines is to give an 
overall impression of the state of the organization being monitored with 
this method.   
The model captures the essence of Endsley’s model, and combines all 
the elements and levels together. It is possible to observe the reality from 
the individual’s perspective and understand that individual factors affect 
the individual SA levels. When the individual is a member of a team, 
one’s individual factors become an asset of the team. The individual 
needs to be aware of the team SA requirements and understand the 
devices, mechanisms and processes that are related to the team’s 
activities. With them one can form individual view of the team member 
SA requirements and understand what is needed in order to act and 
perform as a team towards the general goal. This can also be viewed from 
the organizational perspective; how to build up teams that are able to 
fulfill the needed SA requirements as a team with the right rules, roles 
and tools? And eventually, which individuals are most capable to perform 
as member of a team in these build conditions. Of course also from the 
technological aspect it is possible to view, what are the capabilities 
needed to be build up in order for a team to perform efficiently. 
The organizational decision making level is supported with a 
conceptual model that presents all the elements from the individual’s 
perspective that affect the SA and from that also the information sharing 
and performance. Organization is also supported with guidelines and a 
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check list to provide a wide range view from individual factors all the 
way to the technological issues and processes.  
8.8 Individual level support: Process of Situational 
Awareness Support (PSAS) 
PSAS supports the operator continuing one’s thinking process even 
though operator may face a lot of interference and distractions.  This type 
of process is needed since individuals face a lot of challenges in 
information sharing when acting in a multinational cooperation. Even 
basic information sharing within a team can be interfered with too much 
information. With this type of tool the operators are more confident in 
their work and are able to structuralize their actions. By supporting the 
team members with a process like PSAS, teams are supported in taking 
relevant information requirements into account and achieve better team 
SA and SSA, which will decrease the risk of possible errors in 
information sharing and decision making.  
8.9 Technical level support: Usability monitoring  
The technological level is also taken into account, even though it has been 
acknowledged that technology should be seen as an enabler, not always 
the solution. Still technology has become more and more integrated to the 
line of work. The monitoring-tool is developed to get the maximum 
performance of the technological tools that are being used as the 
moderators for information sharing. The monitoring ideology revisits and 
presents elements that can hinder or support information sharing from the 
technological perspective. 
8.10 Eye on the future – the next steps 
This journey with the maritime surveillance community has been very eye 
opening and provided a lot of vital information that enabled the 
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development of the conceptual model and situational awareness concept. 
Both – MNE5 and MNE6 – case studies gave crucial information about 
activities related to collaboration in a maritime environment. The case 
studies were conducted with different study interests, by different 
experimentation teams, different nations participating. By seeing 
similarities in these different case studies, gave me the confidence, that 
following pre-defined data collection and analysis plans, with introduced 
research methods used, I was able to gain reliable data from the case 
studies to work with the framework presented in this dissertation. If there 
were possibility for error/inaccuracy margin related to case study data, it 
has been reduced by comparing the findings to both of the case studies 
quantitative and qualitative data, to make sure that observations and 
findings can be creditably explained and quantitative data correlates with 
qualitative data. Inside each case study, each MOC were separately 
observed and also these findings were discussed and verified in order to 
fully understand the collaboration between teams. Also, to minimize the 
error margin and false interpretations, the trauma center examination adds 
the credibility of the findings, since all the main elements discovered in 
the maritime environment where also identified in the health care 
environment.  
This gave a good and solid foundation for the concept creation, since I 
can be sure that the different case studies and environments have similar 
challenges that need to be tackled, in order to support organizations in 
time critical situations. The findings encouraged to proceed with the 
development of the conceptual model’s versatile usage in different 
environments. This guides to more structured way to support 
multinational collaboration in the maritime environment, and I hope that 
this dissertation inspires authorities from different fields to take benefits 
from the presented concept and to utilize it in different organizations and 
environments.  
Situational awareness is like the building block of information sharing 
in the multinational collaboration environment. By successfully 
identifying possible challenges related to these activities, we are on our 
way of supporting the core of the activities of the organizational structure 
– the individuals.  Next, also a challenging task, providing tools and ways 
to tackle the challenges has been the main objective of this dissertation: 
To provide examples of possible solutions that may improve the level of 
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awareness, and by that also enhance information sharing in collaboration 
from the identified social, technical and organizational perspectives.  
These perspectives guide us to remember always, that simply by 
developing something technical does not automatically mean that it 
supports the actual work done by the individuals. The information sharing 
framework is a combination of all of these elements that together can 
provide a good guideline to follow in the attempt to support multinational 
collaboration.  
Time criticality and unexpected events cause challenges to any type of 
collaboration, whether the collaboration is between national organizations 
or if it involves multinational actors. Since organizations and their ways 
of working towards the same end result vary, the SA concept can be a 
discussion opener for further development of inner preparedness in 
organizations, but also to collaborate and understand other organizations 
restrictions and possibilities for future collaboration. Even though nations 
are putting effort to organize collaboration between authorities, the work 
is not done: Possible challenges and possibilities can be identified within 
the organizational context. This dissertation provides a good starting point 
and possibility for the organizations to implement the proposed solutions 
in their collaboration structures, to support the main goal: improvement of 
the level of situational awareness and as a desirable outcome, also to 
improve the circumstances for better decision making.  
When comparing with the trauma world and thinking of possible 
lessons learned, training is needed in trauma centers to prepare 
individuals to react in emergent situations and to support decision making 
in time critical incidents. This type of training and preparedness should 
also be implemented to other crisis organizations as well, to support all 
the different levels of decision making in understanding all the necessary 
elements that are affecting the performance in crisis situations. When I 
look back at the maritime surveillance community and compare the 
demands and resources, I am able to identify three major concerns that I 
feel are important to highlight as a conclusion of this journey:  
First, MNE series have provided a good platform to do this type of 
preparations, to understand what should be improved and what are the 
possible tools to support that. In the maritime surveillance community, it 
would be beneficial to create similar standards of training and profession 
requirements for the personnel operating in MOCs as in the trauma 
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centers in the health care environment. Especially to deselect persons who 
are not able work under mental pressure in crisis situations. Based on the 
experimentation findings, national sea surveillance should be developed 
more towards collaborative and proactive work. This requires creation of 
standard procedures of the complex activities in crisis situations, training 
and mandate from the higher HQ. Technology surrounding current 
maritime surveillance support widely collaboration in technical level. 
Now it is time to raise operating procedures and organizational culture to 
the same level, in order to further develop the maritime surveillance 
community.  
Worst case scenarios and preparedness require certain mental skills 
that should be tested and trained to support acting in crisis situations. The 
reality of maritime surveillance situation in Finland does not reflect the 
setting created in multinational experimentation where the role and 
appreciation of the surveillance and intelligence needs were raised higher. 
With that said, it requires similar standardizations as in the trauma 
context, where there are high standards and requirements for certain tasks 
and skillsets. The entire definition of roles and task division should be 
reconsidered and this dissertation hopefully supports the discussion and 
gives firm view what the situation is, and where we should set our goals if 
we want to be leaders in crisis prediction and prevention. To avoid the 
threads of complex catastrophes, we need to be prepared to put our effort 
in gaining adequate capabilities for the needed preparedness and 
prevention skills. MNE community and research made related to this 
environment has provided critical information and lessons learned that I 
hope will be used in the future to develop our national defense strategies 
and to enhance our collaboration with our partner organizations and 
nations. Change requires raising the value and importance of the 
surveillance function and creation of standard requirements for personnel 
and their continuous training. 
Second, technology should not be handled and observed as a separate 
from the surrounding context. Crisis management in time critical 
situations require both human and technical capabilities and lessons 
learned from the experimentations provide good insights  to further 
develop the surveillance community – not only from the technological 
perspective – which leads to second important view to take from this 
dissertation: the recognition of technology as a supporting function, 
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not as value per se. Technological capabilities are not directly answers to 
any functional challenges, and this is why the recognition of the problem 
field should be expanded beyond traditional technological aspect. This 
dissertation proves that with technological solutions it is possible to 
support for example multinational collaboration, but it requires 
identifying the boundaries of technology and accepting its limitations and 
restrictions. Technological solutions should answer a particular identified 
gap and to be adapted to the functional environment.  
The created conceptual model reflecting multidisciplinary view is one 
step taken towards supporting organizations in tackling the challenges 
related to time critical situations. This is done by shifting the focus on the 
organizational framework combining all the strategic and functional level 
elements – not only from the technological perspective – but by 
identifying the elements supporting and hindering information sharing 
and gaining needed level of awareness, all the way from the individual 
level to the highest decision making levels. 
Third, there is no such thing as doing research “by the book” or 
“textbook research”. In the beginning of this journey I tried to hold on to 
the basic principles of making science. Before being able to participate in 
the first experimentation, I had to face the fact that things change: 
scenarios were modified at the last minute, experimentation personnel 
changed we were not able to follow exactly the written and agreed plans. 
After recovering from the first shock, I realized that it is okay. Research 
plans and focus are made to support us as researchers getting the needed 
data, and the world we are exploring is not perfect, nor are we, the people, 
tools and ideas of the experimentation team. This is why I feel it is 
important for me to give the readers the retro perspective view of this 
journey and with the process description to demonstrate that if we tolerate 
insecurity and accept the changes in situations, we are able to use science 
and research methods as powerful development tools and to give the 
experimented context the added value that would have not been possible 
without the attempt to use scientific approach in development. I have 
always believed in saying/hypothesis “best science is applied in 
practice” in Finnish “hyvä teoria toimii käytännössä”. With this journey I 
am more than happy to conclude being re-assured that my hypothesis is 
still valid.   
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NASA Task Load Index (TLX) 
 
 
Team: _________________________  Date: __________________________ 
 
Scenario Number:________________           Player team position: ______________ 
 
Directions 
Please complete this quick survey regarding the workload you experienced during the scenario.  
Workload is split up among Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, Performance, 
Effort, and Frustration Level. These six aspects of workload are defined on the sheet. Please note 
that all scales go continuously from Low to High except Performance, which goes from Good to 
Poor. Please place a mark anywhere along the scale.
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APPENDIX B 
1 
 
Analyst Assessment Report Performance Rating Questionnaire (AAR PRQ) 
 
Team: __________________________ Date: ________________ 
 
Scenario Number: _________________   Configuration: _________ 
 
Please rate how well the following statements describe the fused product. 
 
1. The MOC TEAM backs up answers with facts/information. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
2. The MOC TEAM story contains flaws in logic or unsupported recommendations 
(NEGATIVELY WORDED). 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
3. The MOC TEAM considered the complexities and intricate relationships among 
underlying issues or problems. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
4. The MOC TEAM identified the gaps in existing information important for fully 
understanding the issue or problem. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
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5. The MOC TEAM describes how they came to their conclusions. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
6. The MOC TEAM story contains inconsistencies (NEGATIVELY WORDED). 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
7. The MOC TEAM explains the limitations of the available facts and methods of 
collecting information. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
8. The MOC TEAM was able to report the basics of the story: who, what, when, 
where, and how. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
9. The MOC TEAM was able to communicate a logical flow of thoughts and ideas. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
10. The MOC TEAM makes an overall case using the important facts. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
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11. The MOC TEAM clearly identifies the issues. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
12. The MOC TEAM clearly answers the questions. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
13. The MOC TEAM broke down the story into component parts to identify the 
underlying issues. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
14. The MOC TEAM thoroughly answers the questions. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
15. The MOC TEAM answers were both brief and complete. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
16. The dates of the events used in the explanation are relevant for the given 
timeframe. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
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17. The MOC TEAM description of events was organized well; it has a logical flow. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
18. The MOC TEAM description of events is confusing and contains ambiguities 
(NEGATIVELY WORDED). 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
 
19. Please provide an overall rating of the MOC TEAM description of events.  
 
Poor  Weak  Below 
Average 
Above 
average 
 Good  Excellent 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
7 
¨ 
8 
¨ 
9 
¨ 
10 
¨ 
 
20. Rate the quality of the supporting facts.  
 
1 
¨ 
2 
¨ 
3 
¨ 
4 
¨ 
5 
¨ 
6 
¨ 
7 
¨ 
8 
¨ 
9 
¨ 
10 
¨ 
No evidence 
of supporting 
facts 
        Exceeds 
expectations 
 
 
Additional comments about the MOC TEAM:   
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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1 
STORS  
Instructions:  The following is a list of variables that may or may not have 
affected your ability to carry out your duties during the scenario.  In the first 
column to the right, for each variable listed, assign a number from 1 to 5, 
where 1 is a very harmful, 5 is very  helpful and 3 is neutral.  In the second 
column, indicate with a + the top three variables you feel were most helpful 
and indicate with a - the bottom three variables you feel were least helpful.  
1 = Very harmful 
2 = Harmful 
3 = Neither harmful, nor helpful  
4 = Helpful 
5 = Very helpful 
 
VARIABLE  1 to 5 + or - 
rules for information exchange    
team roles/tasks    
access to command structure  N/A N/A 
access to technical system    
chain of command  N/A N/A 
empowerment    
business processes/SOP's   
familiarity with system    
intel    
leadership   
track history    
database access    
chat    
email    
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2 
voice    
anomaly detection    
network performance    
map sharing  N/A N/A 
information from other MOC   
ability of system to filter out noise in data   
interaction with the system    
past operational training    
social interaction with co-workers within MOC    
social interaction with other MOC's    
cultural influences    
flexible database query   
language   
past operational experience    
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INTERVIEW 
 
MOC teams should be able to provide the following specific pieces of 
information related to the scenario model of maritime threat.  This is a 
structured interview and the questions are based on the concept maps 
developed from the Data/Frame theory of Sensemaking. These maps were 
produced during previous experimentation and represent operator mental 
models of maritime threats.  A representative Concept map is on page 2 of 
this Appendix.  Analysts should know and use specific information from the 
scenario to guide questions.  
 
PRIMARY ANCHORS:  
· Ports: previous and future 
· Crew List: too many crew for type of ship, known or suspected ties to 
bad people or organizations, nations typically have, NATO typically does not 
but receives on occasion 
· Vessel Type: limits search and identifies capabilities 
· Flag: identifies motive and opportunity (hostile or uncooperative nation) 
 
ELABORATING CONCEPTS: 
· Detention List: might indicate a vessel more willing to accept risk 
· Vessel Type: additional details 
· Departure from expected path: rendezvous, coastal hugger (avoiding 
interdiction), non-economic behavior, dead in water, collision course 
· Cargo Type: opportunity 
 
MITIGATING EVIDENCE (+/-): 
· Weather: wind direction may increase risk, storm might explain course 
change  
· Intel events: news stories, increased chatter 
· Normative behavior: normal for type of ship (ferry, tug, pilot vessel, 
pleasure craft), not normal for type of ship, port area, etc… 
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INTERVIEW PROCEDURE: 
· Begin with the end: Identify the operators’ understanding of the 
scenario end state.  Identify the earliest known position for each VOI and 
information based on the anchors, concepts, and evidence identified above.  
Maintain a non-sequential interview so that the interviewer is in control of the 
focus.  People naturally want to tell stories and these stories will focus on the 
things that are important to them.  However, what is important for an interview 
and what is important for a person telling a story typically are not the same.  
Story telling can result in loss of focus and should be avoided. 
· Key Events: Identify key events occurring during course of the 
scenario story as operators understand them. 
· Decision Points: Identify the relationship between the key events and 
decisions about the problem solving process and information sharing. How 
does the interpretation of event and VOI information affect decisions about 
inclusion/exclusion of vessels and information haring/collaboration? 
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SITUATION AWARENESS BEHAVIORALLY ANCHORED 
RATING SCALE (SABARS) 
 
 
You, as a data collector, are invited to participate in our survey 
SITUATION AWARENESS BEHAVIORAL ANCHORED RATING SCALE 
(SABARS). It will take approximately 2 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. 
 
The survey responses will be strictly confidential and data from this 
research will be reported only in the aggregate. The information 
will be coded and will remain confidential. If you have questions 
at any time about the survey or the procedures, you may contact 
xx at the EXCON desk or by email at xx@xx. This survey has been 
designed to capture how well the operators exhibited behaviours 
consistent with acquiring, processing and disseminating SA 
information during the experiment. It requires that you rate on a 1-
5 scale (from POOR to EXCELLENT) the concepts that are 
presented to you.  
 
It may be the case that the operator is not expected to show a 
specific behaviour due to his role (e.g. RMP manager). Rank 
POOR, regardless of the operators overall performance. 
(Operators performance is not being evaluated here)This 
questionnaire by itself, does not rate actual SA, rather it looks at 
actions that indicate a greater likelihood of good internal 
representations.  
 
These actions can be an important indicator of SA mental 
processes. The information you provide within this survey can be 
used and shared for analytical purposes within MNE 6 (obj. 4.2) 
and for research purposes at the Operation Research Center of 
the Spanish NAVY. Please start with the survey now by clicking on 
the Continue button below. 
 
 
Select your assigned MOC 
1. MOC 1 
2. MOC 2 
 
What is your role within the MOC of the person you are 
evaluating? (If you are evaluating two, operators, remember to 
take this survey again) 
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1. Watch Captain (WC) 
2. Assistant Watch Captain (AWC) 
3. DataBase Manager (DMAN) 
4. DataOperator (DO) 
5. RMP manager (RMP) 
 
 
 
When are you taking this survey? 
 
 MORNING 
SEGMENT 
AFTERNOON 
SEGMENT 
DAY 1 (20 APR) ? ? 
DAY 2 (21 APR) ? ? 
DAY 3 (22 APR) ? ? 
 
Uses available assest (tools, maps, etc.) to effectivelly assess 
environment 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
 
 
Utilizes standard reporting procedures 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
Raises appropriate levels of alert 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
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Assess information received 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
Gathers follow-up information when needed 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
Monitors MOC communications 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
Solicits information from IA partners 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
 
Solicits information from other MOC members 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
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Communicates key information to MOC Watch Captain 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
6. N/A 
 
Asks for pertinent intelligent information 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
Assesses key findings and unusual events 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
Discerns key information from reports received 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
Uses sources and resources to gather needed information 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
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Overall SA rating according to his knowledge of the situation 
 
1. Poor 
2. Below Average 
3. Average 
4. Good 
5. Excellent 
 
 
Overall performance rating according to his role 
 
6. Poor 
7. Below Average 
8. Average 
9. Good 
10. Excellent 
                                                         
 
 
 
APPENDIX F 
 
1 
 
MOC OPERATORS UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
 
 
1. OBJECTIVE 
 
The objective of the unstructured interview is to capture ideas, 
opinions, subjective SA, people interactions, experience and 
information flow, in order to assess MOC’s performance as a team. 
 
2. PARTICIPANTS 
 
Analyst supervisors of each MOC will interview Watch Captain and 
Assistant Watch Captain at the end of the experiment. 
 
3. INTERVIEW GUIDELINES 
 
Although no specific questionnaire is to be delivered, the following 
questions will help analysts conduct the interview: 
  
 SA processes. Information Flow. 
How was the flow of information within the MOC?  
 
Were there any specific instructions given by the WC and 
AWC to MOC members related to tasks and processes not 
contemplated in the SOPs? 
 
Perceived Situation Awareness 
What was the level of Perception? 
 
What was the level of Comprehension? 
 
What was the level of Projection? 
 
What was the overall level of SA attained? 
 
Brief summary of scenario and vignettes 
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MOC performance 
What is the overall view of the MOC performance? 
 
How can the performance be improved? 
 
What were the major issues that affected the MOC 
performance? 
 
 
LOE design 
Was the scenario realistic? 
 
How feasible is the transition of the concepts to real life? Was 
the experiment too artificial? 
 
 
4. REPORTS 
Analyst supervisors will write a report with the interview results and 
their personal comments on the overall MOC performance. Their 
expertise is key to evaluate the extent to which subjective SA and 
players’ perception match with the simulated scenario; and to 
investigate the reasons behind the taken actions and observed 
behaviors. 
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 SAGAT PROBE QUESTIONS   
NUMBER QUESTION DAY QUERY 
1 Which of these information requirements 
has been published by X? 
1 1 
8 What is the most likely time delay to get 
acknowledge of a message sent to Y? 
1 1 
13 What is the bandwidth of the network 
which gives you access to the internet? 
1 1 
16 Who is the point of contact at Z to ask for 
information? 
1 1 
29 What is the job of your point of contact 
(POC) as the Z representative? 
1 1 
35 How many tracks are transiting 
eastbound in the A? 
1 1 
37 Do I hold any track in the system that 
might be classified as COI or higher? 
Locate on the map 
1 1 
39 What is the flag of B? 1 1 
67 Are there any major Naval Bases in the 
Area? Locate on the map 
1 1 
83 Are the weather conditions for navigation 
worsening? 
1 1 
2 Which of these information requirements has 
been published by Y? 
1 2 
14 Who is the point of contact at X to ask for 
information? 
1 2 
21 Who is the point of contact at Y to whom 
submit you RFI´s? 
1 2 
31 Which of these stakeholders may best support 
your current information requirements? 
1 2 
33 Which of these statements best describe the 
MOC required level of effort? 
1 2 
36 How many tracks are transiting the C? 1 2 
43 Where is AZ heading to? 1 2 
60 How long does a ship take to cross the A from 
D to E at an average speed? 
1 2 
65 According to the information you were able to 
gather, what would you say is the most 
frequent activity on the area? 
1 2 
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41 What is the previous port of call of H 1 4 
70 Are there any marine reserved area? Locate 
on the map 
1 4 
84 Will the weather conditions improve and favor 
navigation in the next 24h? (with some 
probability) 
1 4 
90 Is the local traffic scarce due to current 
weather conditions? 
1 4 
95 Select the available means of communications 
to contact X 
1 4 
101 What is the RFI published by X that needs to be 
addressed the soonest? 
1 4 
111 What is the most likely depth contour 50nm off I 
(eastbound)? 
1 4 
115 Would it be reasonable to assume that a 
trawler is conducting fishing activities 100nm off 
I (eastbound)? 
1 4 
130 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel J 
1 4 
133 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel K 
1 4 
 
26 What is the job of your point of contact (POC) 
in the X? 
1 3 
34 Which one of these is not a priority of the 
operational commander? 
1 3 
40 What is the destination port of F? 1 3 
68 Locate on the map the most important fishing 
areas 
1 3 
69 Are there any navigation exclusion area? 
Locate on the map 
1 3 
74 What is the sea state in A? 1 3 
82 Is the sea state increasing or decreasing? 1 3 
88 Am I suffering, up to certain extent, data 
acquisition problems due to current weather 
conditions? 
1 3 
92 How many navigational warnings have been 
issued for the area in the last 24h? 
1 3 
136 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel G? 
1 3 
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7 What is the most likely time delay to get 
acknowledge of a message sent to X? 
1 5 
38 What is the vessel type of L? 1 5 
61 How long does a ship take to cross the C from 
E to O at an average speed? 
1 5 
71 Are there any naval operation area?  Locate 
on the map 
1 5 
81 Is the wind increasing or decreasing? 1 5 
96 Select the available means of communications 
to contact HHQ 
1 5 
103 What is the RFI published by KK that needs to 
be addressed the soonest? 
1 5 
129 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel M 
1 5 
132 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel N 
1 5 
134 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel P? 
1 5 
 
42 What will be the future position of Q in 24h time 
period? 
1 6 
59 How many ships in C are showing a speed too 
high according to normal standards? 
1 6 
66 Are there any major ship builder ports in the 
area? 
1 6 
72 Are there any firing zones for naval exercises on 
area? Locate on the map 
1 6 
107 What is the westbound traffic density in the A? 1 6 
112 What is the most likely depth contour 100nm off 
I (eastbound)? 
1 6 
121 How many vessel name discrepancies have 
been pointed out by the BRITE Smart agents in 
the area? 
1 6 
125 What is the smart agent’s tolerance with 
regard to wrong-course anomalies detection? 
1 6 
131 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel R 
1 6 
135 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel L? 
1 6 
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179 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel S 1 6 
180 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel T 1 6 
181 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel U 1 6 
182 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel V 1 6 
183 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel W 1 6 
184 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel Å 1 6 
185 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel Ä 1 6 
186 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel AA 1 6 
187 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel BB 1 6 
188 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel FG 1 6 
189 What is the speed of the vessels: S, V, W, Ä, SA CC, DD 
190 What is the destination of T, U? 1 6 
 
3 Which of these information requirements has 
been published by Z? 
2 1 
9 What is the most likely time delay to get 
acknowledge of a message sent to Z? 
2 1 
22 Who is the point of contact at Z to whom 
submit you RFI´s? 
2 1 
23 Who is the point of contact at EE to whom 
submit you RFI´s? 
2 1 
27 What is the job of your point of contact (POC) 
in the EE? 
2 1 
49 What will be the future position of FF in 24h 
time period? 
2 1 
76 Is the current sea state favorable to small craft 
navigation? 
2 1 
114 What is the most likely depth contour 100nm 
off I (northbound)? 
2 1 
137 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel GG 
2 1 
155 How would you classify a contact that shows 
the following anomalies: AIS discrepancy, 
loitering at slow speed? 
2 1 
4 Which of these information requirements has 
been published by EE? 
2 2 
15 Who is the point of contact at Y to ask for 
information? 
2 2 
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48 Where is HH heading to? 2 2 
73 Are there any naval forces operating in the 
area? Locate on the map 
2 2 
79 Is the current wind force favorable to small 
craft navigation? 
2 2 
117 Are there any traffic separation schemes in 
the area? Locate on the map 
2 2 
122 How many X number discrepancies have 
been pointed out by the BRITE Smart agents in 
the area? 
2 2 
126 What is the smart agent’s sensitivity level to 
trigger high-speed-vessel anomalies? 
2 2 
138 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel II 
2 2 
143 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel JJ? 
2 2 
 
17 Who is the point of contact at EE to ask for 
information? 
2 3 
24 Who is the point of contact at Z to whom 
submit you RFI´s? 
2 3 
28 What is the job of your point of contact (POC) as  
the KK representative? 
47 What is the previous port of call of LL? 2 3 
57 How many ships in C are showing a speed too 
slow according to normal standards? 
2 3 
93 How many navigational safety warnings have 
been issued for the area in the last 24h? 
2 3 
116 Would it be reasonable to assume that a 
trawler is conducting fishing activities 50nm off 
I (northbound)? 
2 3 
120 How many smart agents are available in the 
COP compilation tool? 
2 3 
139 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel "MM" 
2 3 
156 How would you classify a contact that shows 
the following anomalies: discrepancy on 
vessel name that changed course without a 
reason? 
2 3 
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32 What is your information requirement that 
needs to be addressed the soonest? 
2 4 
46 What is the destination port of NN? 2 4 
56 How many ships in A are showing a speed too 
slow according to normal standards? 
2 4 
64 Mark on the map the 5 most important choke 
points in the OO. (Sea lines of 
communications) 
2 4 
85 Will the weather conditions improve and favor 
navigation in the next 48h? (with some 
probability) 
2 4 
97 Select the available means of 
communications to contact KK 
2 4 
102 What is the RFI published by HHQ that needs 
to be addressed the soonest? 
2 4 
140 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel PP 
2 4 
157 How would you classify a contact that shows 
the following anomalies: speed too high, not 
following traffic? 
2 4 
166 How many tracks in A are possibly involved in 
illegal traffic? 
2 4 
 
10 What is the most likely time delay to get 
acknowledge of a message sent to HHQ? 
2 5 
45 What is the flag of QQ? 2 5 
62 Which of the following would you choose as 
the average time delay shown by tracks in the 
area? (time passed since that last update) 
2 5 
91 Is the commercial traffic low due to current 
weather conditions? 
2 5 
98 Select the available means of 
communications to contact Z 
2 5 
118 Are there any specific recreational zones in 
the area? Locate on the Map 
2 5 
123 How many AIS discrepancies have been 
pointed out by the BRITE Smart agents in the 
area? 
2 5 
162 How many incidents at sea, regulations 
violations, etc have been reported in the last 
72h? 
2 5 
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164 How many tracks in the C have been 
previously related with suspicious activities? 
2 5 
170 Is there any developing terrorism situation in 
the area that might require intervention of 
naval forces? Locate on the map. 
2 5 
 
44 What type of vessel is RR? 2 6 
63 Rank the following ports in descending order 
of importance (Importance as most frequently 
visited and  tons handled per day) 
2 6 
86 Is there any worth-noting seasonal weather 
effect? 
2 6 
104 What is the RFI published by Z that needs to be 
addressed the soonest? 
2 6 
108 What is the eastbound traffic density in the A? 2 6 
127 What is the smart agent’s sensitivity level to 
trigger low-speed-vessel anomalies? 
2 6 
141 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel SS 
2 6 
142 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel TT 
2 6 
144 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel LL? 
2 6 
173 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel UU 2 6 
191 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel VV 2 6 
192 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel WW 2 6 
193 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel UU 2 6 
194 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel XX 2 6 
195 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel YY 2 6 
196 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel ZZ 2 6 
197 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel AA 2 6 
199 What is the speed of the vessels: ÅÅ, L,  ÄÄ, 
ÖÖ, UU 
2 6 
200 What is the destination of VV, XX, YY, ZZ? 
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11 What is the most likely time delay to get 
acknowledge of a message sent to Z? 
3 1 
18 Who is the point of contact at Z to ask for 
information? 
3 1 
30 What is the job of your point of contact (POC) 
in the NGO? 
3 1 
50 What type of vessel is AAA? 3 1 
77 What is the wind force in A? 3 1 
105 What is the RFI published by NGO that needs 
to be addressed the soonest? 
3 1 
109 What is the north-eastbound traffic density in 
the C? 
3 1 
154 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel BBB? 
3 1 
158 How would you classify a contact that shows 
the following anomalies: Shows no AIS and has 
a history of maritime pollution? 
3 1 
168 How many tracks in C are possibly involved in 
illegal traffic? 
3 1 
174 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel AAA 3 1 
 
 
25 Who is the point of contact at NGO to whom 
submit you RFI´s? 
3 2 
51 What is the flag of CCC? 3 2 
110 What is the south-westbound traffic density in 
the C? 
3 2 
119 What are the most likely type of vessels 
involved in local activities? 
3 2 
145 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel "EVER ELITE"? 
3 2 
146 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel DDD 
3 2 
159 How would you classify a contact that shows 
the following anomalies: has been conducting 
activities on restricted areas? 
3 2 
167 How many tracks in C are possibly conducting 
terrorist or piracy activities? 
3 2 
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172 Is there any illegal-trafficking situation under 
development in the area that might require 
further intervention of local forces? Locate on 
the map. 
3 2 
175 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel EEE 3 2 
 
5 Which of these information requirements has 
been published by Z? 
3 3 
19 Who is the point of contact at NGO to ask for 
information? 
3 3 
52 What is the destination port of FFF? 3 3 
58 How many ships in A are showing a speed too 
high according to normal standards? 
3 3 
89 Am I suffering, up to certain extent, data 
acquisition problems due to seasonal weather 
effect (if there is any)? 
3 3 
94 How many navigational security warnings 
have been issued for the area in the last 24h? 
3 3 
106 What is the RFI published by Y that needs to be 
addressed the soonest? 
3 3 
147 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel "EEE 1" 
3 3 
152 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel GGG? 
3 3 
163 How many tracks in A have been previously 
related with suspicious activities? 
3 3 
    
6 Which of these information requirements has 
been published by NGO? 
3 4 
20 Who is the point of contact at X to whom 
submit you RFI´s? 
3 4 
53 What is the previous port of call of AAA? 3 4 
80 Are there any low pressures crossing the area? 
Locate in the map the center of the 
atmospheric depression 
3 4 
99 Select the available means of 
communications to contact Y 
3 4 
128 What would you say is the smart agent’s false-
rate detection of anomalous behavior? 
3 4 
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148 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel HHH 
3 4 
153 According to the evidence you were able to 
gather what would be a possible future 
classification of vessel III? 
3 4 
160 How would you classify a contact that shows 
the following anomalies: wrong AIS, wrong 
course according to destination and cargo 
inconsistency? 
3 4 
171 Is there any developing environmental-
threatening situation in the area that might 
require further intervention? Locate on the 
map. 
3 4 
 
12 What is the most likely time delay to get 
acknowledge of a message sent to NGO? 
3 5 
54 Where is JJJ heading to? 3 5 
78 What is the wind force in C? 3 5 
87 Is the seasonal weather effect disturbing local 
traffic? 
3 5 
100 Select the available means of 
communications to contact NGO 
3 5 
149 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel KKK 
3 5 
151 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel "LAA" 
3 5 
161 How would you classify a contact that shows 
the following anomalies: high speed and 
changed course without a reason? 
3 5 
165 How many tracks in A are possibly conducting 
terrorist or piracy activities? 
3 5 
169 How many vessels in the area might be a 
potential hazard for the environment? 
3 5 
176 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel JJJ 3 5 
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55 What will be the future position of LLL in 24h 
time period? 
3 6 
75 What is the sea state in C? 3 6 
113 What is the most likely depth contour 50nm off I 
(northbound)? 
3 6 
150 What smart agent triggered the alarm on 
vessel MMM 
3 6 
177 Are there any signs that may indicate some piracy activity 
on the area? Locate on the map. 
178 Is there any terrorism developing situation in the C? 
Locate on the map. 
201 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel NNN 3 6 
202 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel WW 3 6 
203 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel EEE 1 3 6 
204 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel OOO 3 6 
205 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel PPP 3 6 
206 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel AAA 3 6 
207 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel QQQ 3 6 
208 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel RRR 3 6 
209 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel SSS 3 6 
210 Locate on the map if possible, the vessel TTT 3 6 
211 What is the speed of the vessels: EEE 1, PPP, 
RRR?  
3 6 
124 How many wrong-course discrepancies have 
been pointed out by the BRITE Smart agents in 
the area? 
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